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ART. I.—THE PERICOPES; OR, SELECTIONS OF GOSPELS  
AND EPISTLES FOR THE CHURCH YEAR.

BY E. E. HIGBEE, D. D.

NO. V.

IN resuming, at the earnest solicitation of many friends, our remarks upon the Pericopes, we may say that we have seen no reason to change our view as to the principle governing their selection, which is that of the Apostles' Creed. This indeed governed the whole faith-apprehension of the early Church, conditioning the order of the canon of New Testament Scripture and the whole service of the Church.

Our last article closed with the fifteenth Sunday after Trinity, and we now begin with the sixteenth, the selections for which are St. Luke, vii. 11-17, and Ephes. iii. 18-21. Here, both in Gospel and Epistle, the communion of saints in the Lord is viewed as lifted above the whole order of nature, transcending death, and reaching through the whole realm of the spiritual beyond the grave. The family of God is one unbroken family in the Lord, and death hath no power to sunder it. Death breaks up all natural relations. We seem to have no power naturally to pass out of our flesh-immersed vision and

see or understand what is beyond the grave. "Man dieth, and wasteth away; yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he?" (Job xiii. 1-3.) The falling away of the external man seems to be the cessation of all personal life; and all that is left to us, therefore, is to weep and struggle after consolation, burying the dead from our sight, with some faint hope it may be that they are not lost from our gaze forever. Time may blunt the pain, or at least our mourning for the dead itself be hushed to forgetfulness by death. So the widow of Nain wept as her only son was borne upon his bier from the gates of the city. Nothing but the cold corpse seemed left, and that must soon vanish from sight. Life has fled vanquished by an all-conquering king of terrors, and what is left but sorrowing desolation, unsatisfied yearnings, and gloomy resignation to fate.

Christ, in the purpose of whose love to man, life and immortality is brought to light, and in the scope of whose contest with evil, death and hell are conquered—Christ, the source and substance of all life, meets this weeping widow and this gloomy pageantry of death. He is not, however, confined in the bosom of these external things, as though flesh and blood were all of life. Before His glance that spirit-world lies open in which the young man now is—a world in which the power of His Name can be exercised and felt—a world which surrounds each one of us, and is indeed within us, but not seen with the eyes of the external body unless these be opened by the Lord to let the inner spiritual seeing have place therein. To the materialist all this, of course, is but vain imagining. But there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in their philosophy.

Christ compassionately looks upon the weeping mother. He calmly bids her not to weep. He walks up to the bier, and touches it, and, awe-struck, they that bear it stand still. The sad procession is checked in solemn pause, soon to return with joyful triumph within the gates of the city. Christ speaks, not addressing the surrounding crowd nor the corpse. He

sees beyond all this, into a realm which lies behind all this outer covering. He addresses the spirit, still the same young man, although unclothed as to the outer tabernacle of his earthly relations—not an undefined, wandering, unidentified ghost, but the same as before in another more inward state of seeing and hearing. He says, "Young man, I say unto thee, arise." These words, so far as sound, and grammatical sense, are concerned, reached the ears and understanding of the mother and the pall-bearers; but there was a content in them far beyond what carnal ears or understanding could grasp. They bore with them a spirit power and import, recognized at once in the spirit realm, and obeyed. The angels release their charge, and the young man takes possession again of the outer tabernacle, sits up, and begins to speak.

In our earthly life, spirit comes into contact with spirit, but through the medium of the earthy, so much so indeed that many suppose that the all of man is flesh. Thought, for instance, or rather the state of the inward man in thought, communicates itself to the various muscles and organs of the body, and utters itself at last through voice in word, which word in turn is grasped by the sensuous organs of another and translated by an understood correspondence back again to the spiritual base whence it proceeded. We know each other thus, and can come into communion partially at least with psychic realities around us. The communion here, however, is within the natural, and when the outer tabernacle of the flesh is gone, the communion after this order ceases. But in the Lord the fulness of the Godhead dwelleth bodily, and the communion of the saints in Him is after an order quite transcending flesh and blood. His words, it is true, may and do address the carnal ear and logical understanding, yet when translated back again to their divine base by a correspondence grasped only in faith, they open up a fountain of light and life inexhaustible and eternal. His words also reach behind the outer world into the spirit realm. There is no separation here for Him. He is

Himself the full adoration of the two worlds, and His words therefore ever carry this reality along with them. (St. John v. 24-29).

The family is a communion, but reaching no farther than what is involved in the relations of natural generation. So the state, and national life, and humanity itself, as in the sphere of the natural, are but perishing forms of worldly life externally viewed. In such forms they are forever passing away. "Festinat decurrere velox flosculus." The communion of the saints, and this is the theme for meditation in the lesson, is something vastly broader than all this. It holds in one the two worlds, for its very substance is the Lord Jesus Christ, "of whom the *whole family in heaven and earth is named.*" Here death has no divisive power. The outflow of love here has no limiting bounds of this character. Its breadth and length and depth and height transcend all knowledge, sweep immeasurably beyond the external earthly, and hold in one indissoluble family embrace, cherubim and seraphim, archangel and angel, innumerable spirits, and the Church throughout all ages, world without end.

Keeping what we have now said in view, it will not be difficult to see the connection between the lesson of this Sunday and that which follows, the selections for which are St. Luke, xiv. 1-11, and Ephes iv. 1-6.

We have here, brought into view with particular emphasis, what may be called, for want of a better term, *positive* humility, the humility of love, grounding itself not in the negative sense of our own sinful worthlessness, but in the positive sense of the grandeur and glory of our privilege and calling in the Lord, before which we bow in adoring lowliness—a debasement which for the inner man is the very pivot of exaltation.

Humility of this character inheres in that necessary unselfing of self which is essential to any true ethical process in the formation of character. That mind, for example, which does not realize the broad orb of truth, whose rays reach it through

the systems of embodied reason which confront it in the world's historical life, is self-exalted in private judgment, perched proudly on its self-reared tower of ignorance. That mind, however, which recognizes truth as its very substance, and recognizes it as rising up from behind the individual existence, infinitely broader than the narrow processes of its analysis and logic, shining through these with a light of its own, illumining and inspiring—that mind is humble, awe-struck before the illimitable sweep of truth surrounding it. By oracular response Socrates was styled the wise, not so much because of his ignorance, as because he saw more clearly than others the vastness of the realm of possible knowledge that sank below the distant horizon of his far-seeing gaze.

Or again, take any one of the social organisms of our life, the family for instance. The child may be humiliated by an awakened sense of disobedience. He may feel abject in the presence of the necessary restraints imposed upon him, and his whole humility in the case be pivoted on pride. It is quite another thing to have his spirit filled with a reverent sense of the broad meaning and privilege of family life, so that the law commanding honor to Father and Mother seems to be the very echo of his own deepest sense of the relation, the spontaneous utterance of his own unselfish reverence of what is involved in home. This humility elevates, and enfranchises self from bondage.

It is needless, however, to illustrate farther. The communion of saints in the Lord is a sublime and infinite presence of divine love, before which the human spirit must bow in lowliest reverence. The vocation here is heavenly, looking toward that ineffable mystery of marriage between bride and Bridegroom to which we are called. A sense of all this must condition our whole activity and thought, filling us with lowliness and meekness, destroying the very roots of selfishness in will and understanding. All localizations of a mystery of this character, as though our comprehension thereof could be a fixed boundary

for it, will show itself in the end a self-exaltation which must meet with debasement. We may speak of the *Roman Catholic* Church, the *Greek* Church, the *Episcopal* Church, and of this communion and of that communion, some upper rooms and lower rooms of the marriage palace-hall; but the eye of the spirit must gaze with adoring humility upon that communion which holds heaven and earth in its embrace, which out-measures all empirical determinations—"one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all, and in you all." We are here at once in the bosom of a new creation, and confronted with the powers of the world to come.

Enough has been written to suggest the significance of the selections for this Sunday, and to show that Gospel and Epistle are bound together by one purpose. We turn to the next Sunday, the eighteenth after Trinity, the selections for which (St. Matt. xxii. 34-46, and 1 Cor. i. 4-9), require a more detailed examination, as marking a transition or epoch of progress in the cycle of the church year.

The lessons now are reaching rapidly forward to the close of the church year. The presence of Christ in the Spirit unfolding through the Church its wondrous, divine energies, purifying the heart, enlightening the mind, cleansing the whole spirit, gathering into one unbroken family, one mystical body of love and life and light celestial, the otherwise fragmentary existence of our humanity, invading the kingdom of darkness, arousing its hostility, and unmasking thereby and challenging to conflict the whole vast antagonism of the world—the presence of Christ in the Spirit, accomplishing all this, is soon to be viewed as opening up a mystery still more grand, which the lessons now begin to intimate as rising into the horizon of faith, viz., a higher and last form of the presence of Christ, a presence still more substantial and real, when He shall come to be glorified in His saints, and to be admired in all them that believe in that day. Towards this the whole movement of divine revelation

directs itself, and towards this also the whole inward disciplinary activity of grace looks, that God's children may be made meet for the inheritance of the saints in light. Already, as anticipating such issue, the exhortations in the Epistles, which are also exemplified in various ways by the Gospel selections, look more directly forward to that most solemn and searching of all with which the year closes, which in the Gospel is, "watch therefore, for ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of man cometh," and in the Epistle, "be diligent that ye may be found in him in peace without spot and blameless."

It were strange indeed, if the post-trinity Sundays, which have to do with the progress of the divine life of grace among men, should not bring into view the fellowship of the Church militant with the Church intermediate and triumphant. In fact, the Church militant involves in itself already the powers of the world to come. How then could the lessons be regarded as exhibiting the covenant of Grace in the full compass of its reality without considering its glorious element of promise so significantly brought into view by St. Paul in those words of precious significance, "When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory." It is not enough that the sense of our vocation as a present reality, with its precious array of sacramental powers, should stimulate us to walk with vigor in the way of life, abounding in love and meekness and forbearance and long-suffering, and in all the graces of the Spirit. There must be added to this the enlivening *hope of our calling*, the end or consummation towards which it looks, the unveiled inner revelation of the Lord as He is (1 Cor. xiii. 12), so that now we may wait in confirmed expectancy, and be blameless at that day.

It is quite plain that in the Epistle for this Sunday, we have the vocation or high calling of God, found directly in thought to its consummation at what is called the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Examine it for a moment and mark how the grace of God, given by Christ, enriching in all utterance and

knowledge, and full, so that there is coming behind in no gift, is directly pointed forward, giving to the spirit a waiting attitude for the Lord's coming, and making it possible that the saints be blameless in that day. Just as the spreading leaves and growing branches and ascending stem of the plant are made to look out towards the coming glory of blossom and fruit, waiting in their very activity for that without which they are themselves incomplete;—so the whole Christian life, the whole Church militant looks forward, according to the Epistle, waiting in the midst of its diversity of activities for that blossoming glory, the marriage of the bride and Bridegroom, as that higher mystery of revelation without which its whole process must be incomplete and vain.

This Epistle is also in most beautiful accord with the two preceding, summing up what has gone before, and pointing it all forward to what soon must confront the meditation of the Church in the close of its great year cycle of lessons.

It is not out of place here, at the risk of some repetition, to refer a moment to the general scope and connection of the three lessons now mentioned. In the first, the communion of saints is made to transcend the whole order of nature, involving powers over which death hath no sway, binding together in one the whole family in heaven and on earth, prophetic thus of the hallowed truth, not yet clearly articulated in the lessons, but soon to confront us in its fulness, the truth that His voice who bade the widowed mother weep not, and stopped the bier, and challenged the spirit of the young man, and stirred the very abode of death into obedience, shall call out from the world's seeming ruin, a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. The sense of this fellowship, thus embracing two worlds in that which, in the midst of tribulation bowed the knees of St. Paul, and drew from his yearning heart the prayer that all might come to know the breadth and length and depth and height of such love transcending all knowledge. In the next lesson, mark again, how reaching out into a Sabbath of re-

demptive glory, in which all the helpless palsy of this life shall be healed, and reaching out to a wedding feast, the marriage supper of the Lamb, where those now humbled shall be forever exalted, the same sense of that into which we are called brings out the beseeching exhortation that all walk worthy of such high vocation, humbled before its infinite reach of glory into lowliness and meekness and long-suffering. And now in the Epistle for this Sunday it is the same sense of given grace in Christ, reaching out into a confirmation so comprehensive that those who are called may be blameless in the day of the Lord, which awakens the Apostle's thanksgiving and makes it unceasing. "I thank God always on your behalf, that ye come behind in no gift, waiting for the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."

The theme is not what is termed the second Advent itself. Rather there is now to be a transition, in which through the mystery of forgiveness of sin and the resurrection, that Advent is to come directly before us; and now, the communion of saints, the fellowship of Christ into which we are called, is to be viewed as carrying in itself the warrant that we shall reach out to such consummation, and involves the powers also, in the presence and activity of which alone, we can be prepared for it. We are now, by the design of the lesson, to bring into the earnest study of our meditation the truth, that a glorious promise underlies the whole movement of our walk in the Spirit, which our faith must steadily grasp, and in the apprehension of which, the mystery of Christ must show itself in its greater fulness of revelation and redemptive grace.

Let us now, under the guidance of this preface, endeavor to unfold the solemn and pertinent warning designedly couched in the Gospel selection, as connected with the Epistle and the present position in the cycle of the Church year.

The Old Testament, as we have had occasion to say, was primarily a covenant of *promise* and not of *law*. The *promise* held out before the Jew in mystery, foreshadowed by historical

events, and by types and ceremonies, and by direct prophecy the positive element upon which his faith was to repose. No doubt the spiritual sense of the law included the same mystery. The whole covenant indeed looked toward one who in Himself should become the source and substance of that revelation and redemption which the promise declared was to come. The Word indeed, not yet come in the flesh, was the inward soul and principle of the whole Old Testament economy.

Now should the Jew, resting only in the representative external, fail to have his eyes opened to perceive this mystery of promise, and to rely upon it alone in the obedience of faith—should he fail to apprehend its spiritual content as opening the way through darkness to its fulness of revelation, and failing to apprehend not be prepared for such fulfillment—of course then, losing the positive element of the covenant in the interest of its representative clothing only, its whole force would be vitiated, and to him thus conditioned, its whole measure of preparatory grace would be of no effect. When the promise underlying the law and the types, should meet its responsive fulfillment in the Lord, the Jew, having lost the preparatory discipline, or rather having perverted it by a false reliance upon its merely external and representative side, could be in no condition to appreciate or receive the mystery of the Word made flesh and dwelling with Him. Therefore when met by the startling question which unmasked all this perversion, “what think ye of Christ,” irrespective of your quibblings about the letter of the law, no answer could be given. The spirit was shut against the mystery, and the poor literal Pharisee stood dumb before the Lord.

But again; the mystery of the Old Testament promise inclosed within type, ceremony, prophecy and law, not being steadily held before his faith, not unreservedly submitted to as that alone which unveiling itself, should bring the fulness of redemption and reconciliation, the Jew must fail also in rightly apprehending the spiritual content of the law, and the relation

of Christ, the promised seed, to it. The law in its literal sense came to be made the base of the covenant itself, and obedience to it in such form was made the necessary condition of redemption. Outwardly God came in the law was the thought, and His coming in the promise is to be subordinate thereto, and must be measured by the statute, and not by its own fulness of life. Immersed in the mere police element of the law, the casuistic pharisaic spirit could devise no surer way, in its own estimation, to prove the claims of Jesus entirely void, than by placing the law in its literal sense and application over and above Him, and test Him throughout by its special precepts. Hence their tempting questions, and their quibbling tricks. Instead of endeavoring to grasp the true mystery of the promise, and seeking in the bosom of its illumination, to discern the Christ, and allowing the susceptibilities of their spirits—susceptibilities God-ward, cultured and strengthened by the old economy—instead of allowing these susceptibilities to reach out, and joyfully welcome and receive the Deliverer as He came to His own, and in the flesh healed the sick and raised the dead before their very eyes—instead of all this, they sought to turn the whole glorious reality into the appearance of a neglect, or wilful disobedience of a divine precept. Instead of pondering upon the miracle wrought, to catch if possible the hidden orb of glory in the person beaming forth therein, they shut their eyes to all this, and, with a soul hardened and a spirit dead in the letter, they made the cavilling remarks, He healeth on the Sabbath and maketh Himself greater than Moses and the Law. Just because they neglected, the positive element of their covenant; just because they looked upon everything, both promise and law, from the external representative side only, and failed to repose their faith upon the included mystery and to draw therefrom, as a fountain opening up in the house of David, supplies of strength, of nurturing and disciplining and confirming energies, by means of which they might await the coming seed, and welcome His day, as did the aged Simeon with his soul-sat-

isfied *nunc dimittis*; just because of this, they were speechless when answered from the stand-point of the law rightly grasped, as well as when asked from the stand-point of faith. The literal unspiritual Pharisee, in the Gospel for the day, when confronted with the Saviour's questioning answer, which comprehended the real content of law and type, and when confronted too with His person, as son of David and David's Lord, the very fulness of that covenant love, the very presence of its long-veiled glory now unveiled, the very Jehovah of the Old Testament in flesh—the poor Pharisee is dumb—has no gift of grace—is enriched with no utterance or knowledge, blameful not blameless—wrapped up in weakening prejudices, and quibbling literality—unconfirmed unto the end and not waiting for the coming of the Messias in the awakened susceptibilities of his spirit, or in the cleansed intuitions of his mind.

There is a solemn warning in all this most pertinent to the general theme of the lesson. We see here a sad counterpart, in this state of the old-covenant Jew, of that which awakens the thanks of the Apostle in behalf of those who in the New Testament dispensation are waiting for the coming of the Lord, and who are enriched in all utterance and knowledge; and it is well that we ask ourselves whether we have not before us some merely phenomenal outward flesh coming of the Lord, some pageantry of externalizing pomp, in place of the mystery of seeing Him as He is, not with carnal eyes, but with the opened eyes of the inner man. "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." But we must turn to the lesson of the next Sunday (St. Matt. ix. 1-8, and Eph. iv. 17-32), where the very process by which old things are to pass away and all things are to become new, is brought before our view.

One can easily see that, in the second part of our Creed, which, from the Church and communion of saints, moves onward to the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting, there is and indeed must be the intermediate link of the forgiveness of sin. Without this, the resurrection can have for us

no inward reality. Through sin, the law of death reigns over our whole being, and of course unless this reign is broken in upon, so that sin may be eliminated in all its physical and spiritual forms, there can be no possibility of a glorified spiritual existence—no becoming meet for an inheritance of the saints in light.

Now in the lessons assigned by the Church as covering this second part of the Creed, we have not reached that which takes up the resurrection of the body. This is not presented to us in full definiteness as a theme of thought and comfort until the third Sunday before Advent, as can be easily seen by a moment's reference. There the Epistle at once enters upon it as related to the whole family of God, those asleep and those alive, and the collect pours forth the longing prayer, fresh with the breath of love, "that numbered with Thy saints in glory everlasting, we may share hereafter their joyful triumph in the resurrection of the last day."

Before this, especially in the collects, because the yearning emotions of prayer outspeed in anticipation the slower analysis of thought, the resurrection is shadowed forth and felt as an element of hope; but it does not in reality form a theme of meditation in the assigned lessons of the Church. The lesson on the miracle of raising to life the son of the widow of Nain is not an exception as we have seen. Not yet then we repeat have we been called upon to study the communion of saints in the mystery of the resurrection. We must first study it in the antecedent mystery of forgiveness, as flowing from the Lord among men, and forgiveness as reigning in the family of God, extending from one member to another, developing thus subjectively over against the bitterness and wrath and anger and clamor and evil-speaking of mere worldliness, the kindness, tender-heartedness, and forgiving spirit of those who are members one of another in the Lord. This we have in this Sunday's lesson, in beautiful connection with the two preceding lessons; and this theme now enters into all the lessons up to

that of the resurrection, at times covertly and then again in most sharp articulation.

In this Sunday's pericopes we have at once a peculiar and beautiful correlation of parts between Gospel and Epistle, through which *designedly* (who can doubt it?) the whole conception of forgiveness is developed. The Gospel opens with a touching scene of brotherly kindness and tender-heartedness, in immediate connection with the sad ravages of sin. A band of sympathizing disciples of Christ, bear a poor sinful palsied stricken man into the presence of Christ, manifesting both their sympathy with distress and their faith in Christ. Jesus, touched by this exhibition of love and faith, feels Himself challenged to manifest a still deeper sympathy and love, reaching quite beyond the physical into the profound and dark background of guilt in the spirit. He turns to the palsied sinner, regarding him also as one of the family, saying, "*Son, be of good cheer. Thy sins be forgiven thee.*" How could the communion of saints in the sphere of forgiveness be more profoundly or touchingly exhibited. Christ is the source of it, the very fountain whose freshness and purity carry themselves into the whole stream which flows therefrom. All this moreover is now heightened by the dark contrast of the evil, harsh, flesh-confined false piety of the murmuring scribes. They are only able to glory in the letter of the law which condemns, and cannot appreciate the grace which forgives. They can coldly grant that Jehovah in Heaven has power to forgive sins, but cannot acknowledge that such power has come to earth in the incarnate Christ. They cannot see the Divine in the human, and the words, "*thy sins be forgiven thee*" are but blasphemous imposture. The multitude, overwhelmed by the outer miracle, are constrained to recognize in the words spoken a kindred, though deeper power, and they glorify God, who hath given such power unto men. The Scribes, in a sort of mock piety, would reverse the whole order of grace, making what is remitted in heaven (some far removed theater of divine activity),

remit ted then, if at all, on earth, while the whole mystery which confronted them was this, that what is remitted on earth is remitted in heaven, because there is no room for looking beyond the Lord to some other invisibly-acting God. He is Himself the power and heaven by and in which all forgiveness is possible. They would change the whole glorious parable of Jacob's ladder, and have the angels descend and then ascend, when the real mystery is that the heavens are in Him opened, and angels are ascending and descending on the Son of Man. He is the focal center, the radiating orb of all angelic ministrations. They would still cling to the old in the very presence of the new, and not see that love is before and within the law, and that grace is now among men to remove the terrors of condemnation.

Now in the Epistle, the same profound contrast is again before us in its fundamental character, in the *method* by which the old man and the new are contrasted. The contrast itself of the old and the new is not here the emphatic thought. The Church selected the Epistle not for that purpose, for already in the Epistle for the sixth Sunday after Trinity that was placed before us as a special theme. The emphasis rests upon the communion of saints, and with special reference to just that element of forgiveness to which we have already referred. A moment's examination will show this. The exhortation thus commences, "Wherefore putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbor; *for we are members one of another.*" In the original, the meaning seems to be this, now having put off falsehood (which is here viewed as the very essence of sin in selfishness, the element of the old), realize the communion of one another in truth into which ye have entered, the one body of Christ. So again, anger is to be without resentment; its sinful element must be gone, because ye are a new brotherhood in Christ. So, again, the prohibition of stealing is at once linked with labor to gain something with which to help the needy. Again, communication with one another is to be for

mutual edification; and now in grand summary carrying the whole thought to its proper completion, all the work of the old, bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamor, and evil-speaking, the very characteristics of the Scribes in the Gospel, is to give place to mutual kindness, tender-heartedness, and brotherly forgiveness, the characteristics of the band of disciples bearing their palsied brother, and this, because God hath forgiven you, not for Christ's sake, as in the translation, but *in Christ, εν Χριστῷ*, that is, God in Christ reconciling the world. There could not well be a more simple and beautiful unfolding of forgiveness than in this two-fold exhibition of Gospel and Epistle. Such, we repeat, is evidently the lesson assigned us for meditation for this Sunday; and the Collect, as we have already remarked, breathing the emotions of the soul, hurries beyond either thought or will, as John did outrun Peter, and looking towards the heavens where alone the new overwhelms the old in glory, prays that there we may have our conversation, a theme which is assigned for special thought not until the twenty-third Sunday, but which here naturally links itself to the lesson of the day, just as the confirmation and progress of salvation reaches out to the full vanishing of the old, and the continual emergence and effulgence of the new.

## COMMENT.

The Scribes were willing at once to acknowledge that God forgives sin. This was especially a divine prerogative, belonging to a divine sphere, far removed from the earthly, and not to be accomplished by a spoken word alone. The Divine in the human in such form of fulness as here challenged them they either could not or would not grasp. Christ then works the miracle of physical healing, a sort of fact word for their eyes, that they may know that the *Son of man* hath power *on earth* to forgive sins. There is here plainly an emphasis against the false view which led the Scribes to murmur of blasphemy. The presence of the Lord is the presence of a power

to forgive sins. The power of His word not only reaches out to a full healing of bodily corruption, giving a resurrection from the helpless palsy of the grave, but before this and in order to this, it reaches the deep inward consciousness of alienation from God, removing the palsying guilt of conscience and planting heaven in the soul. How inadequate would be all release from the pains and disorganizations of the physical, if the restless deeps of the spirit could hear no quieting voice, saying, peace, be still? To break the fetters of corrupting flesh, and leave the spirit shackled, would be no entrance into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Guilt must be removed. The soul must have its inner marriage feast, its sabbatic rest from struggle, its resurgent victory and triumph before it can bear the image of the heavenly; and the palsied man, forgiven in the depths of his spirit, and then healed, stands as a fact symbol, a sublime parable, of the whole process of forgiving love.

The forgiveness of sin, as essential to the process through which our moral being is perfected, grounds itself ever in the fellowship of love and truth in the Lord. Sin is not simply the absence of the good—a mere negation in this form, as though the will could be indifferently active. It is a moral perversion in which the autonomy of our moral being is asserted in such form as to repel the Divine. The carnal mind is at enmity with God. The enmity here is not the separation of God from us, but our continual separation from Him. God is love, not enmity; and forgiveness of sin, to be real as touching our moral being, must rest upon the mystery of a new creation in grace, in the presence and power of which, the intelligence and will may be unselfed and find the true and the good, divinely derived, becoming their very substance, which is, in other words, an abiding in Christ. There are two sides here of the same process, the unselfing, which is repentance and submission; and regeneration, a process completed when the new life fully overwhelms the old and reaches a sabbatic rest where the struggling week days are ended.

We say nothing here of the outlying world of spiritual evil which enters the will and intelligence in their perversion, and nothing of the necessary combat with all this in the process to which we have referred. This belongs to the Epistle for the twenty-first Sunday, where with remarkable sublimity this whole theme is unfolded, and which will have to engage our attention, before the mystery of forgiveness of sin, as wrought out in the bosom of our moral being, can be adequately apprehended.

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ART. II.—MARTENSEN ON CATHOLICISM AND  
PROTESTANTISM.

BY REV. PROF. NATHAN C. SCHAEFFER.

“KATHOLICISMUS und PROTESTANTISMUS, ein evangelisches Zeugniss von Dr. Theol. H. Martensen,” is the name of a pamphlet which appeared last year in both the Danish and German languages. It is written from the stand-point of a Bishop—the office which the author at present holds in Seeland, and differs therefore very widely in style and method from his work on Dogmatics. The latter is a book rich in thought, concise in style, and very suggestive. It is a book such as a German Prof. would prepare for his students and his professional brethren. The pamphlet before us, on the other hand, is intended for the reading public generally. The author calls it a Gelegenheits schrift, because it grew out of the struggles occasioned by the decrees of the Vatican council, and is intended to bear witness to the truth of the gospel, over against the errors of Romanism, as these have come to light in our day. The first 106 pages accordingly discuss the defects of the Romish system; the next fifty bring out the reasons why we should stick to the principles of Luther and the Reformation.

tion ; and the last 25 take up the modern efforts to remodel the Reformation. Under this last caption the name of NEVIN is mentioned among others.

The author starts out by drawing a distinction between Sicherheit and Gewissheit. He does this in a concrete way. If we inquire into the history of those, who in this century have gone over to Romanism, we find that in so far as they were actuated by religious motives, it was a felt need of authority which led them to take this step. They were either in quest of an infallible authority in matters of Faith and Doctrine,—an authority from which they might obtain a reliable answer to the question : What is truth ? or else they were anxiously looking about for some authority, which might furnish them a certainty of the forgiveness of their sins. If, on the other hand, we examine the conversions from Romanism to the Protestant Church, we find the motive to have been a conviction, that in the Catholic Church there reigns an authority at variance with the gospel, an authority whose teachings and precepts cannot stand before the bar of an enlightened conscience. In both cases therefore the conversion turns on a question of authority, more especially on the relation, which faith and the life of faith sustain to authority. The Romanist maintains that in matters of faith he possesses absolute Sicherheit ; the Protestant asserts and emphasizes the fact, that this Sicherheit must also carry along with it Glaubensgewissheit, that is, in the first place, a personal conviction and certainty, that the Christianity which we profess has neither been fabricated nor adulterated by man, but is in harmony and living connection with original Christianity, and in the second place, that this Christianity is the truth unto salvation, or in other words, saving truth for us and for all who believe. The words Sicherheit and Gewissheit are very often used interchangeably, as if they meant one and the same thing ; but a very important shade of difference thus becomes visible, when we apply them to the inner spiritual life of man. Sicherheit denotes the state

in which we are free from risk and danger, and points to something objective, to an external authority, to guarantees and assurances, which remove every scruple and every doubt. Gewissheit, on the contrary, is that state in which all doubt is precluded or overcome by the thing being at hand in me in a living way, a state therefore in which there is an immediate relation between my personal consciousness and the objective truth. If any one says to me, I assure you that the thing is so and so, it behooves me to accept the thing said upon the authority and credibility of him who says it. But there are cases—especially when any one gives me assurances in reference to the supernatural,—in which I cannot rest satisfied with mere assurances, but must demand the possibility of convincing myself by personal inquiry and personal experience. Catholicism lays stress mainly upon the attribute of Sicherheit in faith, a word pointing to that peculiar relation of authority to the life of faith, which the Romish system emphasizes above everything else, whereas Protestantism, however much it may feel the need of an attitude of certainty towards the objective, will always lay more stress upon Gewissheit, upon that state of personal freedom in the life of faith in which the soul joins itself to the divine authority of the gospel in such a way as to stand related to this gospel, not as if it were something external and foreign, but as being the saving, emancipating truth itself.

Having drawn this distinction, the author passes on to what he calls Papistische Sicherheit, reserving the topic Evangelische Gewissheit for the second great division of his work. The train of thought by which the Romanist reaches his peculiar tenets in regard to papal Sicherheit, is the following:

If God has given to man a revelation unto salvation, He must at the same time have established the means by which this end can be attained. If Christ designed to bring to man saving truth, He must have willed the church by which this truth is to be preserved and communicated to successive generations. The church must have its organs, viz: Bishops. The Apostles were the first bishops. By means of ordination they made their

authority over to their successors. Apostolic authority is therefore at all times present in the church; hence the church can at any time speak and act in the name of Christ, and is throughout all history to be regarded as the infallible organ of His Holy Spirit. This prerogative cannot be predicated of any and every bishop in his single limited capacity; it belongs to the whole body when assembled in an Ecumenical Council. But this council itself must have an *Einheitspunkt*, a head, viz.: the Pope, who by the Council of 1870 was declared infallible in matters of faith and morals. It is impossible, says the papist, to conceive of greater certitude than is furnished by this economy. The pope is the Vicar of Christ. In the name of Christ he figures as the executor of his threefold office. The prophetic office is involved in his infallibility in matters of doctrine. He exercises the priestly office in that he dispenses or withdraws all the grace, blessings and powers of redemption. He is likewise bearer of the kingly office, although by reason of the dangerousness of our times he only exercises its functions at present within certain limits.

The value of the Sicherheit furnished by the Pope, depends upon its discernibility by each and every man. Just here there is a glaring weakness in the system. The learned are by no means agreed as to when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra* and when he does not. (If I am not mistaken, at least a dozen theories have been advanced.) There have been times when two or three rivals claimed the pontifical throne, each one anathematizing the others. How shall we ascertain who is infallible authority at such times? Again it has happened in the history of the church, that the Pope enjoined silence upon the contending parties, without settling the question between them. Where is the boasted Sicherheit under such circumstances?

In the second place, the dogma of infallibility can not stand at the bar of either Scripture or history. The passages cited by the Vatican council will never be referred by any one to infallibility, unless his mind is preoccupied by this thought.

Christ promised that when the Spirit of the truth would come, He would guide His followers into all truth. But how can Pope Pius IX. claim this for himself? For in the same connection Christ says of this Spirit: "For he shall not speak of himself; he shall glorify me: for he shall receive of mine, and show it unto you." Now it is a notorious fact that the Pope is stronger on Mariology than Christology. Instead of glorifying Christ, he has glorified the Virgin Mary, glorified several Japanese martyrs by canonizing them, glorified himself in the proclamation of his own infallibility. Christ further says of this Comforter: "It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come; but if I depart, I will him send him unto you,"—a direct intimation that Christ's visible presence should not continue either in his own personality or in that of a vicar. The papal interpretation of the passage in Matthew,—"Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church," is disproved by other passages. In 1 Cor. i. 11, Paul rebukes those who say, I am of Paul, I am of Apollos, I am of Cephas, *i. e.* Peter, and I of Christ. In Gal. ii. 11 we read that Paul withheld Peter to the face. Peter is by no means the only pillar of the church, inasmuch as three other Apostles receive that designation in Gal. ii. 9.

The argument from church history is equally conclusive. In this connection our author reviews the early history of the church, bringing out with great force the fact that there is no sacrament for the elevation of man to the papal throne, no prescribed mode for his election. He traces the gradual development of papal claims and papal authority. The gist of his argument turns upon the Council of Constance and the case of Honorius. Rome is in the predicament of being obliged to recognize this Council because it elected one of the popes, and yet of setting it aside, because it passed a resolution to the effect that every Ecumenical Council has its authority directly from Christ and is in matters of faith superior to the pope. If the pope is to be judged in matters of faith by a council, he is

not infallible. Honorius was condemned for heresy by successive councils and popes. Hence reasoning upon the basis of the councils, which are accepted as infallible by all Catholics, the infallibility of the pope falls to the ground. The case of Honorius is detailed at length by our author; but his account contains nothing new, his facts being taken from Hefele, who is indeed the only historian that has had access to the original documents preserved in the Vatican.

Thus far the author makes common cause with the old Catholics, in that he argues from their premises against the infallibility of the pope. But now he turns his weapons against them. He points out a characteristic, which will always make the papal party more popular with the masses. Ecumenical Councils are a thing for the learned. So far as the multitude is concerned, it makes very little difference whether their faith is decided for them by one man, viz.: the bishop of Rome, or by a council composed of bishops from all parts of the world. In both cases they are in spiritual bondage to their superiors. It can not be denied that the papal system is of a far more practical nature. Councils are sometimes not in session for centuries; the pope can at any time be consulted. His decisions make it easy for us to ascertain the truth. They save us from the tedious process of investigating the subject for ourselves.

The issue of the late Vatican Council has disproved the fundamental position of the old Catholics, viz.: the infallibility of the councils. For no one who examines the number of bishops in attendance, can for a moment doubt the Ecumenical character of the Council of 1870. But this council decreed the infallibility of the pope, which is rejected by the old catholics; hence the proposition affirming the infallibility of Ecumenical Councils falls to the ground.

Our author likewise shows that the Episcopal theory held by the old Catholics is untenable.

The preceding line of argument shows how devoid of value is the certitude in matters of doctrine, which Catholicism claims

to furnish by means of its infallible organs. Equally unsatisfactory is the certitude which it furnishes so far as the salvation of the individual is concerned. If we ask the question : Where do I find saving truth ? and through whom is it communicated unto us ? the answer is : Saving truth is found in the Roman Catholic Church, and is communicated by those who have been set apart for this work through the Sacrament of Ordination. The certitude for all this is furnished by the pope or immediately by those who stand in the line of Apostolic succession. The Romish system therefore furnishes us what the author aptly styles eine Religion aus zweiter Hand, ein äusserlicher Autoritäts-glaube, inasmuch as we can not ourselves dip out of the fountains of truth, but must allow the Pope and the Church to prescribe for us what we are to accept and to believe. Religion thus becomes a matter of blind obedience. The essence of faith is obedience unto the church. Just as the gospel becomes worthy of acceptance by being stamped with the seal of an infallible Pope and an infallible Church, so all Christian religiousness receives its value by being stamped with obedience unto the church. Hofrat Beckedorff says : "Wenn jemand auch alle Lehren der Kirche als wahr annähme, wenn er sich zu diesen Lehren bekennt, aber alles Dieses nicht aus unbedingtem Gehorsam gegen die Kirche thäte, sondern weil er auf andere Weise, durch Nachdenken und Forschen sich überzeugt zu haben meinte, dasz seine Lehren und Vorschriften wahr und weise seien ; so würde er kein wahrer Katholik sein." Priests in the confessional act upon the same principle. In the case of those who unconditionally obey, the absolution can be granted no matter how grave the offence ; but when such obedience is not rendered, the absolution is unmercifully refused. Indeed it seems as if authority and power were considered the highest good by Rome and its adherents.

This externality in the Romish system makes room for numberless surrogates and makeshifts. The personal falls into the background. No one knows all the acts of the councils ; hence

the Church is satisfied with the intention to believe all. Since such faith lacks all Innerlichkeit, good works come in as a substitute. The Catechism furthermore teaches that one may make satisfaction for another. This is the loop-hole through which a host of abuses have crept into the Catholic Church. In some respects there has been considerable improvement since the days of the Reformation, but many abuses still exist. When a rich man lets his servant fast for him, when a lady of rank hires a peasant woman to say prayers for her at the door of a monastery, or when silent mass, involving according to the Roman theory a repetition of Christ's sacrifice, is offered up for purposes intended by him who pays, sometimes the priest himself being ignorant of the design, it shows to what extremes Romanism will go, in order to accommodate itself to the weaknesses of man.

Protestantism has often been accused of infidelity. During the Vatican council a resolution was brought forward to the effect that the Reformation was the cause of all the infidelity in the world. One of the German bishops protested very strongly; he was called to order. But next morning he found the Executive Committee had withdrawn the resolution. A telegram from Berlin had produced the change. It was Bismarck's way of arguing the question. Martensen repels the charge and casts it back into the teeth of the Romanist himself. The demand for an external authority like that of the Pope, is in reality disbelief in the power of the truth to authenticate itself. It goes on the presumption that man must choose between the bottomless abyss of skepticism and a blind belief in the dictates of an outward authority. In such a system as far as it remains true to itself, no one has Glaubensgewissheit, not even the Pope, for as Pope, he need stand in no personal relation to the truth; he is simply the instrument through which the truth flows, as water through a pipe. Skepticism is repressed instead of being overcome. It is the highest prerogative of intelligence to be able to examine for one's-self, to think

one's-self through the misty regions of doubt into the clear realms of settled convictions. And so far as certitude in reference to the forgiveness of sins is concerned, the Catholic Church acknowledges her own weakness.

The validity of the absolution depends upon the valid ordination of the priest, and his standing in the line of the Apostolic succession. Since it is impossible in any particular case to prove that this condition is met, it follows that the individual can never feel certain of the forgiveness of his sins. The Council of Trent expressly declares that no one can feel certain that he has found favor in the sight of God, the words in the original being *cum nullus scire valeat certitudine fidei, se gratiam dei esse consecutum*, (Sess. viii. Cap. 9). Neither the Pope nor the council give us Sicherheit in matters pertaining either to faith, or to the forgiveness of our sins.

In taking up what he calls Evangelische Gewissheit, our author gives a very glowing account, such as only a Lutheran can give, of the inward struggles and the final victory of the monk, who, at Worms, exclaimed : "Hier stehe ich, Ich kann nicht anders, Gott helfe mir. Amen." He had previously (at the Leipsic disputation) rejected the infallibility of Popes and Councils; on that memorable occasion he manifested a degree of certainty, which can only result from internal conviction. This Glaubens gewissheit did not result primarily from a perusal of the Scriptures, but from that inward change and peace of heart which he had experienced. He had gone through all the penances the Church prescribed ; these gave him no peace. He only found peace when he embraced Christ in faith. Just as the sun does not need a heavenly body to diffuse his light and heat, but shows his enlightening and warming power by dispelling cold and darkness immediately, so the gospel showed its power by dispelling the darkness and terror of the monk's soul. He, however, based his salvation and his hope of salvation not upon this experience, but upon Him who was the author of this experience, viz., Christ. This justifying faith, which relies ex-

clusively upon Christ, forms the centre of Luther's life and doctrine. The life of faith was further developed and matured by a diligent study of God's word. The Holy Scriptures were for him the norm of faith, the standard by which matters of faith and worship were to be decided, the inexhaustible source of the knowledge of things pertaining to the Kingdom of God. And here be it observed, that he did not convert the Bible into a paper-pope. He subjected the Canon of the New Testament Scriptures to close scrutiny, going upon the supposition that the Ancient Church was not infallible, and that justifying faith was the touch-stone by which everything was to be tried. Faith and the Word exercise mutual influence upon each other. The classical productions in the realm of fine art can only be understood by one possessed of a sense of the beautiful. On the other hand, these productions of art will exert a reflex, normative influence upon the person's sense of the beautiful. A great moral phenomenon, be it an action or a personality, can only be appreciated by one possessed of an exalted sense of the moral. Just as the student of art must study the whole realm of art to determine the merits of an individual creation, so Luther studied single books by comparing them with the tenor of the whole. And just as a student having a sense of the beautiful in him, will never for a moment doubt the existence of such a thing as beauty, so did Luther, having Christ in his heart, never for a moment doubt the real existence of Christ.

We thus get two principles, which, in German, are denominated by the terms *Glaubens- und Schrift-Princip*. These are united in the so-called *Geistes-Princip*, that is, in the recognition of the Holy Spirit as being that one, who brought forth both the Scriptures and the faith that is in us; whose witness renders it sure that the certainty which is claimed by the Evangelical Christian, is not a merely human, subjective certainty, but one produced by the working of God's Spirit. Here lies the great difference between Romish *Sicherheit* and Evangelical *Gewissheit*. We do not derive our consciousness of cer-

tainty in matters of faith and salvation from an external authority, but from God Himself, *i. e.*, from the witness of His Spirit in our hearts.

This then makes us safe against the arrows launched by modern infidelity against our faith. If it were necessary to believe in the Bible first before believing in Christ, then, indeed, would we be at the mercy of the modern destructive criticism. For then, as often as a new discovery were made, we would have to hold our faith in suspense until criticism might reach a result favorable to faith. When the Apostles went forth to convert the world, they did not begin by preaching faith in a book. They proclaimed a crucified and risen Saviour. They spoke of sin and grace, of the fall, the regeneration and restoration of humanity. No matter where they preached, and how much they were ridiculed, the foolishness of preaching brought about good results, even as it still does. God works directly upon the hearts of men, when they listen to His word ; the efforts of criticism avail nothing over against the quiet progress of Christ's cause. In a word, the Gospel has self-authenticating power.

As a conclusion to his pamphlet our author refers to what he calls, "Unklare Experimente einer Umbildung der Reformation." By these he understands those tendencies, which have sought to complement the Reformation by introducing a movement towards Catholicism in the form of concession, and an attempt at a union of its principles with those of the Reformation. He mentions Irvingianism, which, while rejecting Catholicism, adopts the same fundamental principle in that a new authority, *viz.* : an apostolate with an extensive hierarchy, is introduced into the church. Of the same nature is Puseyism, which emphasized tradition and ordination in such a way as to lead many of its adherents into the bosom of the Catholic Church. Here belong also those attempts at Reformation which have started on the basis of the Apostles' Creed, following herein an impulse given by Lessing in his controversy with

Pastor Götze, which circumstance is the reason why the Papists still cite Lessing's authority, and lead his arguments into the field against Protestantism. To this category belong the views of the church developed by Delbrück, Daniel and Nevin, all views which give us Lessing in a somewhat modernized form. Lastly, he mentions in this connection the movement in the Danish Church, which goes by the name of Grundvigianism.

He says it is common to all these tendencies that in the conflict with Naturalism and Rationalism, they find the Schrift Princip entirely untenable, and, despairing of this, have looked around for some other and better certitude. The Irvingites and Puseyites seek certitude in inspired and ordained organs; the others in a more or less extensive tradition in the bosom of the church, as the highest infallible authority in faith and in the interpretation of Scripture. When the Schrift-Princip is thus abandoned, when we admit that the Scriptures are not a sufficient norm in matters of faith, we cannot have any certainty that traditions have been handed down unadulterated through many generations, unless there be men who have been fitted to become bearers of the tradition in some extraordinary manner. An infallible tradition implies a hierarchy like that of the Romish Church. It will not do to say with Lessing, that during the second century, when the Scriptures were not fully discriminated, tradition answered every purpose, and that therefore the church of to-day is not in need of a surer guide than tradition. To this argument of Lessing's Götze replies by pointing out the difference between early Christianity and the Christianity of our day. Lessing, who was never willing to leave an objection unanswered, never replied on this point, which is sufficient evidence that he considered himself worsted on this particular point.

The pamphlet then gives a somewhat lengthy account of Grundvigianism. Its adherents advocate the strange theory that the Apostles' Creed came directly from the lips of the Saviour, along with the formula of Baptism, and that the means

of grace are to be found exclusively in the Sacraments, but it is stranger still that a scholar like Martensen should put Dr. Nevin into the same category with such a tendency.

Such is the line of argument, as I apprehend it, in the pamphlet. The author, in passing along, takes up the abuses of the Romish system and points out the superior excellencies of the Protestant mode of worship, topics which can be used with telling effect in addressing the multitude; but the power of the book lies in the manner in which Papistische Sicherheit and Evangelische Gewissheit are compared. The historical portions are a reproduction of what Hase's *Polemik* gives; the style of the latter, however, being far more pungent. That it is a valuable contribution to the science of comparative Symbolics no one can deny; but it falls far below the master-piece of Möhler. A similar book, viewing the subject from the Protestant stand-point, remains yet to be written. The time is perhaps at hand for such a work. Marheineke, Baur, Nitzsch and Hase have fully opened up the subject, and the Vatican Council, besides bringing Romanism to its logical conclusion, became the occasion of throwing new light upon the subject. Because Theiner gave Bishop Hefele access to the original documents pertaining to Honorius, the Pope deprived him of his office as Librarian of the Vatican. Theiner revenged himself by publishing his copy of Masserelli's official minutes on the Council of Trent. Thus, what Rome succeeded in concealing for three centuries, has at last come to the light of day. There is, therefore, no longer a lack of material for a complete work on Symbolics from the Protestant stand-point. To succeed in this sphere it will be necessary for some historical student to live himself fully into the Romish system and explode it from within; for as Hegel somewhere says, *Um ein System zu bekämpfen, muss man sich hineinleben um es dann von innen heraus zu sprengen.* Martensen's pamphlet is merely a skillful attempt from without to repel and subdue Rome, hence a valuable contribution, but not a master-piece in the department of Polemic Theology.

ART. III.—“PHILOSOPHY OF TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE—A  
CONTRIBUTION TO THEOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND  
REFORM. BY REV. A. G. PEASE. PUBLISHED BY  
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, N. Y.”

BY E. E. HIGBEE, D. D.

THE theme with which the work above cited has to do is one which, in spite of all past settlement, is ever rising up anew, and challenging the most earnest thought of the Church. No statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, in any of the old confessions, however rigidly formulated, can be said fully to satisfy the demands of a living and ever-progressing theology. That of the so-called Athanasian Creed, explicit as it is, and seemingly guarded on every side, is apprehended to a great extent in form only; while by its attempted logical determinateness the real content of the mystery is perhaps more likely to be dissipated from all possible grasp of the believing soul, than to be retained as a great fact of revelation for the world.

Often, also, do the very terms used in those past theological controversies, in the bosom of which the dogma of the Trinity found expression, come to have an altogether different meaning for the present age, and, therefore, when assented to without any historical analysis, mislead, and pervert the very faith which once they were to define and fortify.

It is not strange then that many at the present day, releasing themselves from the logical fixedness of past formulaires, should address themselves to the work of reconstructing the doctrine of the Trinity by a thoughtful study of the Divine Word, whose fulness of revelation no age may be said to have entirely grasped. Or, if not to reconstruct, that many should

at least strive to make their assent to the old, not blind acquiescence, but the obedience of an intelligent will. Nor is such effort any mark of infidelity or irreverence, but the evidence rather of a serious and earnest spirit, searching for truth, and dispossessing itself of all formal dogmatic bias only to come with more childlike humility to the sole foundation and fountain of all life and truth, the Word of God.

Such at least we believe to have been the spirit of the author of the work now under review. There is no conscious effort to destroy merely but to rebuild. There is no zeal for orthodoxy so called, but for truth, which, as all know, may often be concealed and confined and made lifeless by the very word-forms which are tenaciously retained in the vain effort in this way to save it.

The author has been, and is now a great sufferer; yet, as in the example of the heroic Augustine Thierry, his mind has risen superior to his physical prostration, and glows with its own fire even more brightly amidst the ashes of his bodily decay. No doubt, however, from the fact of such suffering, connected with other disadvantageous circumstances, his work shows itself to be but fragmentary and somewhat incoherent in its parts. Indeed, in the preface, the author very properly guards the reader against expecting any full or finished treatment. He would but indicate the stand-point from which his view is taken, and submit some partial fruit only of his meditation. It appears also from the preface, and the same may be gathered from the work itself, that the author has been engaged on a much larger and more systematic treatise, the outline of which he sketches, to atone in some measure, as he says, for the fragmentary character of his present publication.

We hope he may be spared to bring out this larger treatise, and be encouraged to do so by the success of his present work—success, not so much in the way of propagating his own views, but, as the author himself most wishes, in the way of awaking the mind of the age to the necessity of examining and

bringing more and more into view the deep and neglected mysteries of the Divine Word. All hope indeed for the future of Christianity seems, with the author, to depend on this rather than on any attempt to reconcile established confessions one with another, or to raise any single denominational confession of doctrine so as to make it the nucleus around which others must in the end subordinate themselves.

It may be well to remark here that the author shows that he has been an earnest student in the field of philosophy, and that he is not dissatisfied with the views which he combats through any pride of ignorance. The incomplete system of Coleridge, as interpreted and advanced by the sainted Dr. Marsh, seems to be quite familiar to his thought. He is indeed a worthy pupil of that great teacher of New England, and is an example, among many others, of the deep and lasting impression which he made upon the thinking of those who had the great privilege and pleasure of listening to his lectures.

It is not our purpose to criticise the work in detail, but to give expression rather to the thoughts which its perusal has awakened, and to the views of Scripture which it has served to bring freshly up again before our mind. This we can best accomplish upon the base of the following fundamental questions with which the work in hand has mainly to do. *How can we know God and commune with Him? How can we apprehend the spiritual world which is above, beneath, and around us, and no doubt also within us? How can we apprehend the natural world in the bosom of which we are, and which must itself be in some way correlated to the spiritual and Divine?*

There may have been a time in the distant past—in that golden age universally pointed to by tradition—when man communed with God and with the spiritual world in the way of immediate converse, by a kind of spiritual sensation and perception; when all life around him was as it were transparent, revealing at once its own spiritual meaning to his gaze; when.

all nature rose up before him as a vast parable and hieroglyph of the Divine, in such form, at once intuitively intelligible to his spirit; when the inner spiritual sense and content of things, which we anatomically search after, was seen to be so married to and clothed by the external form as to constitute these at once a language for the soul, without any effort of science, of metaphor, or of allegory. There may have been such a golden age, we repeat, when any question about knowing God and the spiritual world would be considered as absurd as any questioning about the reality of sensation itself; when only the fool in heart could say there is no God, and when no prayer of the prophet was needed to open the servant's eyes to see the chariots of Jehovah. But such age, if ever existing, has passed away, as a natural possession, and the method of knowing generally pursued by men in the historical period has been quite the reverse. Immersed through the senses in things external only, the general movement of thought has been to start with no recognition of the Divine and spiritual, and study the outer world—the kosmos as revealed in sensation, and to find therein, if possible, the principle, or *ap<sub>r</sub>o<sub>z</sub>u<sub>m</sub>* of all that is—as though this had life in itself, underived and absolute. The old mythical theosopies of the Orient, the old symbolic forms of religious contemplation and art, which seem to point to an age still behind themselves, such as the golden age just mentioned, were generally cast aside at the outset of what is called philosophic thinking.

But the more thought tried to penetrate the outer world in search of a unifying principle there, the more it was forced to the necessity of postulating some inner psychic base to account for the physical itself. An invisible *esse* continually hid itself behind the visible existence, and this visible existence failed of itself to give any intuition of the nexus binding the two together. The psychic being of man then became the theme of investigation; but equally unable to find here any satisfactory stand-point from which to comprehend the unity of all things,

the restless philosophic activity sought after some absolute, some *αρχή*; and thus theosophy came back again, but more in the way of an abstraction, than in any form of a supposed celestial direct inner perception of God and the spiritual. Thus the Greek philosophy started and moved forward from the Hylozoism of the early Ionians to the theosophy of Plotinus, seen in the *Enneads* as arranged by Porphyry. Water, indeterminate infinite life-matter, air, fire; then thought and will, the psychic being of man; and then the primordial essence irradiating from itself an image whose substance is made up of ideas out from which the universe became existent—this was the order of movement.

This order also shows itself as a sort of model or norm for all subsequent philosophy, which runs, only more rapidly, through the same cycle, beginning and closing in much the same way, with some advance probably at every successive repetition, but without any more success in solving the problem, and dropping off either into bold skepticism or into a weary acknowledgment that there can be no rising above self and the world, and that any assumed principle beyond is simply unknowable, and the search for it therefore vain.

Modern philosophy, as did the Greek, begins in an examination of the external world, the *mundum sensibile*, as we see in Bacon. So also with Descartes, the *cogito, ergo sum*, is only the result of a necessity forced upon him to find in the inner psychic consciousness that safe beginning which he could not find in the outer sense perception. He also again is forced to acknowledge that the facts of consciousness necessitate, in order to give them proper content, an objective Divine, and thus the way was opened for the “*substance with infinite attributes*” of Spinoza, and the “*monas primitiva*” with its circle of monads dynamically radiating therefrom, as taught by Leibnitz. Here we have the same cycle again, more rapidly passed over, and closing also with a great cloud of skepticism on every side.

Philosophy, after this order, renews itself for another cycle in Kant. He begins, in fact, with a discussion of the external world. The rotation of the earth, the question whether the earth is wearing out, a general history of nature, and theory of the heavens, fire, winds, and other subjects of kindred character first engage his attention. Then he turns his attention more directly to psychic being, with a half-timid inclination towards theosophy (perhaps from a knowledge of Swedenborg),\* as if he would run through the whole cycle himself. The theosophic inclination, however, was dropped, and he confined himself to the raw material of sensations as taken up by the understanding, and those *a priori* cognitions resident in the mind itself, leaving the Divine in the region of inference, as a kind of necessary postulate to satisfy the demands of the moral consciousness. Fichte also finds no room for anything like theosophy. He makes the Divine in no sense substance, but the moral order of the world; yet he feels necessitated to assume something like an absolute personality positing its own being and something distinct from itself with a mutual process of limitation between them. Hegel reaches beyond the external, but no further than logic, although his logic has to do with the genesis of nature and mind through a certain dialectic process by which the absolute reason evolves itself. Schelling, upon Hegel's developing his system into what he felt to be mere abstraction, at last, after Hegel's death, turns to theosophy,

\* As evidence of this read the following, as quoted by Ueberweg: "Si pedem aliquantulum ultra terminos certitudinis apodictice, quæ metaphysicam decet, promovere fas esset, opera pretium videtur, quedam, quæ pertinent ad intuitus sensitivi non solum leges, sed etiam causas per intellectum tantum cognoscendas indagare. Nempe mens humana non afficitur ab externis mundusque ipsius aspectui non potet in infinitum nisi quatenus ipsa cum omnibus aliis sustentatur ab eadem vi infinita Unius. Hinc non sentit externa nisi per presentiam ejusdem cause sustentatrixis communis, ideoque spatium, quod est conditio universalis et necessaria compresens omnium sensitive cognita, dici potest omnipresentia phenomenon. Causa enim universi non est omnibus atque singulis propterea praesens, quia est in ipsorum locis, sed sunt loca, h., e., relationes substantiarum possibles, quia omnibus intime praesens est."

and reaches a sort of theogonic process, through which the potencies of the Divine essence reach out into three persons, the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit. Here, substantially, we have the same cycle again, running through the physical, the psychical, and ending at last in the theosophic.

We venture the general statement that every effort of science to solve the mystery of the external physical world will drive the mind to the necessity of recognizing in some form the psychical and metaphysical, although this may be for a time, as now, hidden under the terms *force*, or *molecular activity*, or *law*, or *process of evolution* enclosing an ever-ascending series, and, therefore, indicating intelligent purpose: and further, that every effort to solve the mystery of such psychic reality, as containing will and intelligence in inseparable union, must drive the mind at last more inward still into theosophic speculations, where, without some higher life and light entering the spirit than the scientific faculty possesses, the process will fall back again exhausted, yet only to recover vigor once more to start with renewed hope, but to end again, we believe, with just as little success as ever, except perhaps a clearer enunciation of the terms of the problem be gained, a larger body of formulated science be gathered, and more ominous forebodings of universal skepticism be heard and felt.

Now the author whom we are reviewing starts from a theosophic stand-point. With him the only source of the knowledge of God is the Spirit witnessing in and with our spirit. In most beautiful language he declares, "except as with the eye of our own spiritual being we 'read the eternal deep'—and in our inward experience are conscious of the presence of something within us that is infinite, all holy and Eternal—and thus, to use the language of Wordsworth, of being 'haunted forever by the *Eternal Mind*,' it is impossible that that Mind should be revealed to us." Seemingly under the influence of Spinoza, he maintains as a necessary fundamental postulate, "that God cannot be known at all, or be a real object of knowledge or of

thought to any mind, except by means of his organic nature and connections with the universe. If he has no organic connections; if he is to be regarded as absolutely one and simple, without any organic relation of parts or elements within himself, or any organic relations with anything outside of himself, then there are no means by which he can be known at all. By the very supposition he has no attributes, he is a subject without properties—a thing, therefore, that cannot be known, simply because it has no real objective existence, but is a mere form of thought, a mere abstract conception without any corresponding reality in nature." Then as an object of possible cognition, "the being, the life, and the attributes of God, the Father, the fountain-head and life-principle of the Godhead, make themselves known in the person and attributes of the Son. \* \* \* \* The attributes and the character of the Father are seen in the life of the Son (just as in the branch the life of the vine is developed—goes forth into act and visibility). The life of the Father manifests itself in the life of the Son. The life of the Son is the living product of the indwelling life of the Father." Then passing from the Divine sphere, the author maintains, "that the life of the Son is the immediate source of the life of the creation. The life of the Father is in the life of the creation, but not immediately, but only in and through the life of the Son. The life of the Son mediates between that of the Father and that of the creation. The life of the Father is not separated from that of the universe, but is in it, yet only mediately, through the life of the Son, so that the life of the Father, and of the Son, and of the creation, taken together, constitute that grand organic unity of life which comprehends all the life there is, and all that ever was or ever can be life or being at all."

As unsatisfactory as this statement is to us, and reminding us at once of Spinoza, yet we must confess that the effort and the spirit in which it is conducted give us unfeigned pleasure. It strengthens the spirit to find such a hearty acknowledgment

that God in some form lives in the universe and the universe in Him, and that we are not so confined by the limitations of thought and body as not to be able to come into any real communion with the Divine and spiritual. The philosophy of Hamilton, as interpreted by Mansel, cannot satisfy the spirit. To infer only what the Divine is by the imperfect representations of it through merely analogous qualities in the creature is but a vain work, and even worse than vain, if we have no assurance that the qualities in the creature *are* analogous. But even this is only admitted in words, for it is really denied as possible by the whole method of thought which Mansel pursues.

All, however, who begin with the superessential (*υπερουσιος*), have to bridge in some way the gulf to get to the existent. Scotus Erigena, even, has to leave behind his predicateless *esse*, and acknowledge that abstract deity has to pass over in some way to concrete Divine being, or leave the whole sphere of existence without foundation. He neglects his blank and moveless initial point, and assumes a *creatio a vacuo*, an uncreated creating *esse*; and God, in relation to the creation, becomes beginning, middle, and end.\*

We have said above that there may have been a golden age when the creation was, so to speak, transparent, the internal spiritual and Divine shining in and through its correlate external and meeting there the spiritual gaze of man as it were face to face; when the synthesis of the creative and created was so grasped that no analytical anatomizing of science was required in order to see the soul of things in the body with which they were clothed, or rather with which they clothed themselves. It becomes a matter of no slight interest to know whether there is not now some kindred method of spiritually discerning spiritual things, some eye now holden that may be opened to see, not-

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\* *Est (Deus) igitur principium, medium, et finis. Principium, quia ex se sunt omnia, quae essentiam participant: medium autem, quia in ipsis, et per ipsum subsistunt atque moventur; finis vero, quia ad ipsum moventur quietem motus sui siveque perfectionis stabilitatem querentia.*" De Divis, Nat. Lib. Prim. cap. XI.

withstanding the sad immersion in the merely natural and external in which we find ourselves.

How indeed can we maintain that we are spiritual, without the acknowledgment that the sense side of our being must be in some way so correspondent to the spiritual, as not at least to close in the spirit from all possible egress or ingress to meet and admit spirit and life? Mere conscious intelligence in way of science of course is not such meeting and admission, nor is the merely natural activity of the will. But can there not be such a conjunction of man with God, not as by a physical nexus in the way of attribute and substance, nor by a metaphysical one in way of effect and cause, but reciprocal, like the eye and light in vision, where the spiritual capacity or recipiency of man as actually included in his natural being, meets in and through the same natural sphere, the Divine descending and entering revealably therein, as, in way of analogy, we know that the internal life plasticity of the plant with its sun-recipiency meets in its external leaves the enquickening sunlight descending and really there? Is not this, after all, the very conjunction wrought out in faith, where the rational-spiritual is actually brought to pass?

Of course the possibility of anything of this kind, upon which, in our judgment, all knowledge of the Divine rests, depends primarily upon the fact that the Divine becomes *visible*, and that in this *visibility*, or bodily presence, or actual self-inclusion in the natural, we have the very fulness of the Divine and spiritual contained, in a form approachable for man. *This is the Word made flesh and dwelling among us. This is indeed the character of the Word of God universally.*

No one can question the truth that the Scriptures declare that God in a certain sense is beyond the knowledge of man. "No man has seen God at any time." "Who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see." Here, and in many other passages which might be quoted, we find the plain

acknowledgment that there is an invisible and unrevealed element in the unity or order of the Divine, which cannot be reached in itself without that Divine order involves more than this. If there be nothing more, then the mind after all is only playing with an unintelligible abstraction, a formless and ever-vanishing breath. While it may have a capacity God-ward, this capacity falls back unfilled in the vain effort to reach the invisible and eternal, just because there is nothing containing the fulness of the Divine in the sphere of the natural-human, through and in which the mind looks forth. Nothing is left but the work of the phantasy to build up and project from itself a myth continent of the Divine upon which the restless religious life may repose.

Any and every attempt in fact to construct the Divine order, or relations in se, outside of its own self-revelation, will prove a failure, and show itself either polytheistic or pantheistic. *Or, what is the same thing, any conception of a transcendental Trinity of the Godhead, which does not root itself in the Trinity of revelation in Christ Jesus, the Lord, will prove abortive.* The unrevealed relation in the Divine Order may be called, it is true, the person of the Father; but no so-called person of the Father can be reached by thought or faith without there be some image of the invisible Divine—"εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ δόπτοντος"—some leading out from light inaccessible—some "ἀπαγασμα τῆς δόξης, καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως."

Now the Scriptures emphatically declare that there is such absolute image of the invisible God—such full streaming forth of his glory into revelation in Christ Jesus. "For in him dwelleth the fulness of the Godhead bodily." (Col. ii. 9). But just here we find the great danger of being misled by the very terms in which the dogma of the Trinity is stated, so as to suppose that behind and outside of this absolute imaging of the invisible God (under such supposition of course not absolute but relative imaging), we can find and recognize the Father, or, what is equivalent, that the mission of the Lord is to lead us

to the Father as though he were to be found elsewhere than *in the Lord*. When the terms person of the Father and person of the Son are so used as in any way to individualize and separate the fully commensurate unity here of the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father, these very terms only mislead us, and we believe actually pervert the Scriptures.

No man has seen or can see the Father except in the Son. Thought cannot pass around and beyond this absolute image of the Divine, and reach the Father. The disciples themselves at one time seemed to think of the Father, in such transcendental form, as individually outside of the Son, and they even asked the Lord to show them the Father. The startling reply of the Lord is, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father. How sayest thou then, Show us the Father?" There can be no such showing separate from Himself. He is God manifested in the flesh. *In Him* dwelleth the fulness of the Godhead bodily. *In Him* God is reconciling the world to Himself, not to Himself as outside and beyond, and not *in Him*. St. John expresses this truth with overwhelming emphasis, when he declares that in Christ Jesus the true God and eternal life is found.

If it be possible by any other revelation reaching the human spirit, to find the Father outside of the Son, then Christ is at once transcended, and His revelation not absolute. There would be in such supposed case another brightness of Divine glory reaching us from behind the Lord. Against the least shadow of such a conception the word of God is emphatic. The Word, which was the all-creative God, the very life and light of the world, as St. John declares, became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory.

It is not enough, however, that in this sense God is approachable by man—that He is self-included in the human, so that the Word in such form holds within itself the Divine and spiritual to be apprehended and beheld. The apprehension here depends upon man's conjunction also with the Divine and spiritual as thus contained in the Word, so that he may be in the Lord, and

the Lord in him, so that the Word may become spirit and life in him. "Of his fulness have all we received."

This conjunction in the sphere of intelligence is faith, and in the sphere of will is love, not simply a natural activity of the one or the other, but that state of recipiency upon the part of man in which the life and light now flows in from the Divine, through the Word, and apprehends while being apprehended—a mutual union like that of the eye and light in vision—a union which must include both will and understanding, and in which they become spiritually illumined and energized—a union in which the good and the true become the very substance of the man's personality. "Because I live, ye shall live also."

Such a conjunction upon the part of man, while dependent, as we have said, upon the mystery of God manifested in the flesh, is dependent also upon the fact that the relation of man to the Divine by creation is such as to render it possible. This leads us to make some general remarks, suggested by the statement of the author of the work under review, that "the life of the Son is the immediate source of the life of the creation."

"For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given the Son to have life in himself." That is, the Father is in the Son, for we cannot conceive of two absolute independent sources of life in such form. Life in God is absolute, underived, *esse* and *existere* in itself. Life in the creation is not underived. The creation has no such life in itself, but is and continues to be only by the outflow of life from God into it. What has being as now existent in the created sphere ( $\delta\gamma\eta\nu\epsilon\nu$ ) was life in Him, or, if we accept the modern punctuation, in Him was life, fontally of course for the whole creation. The universe subsists or consists in Him ( $\tau\alpha\pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\delta\nu\alpha\omega\tau\alpha\sigma\tau\eta\nu\epsilon\nu$ ). The very essence and existence of man, therefore, are not self-contained in an underived way, but self-recipient of the Divine. Man is in fact created for such recipiency. His personality, his will and intelligence as one, has no other proper content

than the good and the true, which authenticate themselves therein as proceeding from the Lord. "It is the Spirit that quickeneth." The intelligence does not make the truth. Truth is its proper substance derived from Him who is the truth. The intelligence is a recipient organ through which the truth authenticates its presence. The will does not make the good. The good is its proper substance, derived from Him who is it in itself. The will is an organ through which it is brought to pass in us. When, therefore, the will and intelligence find the Lord, who is truth and goodness itself, then the man becomes truly an image and likeness of God, a temple for the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, an organ, receiving and appropriating the outflowing life of the Lord. Christ breathes the spirit from Himself. Man thus realizes that for which he was created, because he is in the Lord and the Lord in him. This is the communion of the Holy Ghost, the regeneration and sanctification wrought out by the Divine in us, "for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure"—διπέρ της ευδοξίας—according to His goodness or because He is good (Winer); or to carry out and satisfy His good pleasure (Ellicott).

While the fulness of life in Christ Jesus apprehends the individual, his recipient apprehension of course individuates such fulness. It becomes his own though always recognized as coming from the Lord. It is the same Spirit, although according to modes of reception or states of the recipient subject, endlessly manifold and diversified in gifts and operations. "Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. \* \* \* And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which works all in all."

We have thus far spoken of man ideally, as placing no obstructions to the life flowing forth from the Divine, and reaching the soul, but as appropriating it freely, according to the full measure of his possible recipiency; as recognizing the Lord, and as centering his whole rational self in Him, and not

upon self or the world, and doing this without any antagonizing seductions from the spiritual world. Man finding himself, however, in natural and spiritual evils ("for we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places" Eph. vi. 12), does not all this without repentance and regeneration; and this is made possible by the redemptive work of Christ, who was manifested for this purpose. ("For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil." 1 John iii. 8.)

Time does not allow us to discuss this in detail. In the course of the work under review, many very valuable thoughts and suggestive hints are given, together with much that we cannot accept, and which we cannot see to be essential or necessary in way of inference from the main principles assumed.

The annihilation of the wicked, for example, is not in our judgment a necessary inference from the truth that our life is wholly derived, and hence cannot be if disconnected with its Divine source. We may continue to remove from God and not He from us. The relation or conjunction of God and man through faith is reciprocal, "I in them and they in me." We may not in love and faith reach such conjunction, so as to be in Him in spiritual will and intelligence, but this is not the equivalent of His not being in us. He was in the world, and the world knew Him not. The light doth shine perennially, and we may receive it, but we cannot suppress it. There is a profound relation in which existence is related to its source beneath consciousness and determinations of will—a bond which we believe no finite act can sever. "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" We may say that conscience itself seems to be a sort of assurance that whatever may be our personal determination, God still holds Himself in relation to us by a bond that we cannot anni-

hilate. The heathen sages felt this. It meets us over and over again in Plato, and the great tragedian, Sophocles, has given beautiful utterance to it.

“ἥγεισθε δὲ  
“βλέπειν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εὐσεβῆ βροτῶν,  
“βλέπειν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δυσσεβεῖς· φυγὴν δὲ που  
“μήπω γενέσθαι φῶτὸς ανοσίου βροτῶν.”—*OEd. Col.* 278.

The moral, however immoral, never becomes the physical. It is true that a false ethicization of our God-given being is not life but death; yet this death is no physical annihilation, if such even be deemed possible. Man can be dead in trespasses and sins, and yet not be annihilated. This is felt to be true now, and can equally be true beyond the grave. How can one be said to exhaust that which is not his either by origination or preservation, and is only his in a certain sense by conditioning recipiency—qualified only?

But we are unwilling here to enter into any argument. We wish to say in conclusion, that the work has been of service to us as arousing thought, and especially as enforcing the conviction, which has been for a long time settling itself in our mind, that the hope of the future of the Church depends not upon confessionalism, but on a fresh reopening of the Scriptures, and a deeper and more reverent grasp of the nexus between the natural and supernatural, therein challenging our faith.

## ART. IV.—THE MISSION OF PHILOSOPHY.

BY REV. HIRAM KING.

WHEN it is asked, *What is the object and end of philosophy?* the effort to discover and give an intelligent solution is, at the threshold, met and rendered entirely futile by the counter-problem, *What is philosophy itself?* Between these problems (they may be spoken of as being such), there obtains the relation of interdependence. The solution of the former is, moreover, dependent on that of the latter—is in fact, in great measure, involved in it. Hence, the treatment of the subject under consideration must, to a considerable extent, take the form of a definition of philosophy.

What then is to be understood by philosophy? Clearly not what is indicated by the term itself, if it be viewed *abstractly*. Etymologically considered, in such view, it is by no means expressive of the real meaning intended to be conveyed. *The love of wisdom* is, in this sense, expressive merely of a quality or affection of the mind, and is purely subjective. There is a sense, however, in which *the love of wisdom* has a deeper meaning. Viewed *concretely* it expresses the union of subject and object. It is the resultant of a real coming together and unification of the subjective activity and objective existence. Love of wisdom, as love of any sort, supposes an object by which it is called forth in the sense of necessary production, and upon which it remains fastened, necessarily, as the condition of its existence.

Under the former of the two views now mentioned, *the love of wisdom* may be regarded as the unresting and ever unsatis-

fied capacity for knowledge, whether it be knowledge grounded in the direct union of subject and object, or, more remotely, the product, purely, of subjective origination in the sense of logical deduction. This, it is clear enough, cannot be regarded as a definition of philosophy, for, in such form, it would solicit its own complementation, and could have no positive mission at all. Under the latter, or, concrete view, may be found a basis for, at least, an approximate definition of our science. We crave the privilege, however, to be allowed to define it for ourself, instead of adopting, in a wholesale way, any vague and unsatisfying definition borne along upon the stream of its history, whether it may have floated from out hoary antiquity, or have been set adrift by the sage devotee of the warlike goddess of more recent ages. In the use of this license the charge may be incurred of investing the title with a meaning differing from that designed by the originator to be conveyed; inasmuch as it may be made to include certain contents foreign to the original idea. Such is most likely to prove the case, for, a definition can be given only in the light of the self-authentication and measurable evolution of the science itself. The essential definition of a science in its incipient stages may by no means serve to exhaust its sense in its more mature form.

The mundane birth of philosophy was synchronistic with the creation of the first human intellect; *id. est*, man in order to think rationally must, in some sense, philosophize. He must possess certain mental philosophical factors, competent to serve as the elemental beginning of the science. In a word, to philosophize is a postulate of the attribute of rationality. This leads to the inquiry, *What is it to philosophize?* To which a brief reference to philosophy, struggling fairly into an historical existence, must be allowed to give answer.

The task, which philosophy proposed to itself from the start, was to discover a *first cause in nature—the producing cause of the phenomenal*. In the attempt to solve the problem the philosophizing of the ancients reaches quite a variety of results.

A Thales lays down the principle that the primal, or original, ground of all things is *water*. "From water everything arises, and into water everything returns." From mere *quality* a Pythagoras rises to the conception of *quantity* and fixes number as "the essence of all things." From this again the Eleatic philosopher rises absolutely above experience, abstracts and negatives all material, and plants himself upon the conception, *Êt xai πᾶς—Pure Being.*\*

While all this, now, suggests a conception of what is meant by philosophizing—the intellectual process by which only the end in view can be reached—it, at the same time, opens the way for a definition of philosophy itself.

Philosophy is the science of *ground principles*—the science, pre-eminently, of realities. It penetrates the phenomenal, the material and experimental, and rests not until it discovers a *base-law*—a general, fundamental, principal force, according to which all can be explained. It enters, in like manner, the domain of the *supernatural* and *supercreatural* and subjects Deity Himself to the scalpel of its anatomy. It seeks to discover and know The Absolute—The First Cause Himself.

Philosophy, in regard to its *material*, is *all-comprehending*. The elemental, the organic; matter, spirit, Deity; time, space, eternity; social, political, ecclesiastical polity; the relation of creature to Deity; the destiny of man and the cosmos—all these are the proper material of philosophy, and all must progressively take form and place in one, universal, system of *intelligized truth*.

In regard to *place-where*, philosophy is *ubiquitous*. Whatever lies remote, and in this way escapes an unsparing analysis, it attempts to subject to a process of purely logical deduction. In astronomic science, for example, it starts from the observed heliocentric system as the primal basis of analogical deduction. From this it plunges into the labyrinthian intricacies of space—

\*Schwegler.

filling creation; mounts the milky pathway of heaven; traverses the expanse of creation; visits the last world that sweeps in circling flight the confines of the universe; hovers over the verge of created existence, and peers inquiringly into the inconceivable emptiness of nonentity beyond.

Philosophy, however, far from resting satisfied with its achievements in the sphere of creation, transcends this altogether and actually climbs into the domain of the infinite, the boundless. It presumes to penetrate the holiest of all—to discover and disclose the essential nature of Deity Himself. Nor does all this exhaust the range of philosophy. It must needs introvert itself upon its own subject. It proposes for its solution the problem, *what is it that philosophizes—what is man?*

From all this it is clear that *philosophy is the science of sciences*. It is entitled to such designation, because every other science is found, in the end, to root itself in it. It is fundamental to the *empirical* sciences (Astronomy, Physics, Medicine, et cet.), because these can take form only as they are developed from ground-laws, which it is the province of philosophy to discover and trace out. It is fundamental to the science of *theology*, because the laws of final causation—of Absolute Being, attribute and act—must, measurably, be determined, to render the science at all possible. It is fundamental to the science of *logic*, because, first principles being undiscovered, there could be neither premises from which to deduce, nor deducing process in order to logical conclusion.

Philosophy, moreover, is its own standard. It becomes its own critic. It introverts and corrects itself at all points of its history. Absolutely, it recognizes no standard but that of the truth. This brings to view the last and highest meaning of philosophy in itself considered, and indicates plainly its true object and end. *It is the science of truth.*

In the light of the definition of our science, now given, the inquiry may be fairly entertained, *What is the mission of philosophy?* By way of reply it may be said to be threefold.

I. The relative apprehension of truth in the domain of the absolute. II. The absolute apprehension of truth in the domain of the relative. III. The intellectual unification of the two orders as the *instantaneous* resultant of such apprehension.

The orders of absolute and relative truth suppose and condition each other at all points in the movement of philosophy. These two orders are but the two sides of one concentric system of truth. The relative can be truth only as it, all the while, refers itself to the absolute truth in consonant relativity. Whilst, in fact, the absolute truth can be such only as it supposes an absolutism, unconflicting with an *instanding* relativity. To realize in the sphere of intellect, by way of conscious apprehension, this unity of truth is the task that philosophy sets itself to achieve. The assumption of this work is, however, neither arbitrary nor precisely voluntary. It is a postulate rising out of the relation of absolute to *constituted* entity. For rational life, such unification is necessitated. The relative truth must, in the end, be made to accord with the absolute truth, for it is in such reconciliation alone that the human reason can find rest.

This naturally makes room for, and in fact introduces, the necessity of a reference to the human reason as related to the twofold domain of truth in the performance of the functions of its office for philosophy; for, it is the active agent in the process of ratiocination and in the entire scope of philosophizing as well. It is through its agency only that the objective end of philosophy can be reached—that its mission can be accomplished. The reason is, however, not bound up in itself as something separate from the two orders spoken of, and as capable of standing aloof from them altogether. It is on the contrary bound up and identified with the relative order of existence. By position it occupies its general level, and as regard is had to its activity, it moves upon the same plane. Such identity of the reason with the relative does not, however, exclude it from the domain of the absolute. It is this precisely that opens the way for the influx of the absolute into the rea-

son, for the whole relative order is bound to the absolute, and can exist only in its bosom. The reason, in the most comprehensive sense, receives its illumination from the light of the absolute truth, gleaming into it through the relation holding between the absolute and the relative. The human ego in its unity stands related to the absolute entity as a depending existence. The reason must thus, from the necessity in the case, be regarded as holding its ultimate ground in the absolute, and as deriving, in the end, its activity from the same source.

The reason as depending and subordinate entity, deriving its activity thus primarily from absolute entity, stands, by virtue of such attitude, in *according* relationship to it. It is this attitude of the reason (which grounds itself, of course, in essential constitution, and is, at the same time, the condition of its normal existence), that is determinative for its activity. It is this that shuts out all possibility of the reason's repose on relative truth, except as it discovers and divests this of all attachments incongruous with its perception of absolute truth. For clearer resolution, however, why must the reason formulate this concrete truth, bringing thus the two sides, for itself, into conscious reconciliation? It is answered without hesitation, that this necessity has place because the constitution of the reason postulates activity of this sort, and necessarily brings about such result. But this is a superficial, and hence, unsatisfying, reason, and by no means accounts, in the end, for the fact in question. The true ground of the necessity is broader than the constitution of the reason, or any postulate of it, merely, and lies back of these altogether, in the idea and constitution of the *physico-spiritual*, as grounded in its unity in absolute attribute and being. The necessity ruling here, it is plain enough, is two-sided as regards its rising, inasmuch as its impulses are nothing less than the combined product of the two orders involved. The human order, as the base-idea of the *cosmos*, must become, progressively, the expression of the truth of the entire system of the physico-spiritual. The *cosmos* must

*utter* itself through mind. The human order must mirror the fullness of cosmical truth; for, in such view only is it possible for it, in any proper sense, to be regarded as the head and crown of the natural creation. In this form only can the cosmos be said to come to a rational culmination. And it is precisely this rational culmination—this focalization of relative truth—that makes room, in any real and felt sense, for communion between the two orders of existence in the case. The human order, *as at once the climax of the cosmical and the point of contact for the supercosmical*, must measurably formulate the absolute (if that may yet be termed absolute, which enters the domain, and falls under the limitations, of the relative). It must authenticate its presence, and bring its claim of priority to the relative and the resulting supremacy over it, to be acknowledged. This last is, however, not to be accomplished in a sort of mutual attestation, by bringing the two orders to confront each other by way of merely outward *juxta-position*, as if each could be made to hold its warranted attitude by the force of any such separate exhibition of the other in its presence. The human order must *utter* the supercosmical (through the channel of mind here again), into the bosom of the cosmos in the most real way, the intromission being measured only by the degree of the endowment of capability.

This *uno-centric* movement, now, from contrary quarters—the interpenetration of the relative and absolute truth in the human order—is rendered necessary to realize the ideal of entity in its broadest view. The reason, to bring to hand the condition of its own normal evolution, as also to make due account of the relation ruling here between the two orders, as such, must carry forward the movement by voluntary assumption. Whilst the profounder element of the necessity must be allowed to be the compulsion of the reason to *involuntary* action.

From what has now been said, the reason may clearly be regarded as *mediational* in its office. The culmination and representing head of an organic and subordinate order, the hu-

man finds its deepest roots imbedded in the bosom of the predominant order, and bears, of course, in its own constitution the potential reconciliation of the two—its actualization depending on the intervention of the reason. The reconciliation now spoken of does not, however, involve the contrary assumption of an original and essential contradiction. The attitudes of relativity and absolutism, though involving quite the reverse of co-ordination, imply precisely the contrary—the idea of harmony; but harmony such as may be denominated a *posed* accordance, *i. e.*, grounded necessarily in the correlation of creation and Creator. Such merely *resultant* harmony, to satisfy the demands of philosophy, must be resolved into an *intellectualized* one. The merely *passive* accordance must become *active, conscious and free*.

The question of precedence in the process of reconciliation, as touching the two orders of truth concerned, is of no small account. The free, full, and efficient, movement of philosophy is dependent altogether upon its proper settlement. The reconciliation in the end to be brought about by philosophy is, clearly, at all points in the movement, conditioned and made possible only as mind is informed, primarily, by truth from the domain of the absolute. There is no room here for either a disjunction of the two orders of truth (which are one in the sense already referred to), or a reverse order. As the absolute is primal in entity, so must it take precedence in the process of conscious reconciliation. If the intellectual apprehension of the absolute truth does not in every case precede the apprehension of the relative, the absolute must still be regarded as being, in the end, the ground of such apprehension. For, involuntary action must here be regarded as primary by way of precedence in every view. The intuitions, or postulates of the reason, are, from their nature, the profoundest movements of mind. They are, primarily, ideas that enter the sphere of intellect from the domain of the absolute and eternal truth. They are eternal ideas, that find entrance into mind and energize it. These

ideas pass over into the domain of the relative at the point of contact of the two orders, denoted by the term *relation*. The medium of such transition is, primarily, the intuitive reason, which may be termed a medium, through which certain truths authenticate themselves *immediately*, precluding thus the necessity, as well as possibility, of the mediation of logical formulæ, or deducing processes. This phase of the activity of the rational nature is involuntary. When challenged by certain truths, whether relative or absolute, their validity is instantaneously acknowledged. On the other hand, there lies the necessity in the case for such truth from the domain of the absolute to challenge the rational nature; for, the intuitive reason has its deepest roots laid in the absolute. These intuitive perceptions are the ground of all rational activity whatever. They enter the reasoning process at every point along the movement as its necessary momentum. The intuitions are of such account, because they are, in the main, the starting point and moving energy of the relative, the finite, reason; because they are projected into mind by the inspirations of Deity—The Fountain of truth.

From all this it is easy to see that the absolute and the relative *may* be, and *are*, made to meet in the rational nature, and are, in this way, brought into conscious reconciliation. The human ego may indeed be said to hold its place, by position, midway between the two orders and on the verge of each, to serve, by direct design, as the channel of such counter-transition; the medium of such interpenetration; the active agent of such *intelligized* unification.

In the general definition, given of it in the former part of this article, philosophy is denominated the *science of sciences*, and the dignity implied is obviously too clearly warranted to admit of dispute. This predicate-title, now, serves, at this point, as an index, pointing in contrary directions. Philosophy, being the science of sciences, is broader than any one other science—is, in fact, fundamental to, and embraces, them all,

holding them thus in a common subordinate unity. It holds them under the weight of a universal and truly internal dominion, the measure of whose legitimate control, in a given age, is determined by the existing degree of correct apprehension of truth. The very altitude, however, from which philosophy, in the character of the reigning science, is made to tower, involves its limitation—*dependence* as regards its proper existence—*mediate operation* as touching the administration of its office. For, unquestionably, the relation, here existing, finds, in some sort, an analogon in what has place between the stem and branches of the tree; which, evidently, is not an *inhering*, simply, on the part of the branches, according to the more superficial notion, by which nothing more is allowed than a *being infixed* in the stem; nor, on the other hand, can the stem be regarded as merely *supporting* the branches for an ulterior purpose, altogether; as if they had no concern with the fact of its immediate existence at all. The truth is quite the reverse of all this. The relation is grounded in both *distinction* and *identity*. Whilst, on the one hand, now, the distinction between stem and branch, so far as this can assert itself, introduces the necessity of mutual dependence, mutual sustentation, mutual complementation; their identity, on the other, makes room for mutual support, and paves the way for the mutual relief required. This must be obvious when it is reflected, that, by virtue of peculiar organic structure, access is opened to two independent, and quite contrary, sources of nutriment. The *leaf-attachments* of the branch procure the influx of aliment from out the bosom of the encompassing sphere of diaphanous fluid; whilst the *root-extremities* of the stem perform similar functions in the somber recesses of the subterranean regions in which they lie hidden. These two sorts of nutriment intermingle in the organism as such. They find counter-passage along its life-courses; sinking from leaf to root; rising from root to leaf. The branch and stem, in their distinction and identity as resting in a mutual dependence, perform, in this

way, the functions of the reciprocal office of mutual complementation. Far from being visionary, this is a fact susceptible of the clearest demonstration by inference from the results of experiment. If the air be shut out from contact with the leaves, the tree will pine away, and, in the end, perish; notwithstanding the roots remain imbedded in the soil, in all respects the same as before. If the roots be laid bare, or, in any other way access be prevented to those elements of the tree's food, which it is the province of the roots to conduct into the organism, nutrition will cease and the tree fall a prey to the disintegration of the elements, no conceivable amount of elemental nourishment, to which the leaves, bathed in air, may have access, being competent to prevent the ruin.

The analogon, as now in partial form brought to view, touches the *existence* of philosophy in relation to the subordinate sciences, setting forth, most clearly, its dependence on them in this view, inasmuch as it cannot have an existence at all, apart from them, save as an abstract term; for, although there is a distinction, there is an essential identity underlying necessary individual peculiarities, and, at bottom, holds all in unity of constitution. There can be no room for questioning the assertion, that philosophy has not an independent existence; as appears conclusively enough from the evident and acknowledged fact, that the whole field of philosophic activity is covered by the adjuncts of the subordinate sciences (the sphere of truth, with which each one is specially concerned, being in this way indicated). The inference is clearly not to be avoided, that philosophy, free from adjunct-limitation, and thus universal in scope as truth itself, has not an existence, as a science, otherwise than in, and by means of, the restricted sciences; or, more definitely, as already assumed, its own existence is bound up in an identity, common all round, from whose bosom, as the science of sciences, it rises distinguished as the stem, and the subordinate sciences project in distinct form

as the branches, of the great tree of philosophy, towering into altitude from out the rational nature of man.

Philosophy is, in the same way, dependent for vigorous life and progressive evolution; for, the relation, obtaining between it and the other sciences, is one of reciprocity, and, whilst involving interdependence, carries in itself, at the same time, the necessity of mutual support and mutual complementation (as also the possibility and capability of rendering such reciprocal service). As more nearly allied, perhaps, to the point in hand, than the analogy already used, reference may be allowed, for illustration here, to the well-known double fact, that whilst society, as something distinct from the individual, and yet finding entrance into the sphere of his life through the medium of an existing identity, brings a general controlling, and, measurably moulding, power for good to bear; apparently doing nothing more than *bestowing*; it unquestionably, in this way, promotes its own well-being, agreeably to the nature and constitution of the social economy; for, what may here be regarded, in a sense, as *propulsion*, is, in the end, made to change direction and become *refluence*, and returns thus again into the bosom of social life at large; swelling now, however, beyond its original magnitude, altogether. This must become evident upon the reflection, that, what finds entrance into the narrow circle of individual existence, from the broader fact in which it stands, is both *principal* and *cumulative*, i. e., evolves and gathers power; and, moreover, forms a new starting point for similar transmissions and augmentations, through other individuals, without observed limits; adding, in this way, all the while, new moments to the gathering vigor of the pulsations, and fresh impulses to the rising tide, of social life.

This is not pretended to be true, however, in each particular, of what has place between philosophy and the individual sciences; for, there the reciprocity undulates more directly between philosophy and *each* restricted science, by virtue of the existence of a less degree of identity, common to the subordi-

nate sciences, than to the members of society; no room being made, thus, among the former for so free a transmission of impulses from one to another, as among the latter. The illustration, nevertheless, fully answers the purpose in view. It sheds clear light upon the fact, that the well-being and efficiency of philosophy can be procured alone in the active *interchange*, involved in the correlation sustained all round—that the tide of its life can be made to rise to a full, steady, and vigorous, flow, only in confluence with its tributaries.

This opens the way, now, for bringing forward another feature of the analogon of philosophy, already made to do service, in which it touches the proposition (consequent, measurably, on the sort of limitation just now treated of), that *philosophy is restricted to mediate operation*. The fruit-bearing tree can accomplish its ultimate purpose only *instrumentally* (the distinction existing between stem and branch, as already brought to view, is here necessary to be borne in mind). The end to be reached is a *production*—at once a formation and a separation; for, the fruit is a summing up and an externalizing. In it the activity of vegetable life, of this sort, sweeps the highest arc of the circle, and projects in this outward, distinct, and mature form, the whole meaning of the organization, as the crown of the tree. For such achievement, as any one can see, an organ is requisite; and such one precisely as is at hand in the branch, as the only instrumental agency, competent to stand in the service of the law of life, in the process of reaching such outward culmination of interior content.

Philosophy is restricted to the same general sort of operation. It can intelligize and systematize truth, as its ultimate end, only by way of *instrumental evolution*; enshrining its inner essence, in this way, in what may be regarded as the *production* of its activity, made, by the central law of constitution, to sweep into culmination. In other words, the tree of philosophy can produce fruit only *mediately*. Whilst, however, the subordinate sciences are the media of production, they may,

nevertheless, not be viewed as serving in that capacity in a merely passive way, as though they were nothing more than inert conductors, giving shape and direction merely, by a passive resistance combined with freedom of transmission of the same sort, to what is impelled by a motivity, in no way inhering in the channels themselves, but existing exterior to, and acting from abroad altogether. The mediation is rather of a double nature, and involves the combination of both passive and active agency. The restricted sciences are clearly the channels through which philosophy, as such, utters truth as it brings it to take intelligized form; but such externalization is not, by any means, a bare *passing through*, inasmuch as the conjunctive activity of the media themselves enters the movement all along, as a necessary element of its vital energy. The distinctive action on both sides, it appears, is the best sort of testimony borne to the truth of the proposition, that philosophy is restricted to mediate operation; for, unquestionably, any exemption from control, existing on either hand, can be regarded only as that sort of *co-operative independency*, which rises, of necessity, out of any organic union (for, what is union, but diversity centered in unity)? furnishing, in this plain way, its own direct proof of an absolute interdependence, resident in the unity from which the diversity asserts such seeming freedom.

The point now reached, in the treatment of our subject, may not unaptly be characterized as the platform in the rotunda of the limited sciences; for, a position is thus attained to, within the encircling panorama, sufficiently interior and central to bring the whole sphere of philosophical activity within the field of vision. The entire realm of truth is seen, from this station of observation, to solicit the progressive ingressions, presence, and operation of philosophy. Truth in its universal character, as it inheres in, or is concerned with, the forms of being and existence—the relative grounded in the absolute, and the absolute enfolding, as well as being enshrined in, the relative—is

laid open to philosophical inquiry, and subjected to a process of rational evolution. For, the one, universal, concrete, truth is the multiform content of the grand circle of the subordinate sciences that crowns the brow of philosophy.

The mission of philosophy, as is now clearly apparent, is concerned with, and embraces the trinity of Nature, Man, God—mounting from the lowermost forms of creation through the rising progression of the structural cosmos, and culminating, at last, in the overshadowing grandeur of Deity.

In our definition of it, philosophy is represented as *ubiquitous*, touching its presence in the field of truth. The bare statement of the fact, with whatever power of self-authentication it might carry with itself, was, however, all that was then possible; for, the validity of it could not, at that point, be properly attested. What could there, from the nature of the case, be but indistinctly seen in the twilight of *assumptive assertion*, moves, here, into the field of clear vision, under the light thrown upon it from a certitude, established and made to stand by the best possible sort of testimony—that of the surrounding prospect, opened to view from the polar elevation now attained to. Unattested affirmation is verified by observation; for, philosophy, in one form or another, is seen to be the moving energy and aggressive agency in every sphere of rational activity, and in every field of scientific research, whatever. Extending its tentacula in the *instrumental* sciences in the act of prehension, it is seen to gather up in its monstrous grasp the contents of physics, anthropology, and theology; verifying, thus, in the sphere of intellect, their trinity in relation; their unity in relativity and absolutism.

The mission of philosophy, it must be allowed, cannot from the stand-point now reached, be regarded as problematical. It is apparent that it empowers the human mind (illumined, as it is, all along, by a flood of light, streaming upon it from the radiating center of absolute truth, by which it is thrown into the involuntary action of intuitive perception), to

converge and focalize, in itself, all the lines of truth in its broadest view. It is apparent that it establishes in the mind of man, in this way, the harmony of entity. Philosophizing, however, cannot be regarded as a merely *intellectual* process, as though the mission of philosophy could be allowed to end at last in only an intellectual apprehension, of the same abstract and powerless sort. On the contrary, truth, formulated in mind, comes to be allied to life; becomes an actual expansive content of capacity—a living and informing power. The ego becomes, in the highest sense, a living, but *intelligized, cosmos*.

To bring about the free, harmonious, conscious, organic and living, unification of the relative and absolute; to mirror, progressively,\* the cosmical and supercosmical in the human consciousness in normal relativity and absolutism; in a word, to give rational birth to the *unpantheistic*  $\pi\alpha\nu\ \epsilon\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$  of entity—this is the sublime, the glorious, mission of philosophy.

\* Philosophy is designed, to be sure, to *accomplish* its mission; but not in the sense that its work is to be all *done*, at any conceivable point in the procession of the unrolling ages, as if it set itself to achieve an ordinary sort of task, whose accomplishment involved, of necessity, the final supersedure and suspension of all operation of the same sort. Philosophy, on the contrary, is concerned with *movement*, as an element in which alone it can have an existence at all. Its mission is to achieve the *crescive evolution of endless progression* in the domain of truth; for, philosophy surely ought not to be regarded as an attachment, merely, of the present order and condition of human life, and as fated, at last, to sink into annihilation upon the funeral pyre of nature. The postulate rises out of the very nature of the combined facts and circumstances, here, that philosophy is inseparable from the race; that, in the final catastrophe, it is designed to surmount the existing economy as an essential constituent of the rising humanity, and in such *transnatural* sphere, to prosecute its *one* mission forever. The progression of philosophy is *perpetual*. The region of *undiscovered* truth is absolutely inexhaustible. The finite cannot, by any possibility, be made to *include* the infinite.

## ART. V.—ATOMOLOGY.

BY REV. THEODORE APPEL, D. D.

IT is a remarkable fact that in the earlier ages of the world so little attention was paid by philosophers to the study of objects near at hand, that fell immediately under the cognizance of the senses. The records go to show that it was not supposed to be involved in the calling of the wise man to derive knowledge from shell, flower, mineral, or from any of the multifarious objects of his daily observation and experience. Those things were useful and the knowledge of their uses was acquired by ordinary minds without much study. But it does not seem to have been imagined that they contained any wisdom or meaning beyond their uses. Chemistry, Geology, Mineralogy and, to a great extent, Natural History, all of which may be considered as the knowledge of common things, are modern sciences, of comparatively recent origin. The human mind in its first stages, among all nations, instead of sitting down and studying its immediate surroundings, with an elasticity that seemed to be innate, took an upward flight and busied itself almost exclusively with the study and contemplation of the spiritual world, or of objects that seemed most remote, most mysterious, and bewildering to its apprehension. The first form of knowledge, science or philosophy, therefore, was religious, theological or moral, and not physical. So the annals of all nations that came to a history or development teach us. Some of them indeed never got down from the spiritual world to the study of material things. India and Persia may be said to have contributed little or nothing to physical science. In their profound thinking, in their earnest struggles to solve the

problem of the universe and of human destiny, they can scarcely be said even to have ventured fairly on the outside of the ideal world. They became petrified, so to speak, in the contemplation of the infinite, before they had time to make any further progress earthwards. It was only in Greece that wise men began to recognize the fact that they belonged to the system of nature, to look around upon its diversified phenomena and to familiarize themselves with the causes of its operations. Here the great reaction against the excessive and one-sided spiritualism of the East commenced, and Greece therefore may be said to be, in an important sense, the turning point or mediator between the ancient and modern worlds. But Greece, so far as results were concerned, did very little for the science of nature. It made only a beginning. It was engaged mainly, under new auspices, in efforts to solve the old problems upon which the oriental mind had been so active; it continued to speculate, like the wise men of the East, on the nature of God, on His relation to nature and man, on human destiny, on immortality, on good and evil and the highest happiness of man. Even when it did enter upon the investigation of nature in earnest, it obeyed the general tendency to look, not at the things which were near at hand, but at those which were far off; not at the small objects which challenged their attention every hour, but at the large and sublime worlds which revealed themselves in the silence and darkness of the night. Astronomy was pursued with diligence and success, but no attention was paid to Geology. Philosophers knew a great deal about the stars and the motions of the heavenly bodies; they in fact discovered nearly all the facts of Astronomy which it was possible for men to discover without the telescope; but they possessed little or no scientific knowledge of rocks and stones, of plants and flowers, of fish and birds, and of many other objects that interest philosophers and scientific men in modern times.

This order in the development of the human mind from the infancy of nations onwards, to which we have thus referred, is

often regarded as irrational and absurd in our day. It is sometimes thought it was a mere waste of so much mental energy, which should have been utilized and turned to better account. Some have made merry over it as an exhibition of the vagarious tendency of the human mind. The disciples of Lord Bacon have disputed the legitimacy of the order which history itself here saw proper to pursue, and affirmed that if it had been reversed and men had studied the inductive sciences more and speculated less in regard to God and human destiny, it would have been so much the better for the world at large. But as there is a divinity in history, we think it can be made to appear that its own laws of development are always better than those which philosophers would dictate, and that they may be amply vindicated.

The imagination that men in the beginning and vigor of the race should have commenced with the natural sciences and then afterwards taken up the profound questions of Theology and Philosophy, and not pursue the opposite course, can be justified only on the basis of certain speculations which are of modern growth. One is, that man was originally a barbarian without culture or refinement, living in close communion with nature and the animal world, from which it is the province of history to raise him to the higher order of a rational life. If this had been so, it would have been quite natural for him to have made himself acquainted first with nature, his foster mother. So, it is quite likely that he would have experienced a strong natural impulse in that direction, and commenced to analyze the soil from which he derived his subsistence, instead of speculating about the gods. Another supposition, somewhat popular in our day, traces man's origin considerably further back than this barbaric life of nature and finds his progenitors among the lower forms of animal and vegetable life. If this had been his descent, or rather his ascent, he would hardly have remembered, it is true, the transformations through which he had passed; but it is natural to conclude that he would have retained some

vague suspicions or dark intuitions of such a wonderful progress upwards from the dark world below; and that from the start he would have taken more kindly towards plants and animals, studied their habits and nature, and piously preserved their extinct forms in herbariums and collections of natural history. But no suppositions of this kind have been verified either by the researches of history or the facts of science; and we are left to the old opinion, taught by divine revelation and confirmed by history, that man's original endowments were by no means of such a meager character as those referred to, but of a much more exalted character; that he started from a high degree of culture and refinement, but that unfortunately his subsequent progress was downwards towards barbarism and decay. His descent, in the nature of things, could not be sudden and absolute. It was rather of the nature of a gradual deterioration. He did not lose at once his vitality, physical, intellectual or moral. He was able to keep up the fight against death at first for centuries, and when roused by his passions, he could still exert the strength of a giant. Besides, when cut off from direct communion and fellowship with God and banished from the abodes of innocence and truth, the light of Paradise continued to stream forth after him and to follow him, although with diminishing splendor, in his downward course through the centuries. Man's origin was from above, not from beneath, and it is therefore neither strange, unnatural nor irrational, that he did not at once forget that fact, but continued to think of it first and foremost, to cherish it as a priceless inheritance, and to cling to it as a light shining in a dark place, when the thick shades of darkness gathered around his habitation. Ancient philosophy and theology, therefore, did not involve a wrong direction imparted to the faculties of the human mind, nor their abuse and misapplication in the region of fancy and imagination. The tendency was a legitimate one, and the deep and earnest thinking of antiquity in regard to the most important questions that concern man was not without its influ-

ence in preparing the world for its high destiny in after times. This natural bias, however, towards the spiritual and infinite, characteristic of the ancients generally, was not the only and exclusive one which lay concealed in the human mind. Man must first think of himself and of his relation to God, for there only can he find the supreme good, as his own instincts tell him; but then as he stands related to nature, even if at first his thoughts carried him heavenward, he could not be indifferent to his natural surroundings, the realm over which he reigns as a sovereign. He betrays everywhere an instinctive desire to examine, to investigate and to analyze nature. It is only in this way, by taking in all the parts, that he can come to solve the problem of the world's history as a whole. This tendency, held somewhat in abeyance for ages, for good and sufficient reasons, must as a matter of course assert its rights and in the course of time claim for itself a free course of development. This it has done in modern times; sometimes with great violence and one-sidedness, as if all previous history were of no account and the moderns were called to build up the superstructure of human knowledge entirely *de novo*. As the ancients in their spiritualistic flights sometimes looked down upon nature with contempt, despised matter and regarded it as the source of all evil, so the moderns, proud of their achievements in the sphere of science and spurred on by what seems to be a spirit of retaliation, have charged home upon the ancient spiritualism without respect or veneration for its age. It has gone so far as to treat it, together with the spiritualism of the Bible, as mere myth and imagination, and then to assert that truth is to be found only in the positive science of our day. So the positivists now teach. But notwithstanding this antagonism, this self-conceit and vain-glory of the moderns, the tendency towards nature and science is a just and legitimate one, fully as much so as the other. The mistake consists in sundering two things which belong together. In ancient times man's pursuit of knowledge seemed to be a struggle upwards towards an in-

visible apex above him; in our days, it is rather of the nature of a descent downwards, along the slope on the other side, towards the foundation of things. It is, however, all one process, carried forward by the same agent.

One thing seems to be certain, and it is so much credit that must be acceded to the moderns, that they have made the most progress when we consider the short time in which they have been at work. For the last few centuries, during which only science has been in earnest at work, its achievements have been prodigious. Astronomy may be said to be a finished science. We know all about the motions of the stars and the mechanism of the universe as a whole. We are familiar with physics, the properties of bodies and the laws which they obey in their relation to each other. But what is more wonderful to relate, with the light of chemical science, we have become acquainted with the inward properties and habits of bodies; we have succeeded in taking them apart and putting them together again; in finding the likes and dislikes of their separate particles; and in detecting the presence and operation of fraternal laws among the constituent elements of matter. Similar progress is manifest in Geology and Natural History, in Botany and Mineralogy. It is an age of wonderful discoveries both on the lands and in the seas. Unremittingly the work of analyzing is going forward under competent corps, and scientists everywhere are digging and delving into the rugged sides of nature with the view of discovering the precious metal of truth. This process of questioning nature and of extorting from her the secrets, which for ages lay concealed in her mysterious realms, is not without its dash of heroism, and its mere contemplation excites within us feelings akin to those which exercised Horace, when he viewed the audacity of the man who first navigated the oceans and seas.

Illi robur et as triplex  
Circa pectus erat, qui fragilem truci  
Commisit pelago ratem  
Primus.

The ambition now a days seems to be to get at the bottom of things just as it was formerly to reach the top. Whether we have succeeded as well as our predecessors is a debatable question. It is certain, however, that we are just as one-sided. Perhaps the time allotted to us has been too short. We may hope, at least, that it is our mission to bring up the rear in the march of science and to finish the great battle of Truth against Error, by combining all knowledge in a single unity.

One of the boldest and most startling achievements of science at the present day has been to pass beyond the regions of Astronomy, Chemistry, Geology and Zoology, and to get down among the infinitesimals of matter, out of which all things were formed. It is a bold plunge certainly into an unknown, mysterious realm, which neither the eye, aided by the microscope, nor any of our senses, can penetrate. It is a region where only the torch of reason can give us any assistance in threading our labyrinthine way. Atomology is engaging the thoughts of many who occupy very different points of observation. It is perhaps destined in the course of time to become a science. As, however, it has not yet gained a place in our text books, we shall endeavor to show that it is worthy of attention, not a malarious district, but a fertile region from which the very best fruit may be gathered in.

As Atomology has ever been more or less in bad odor with many really thoughtful persons, it will be necessary for us in the first place to endeavor to divest it of some of the prejudices which have gathered around it and to remove the unpleasant materialistic associations that still cling to it. It has in fact at different times fallen into bad hands, who have used it for illegal purposes. It has been much misused and abused.

It was made prominent in the old Epicurean philosophy. We have all read of the fight of aboriginal atoms, and of their fortuitous concussion in the formation of the universe. But a careful study of Epicurus has shown that his theory of atoms has no real or inner connection with his system as a whole, and

that it was not derived from his theory of morals nor from his canon of reason. He was not its author; he in fact borrowed it from others and attached it mechanically to his system, because it seemed to be well adapted to subserve an object of his own. In order to make men happy, he sought to free them from superstition, from the fear of the gods and the voice of conscience. It was only in this way, as he supposed, that they might attain to that calm and placid life, in which the ancients imagined that true happiness consisted. He therefore lugged in his doctrine of atoms to explain the origin and source of the worlds, because it seemed best suited to set aside the idea of God and of a divine providence.

More immediately Epicurus borrowed this plank of his philosophy from his masters, Leucippus and Democritus, who were praised without stint by Lord Bacon in his day and by Prof. Tyndall in our times, as the great lights of ancient science.\* According to Bacon, "they were of weightier metal than Plato or Aristotle, whose philosophy has happened to come down to us because it was of a lighter substance, while things more solid sank and almost passed into oblivion." But our best authorities on the history of philosophy, such as Cudworth, Ritter, Tenneman, Rixner and others are far from giving such credit to Leucippus or Democritus. They were the ultra materialists of their day, who set up a reactionary movement in opposition to the prevailing spiritual philosophy of their age. As others asserted that there was a world of spirit, they maintained that nothing had any existence save matter. As others contended for some material principle, such as water, fire or air, from which all things proceeded, they gave this up as a fruitless task and professed an infinite number of principles in atoms, by which nature in all its parts was built up. This doctrine seemed to suit their purpose; they made even a system of philosophy out of it by which they sought to explain all things as well as refute

\* See Tyndall's *Advancement of Science*, p. 22.

their opponents, the spiritualists. They applied it to psychology and, as Prof. Tyndall says, maintained that the "soul was made up of atoms, and that the phenomena of sensation and thought are also the result of their combination."

Democritus was no doubt a very learned man; he is said to have written more books than Plato or Aristotle; he perhaps knew more than either of those great men; but he possessed only a modicum of their penetration, of their power of comprehension and profound thinking. Like Epicurus he and Leucippus borrowed the doctrine of atoms from others. History, according to Cudworth, proves that it came down as a tradition from an earlier age, where it was merely one branch of a much more comprehensive spiritual philosophy. Pythagoras and his followers taught the doctrine of physical monads, which was only another word for atoms. With him, however, monads occupied simply one department of philosophy and were held in intimate, but subordinate relation to the spiritual world. The earliest philosophers of Greece all held to the existence of both spirit and matter; and as they came from the East or were in close communication with it, it is not improbable that the doctrine of atoms came down to them as a tradition from divine revelation. In Genesis, it is said, that the spirit of God moved on the face of the waters. Here spirit and matter were held together in proper relation to each other as factors in the formation of the universe. And so they continued to walk together arm in arm for many centuries, forming a complete philosophy, until such men as Democritus succeeded in detaching the one from the other and setting up an atheistical philosophy on a single plank or fragment of the older philosophy. It was in this way, we conceive, that the old doctrine of atoms or monads, which was nothing else but the scriptural account of a primeval chaos, fell into the hands of such thieves and robbers as Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus, who perverted it and stripped it of its original meaning and character. The encomiums, therefore, which Lord Bacon

and Prof. Tyndall have bestowed on these men, as leaders of science in ancient times, are not deserved. There is no reason whatever for supposing that they were animated by any special love for science as such. They were speculative philosophers, like many others, who had entered the arena as polemics and made use of a physics as a mere tool, to put down metaphysics and the ancient doctrine of God and a future life.

From what has now been said, it will be evident, as we think, that the origin of Atomology is both ancient and honorable. From time to time, it has been torn from its connections and made to subserve the interests of a gross materialism; but that, as history goes to show, is not its proper place or use. As in the beginning, so now, it belongs to a more comprehensive system of thought, in which matter and spirit stand in necessary and friendly relation to each other. Atomology, therefore, when studied without any previous adverse bias, so far from leading to materialism and unbelief, leads just in the contrary direction. This we think can be made to appear. Facts might be cited to sustain this position. Many of the profoundest Christian thinkers have embraced the doctrine of primary atoms as the physical origin of the universe; but it has not ruled out of their minds faith in a higher order of things. In their systems, it has been of great use in confirming men's faith in the infinite and eternal. Leibnitz speculated on the subject of atoms or monads much more profoundly than Epicurus or Democritus or any of the ancient philosophers; they indeed occupy an important position in his system of philosophy; but no one would charge him with being a materialist. He belonged rather to the other side in this controversy. He was a Christian philosopher, who sought in his own way, "to justify the ways of God to man." He saw no antagonism between matter and mind, but regarded the whole universe, spiritual and material, as a single process. He invested the humble atoms that entered into the constitution of all bodies with a dynamic character, which has elevated them immensely in dig-

nity in our days, and helped materially in reconciling the old differences which had sprung up between the outward and the inward, the finite and the infinite. Whilst the ancient atomistic materialists employed atoms as weapons in beating down the citadel of truth, Leibnitz gathered them together and employed them with good effect in building up the superstructure of a Christian philosophy.

It might, we presume, be taken for granted, that a doctrine so ancient as Atomology, taught by so many great and wise men in different ages and countries, must in its essential elements be true. The authority of the ancients here ought to have great weight with us, for although they did not analyze and experiment as much as we do in getting at inductions, they were superior to us in their intuitional powers. It is well known that Pythagoras taught the true system of the universe, with the sun in the center of the solar system, at a time when he had not a sufficiency of facts or data to justify him in arriving at this conclusion in the ordinary way. It must, as it seems to us, have been owing to his great insight into things. So, probably, it was also with his doctrine of monads. Guided by intuitive reason and prevailingly controlled by the mathematical bent of his mind, he gave form to the old tradition of an original chaos and laid the foundation of the science of atoms prophetically. In the history of science, there have been prophets who have foreshadowed future developments, just as there have been prophets who have predicted future events in the religious world.

But as we have passed beyond that point in the history of science, in which tradition was the main source of authority, and live in an era in which every one is expected to examine and judge for himself, it will be necessary for us for a few moments to go down among the atoms themselves, examine their capacities and see how far they are adapted to build up multitudinous worlds, the shining orbs above us, as well as that beautiful world in which we here live.

As already intimated, Atomology had probably a mathematical origin. Whilst mathematics is purely an abstract science and may be evolved by the human mind without any reference to the outside world, its harmony with the natural world is marvellous. Nature everywhere performs its operations in accordance with mathematical laws. God Himself, it is said, geometrizes; and if so, nature is nothing more than a concrete system of mathematics. But as lines, surfaces, solids and magnitudes generally are all evolved out of mathematical points or zeros, so it would follow from the parallelism just spoken of, that all physical bodies must be made up of atoms, which, if not absolutely zeros, must be infinitesimally small. If we knew more of Pythagoras, we should probably find that he reasoned just in this way in regard to this matter.

But coming down from the world of abstractions to tangible objects, we meet with so many facts that point to the infinitesimal origin of material bodies, that it becomes difficult to arrange them in order or to enumerate them. Bodies have weight and they all respond to the force of gravity. But in these respects they differ widely. Some are heavy and others very light. This is best explained by supposing that within a given space some contain more atoms and others less. Then bodies differ materially in form, in structure, and in various qualities which distinguish them from each other. Some are solid and hard. Their particles are all fixed, and yet we know that comparatively large space, or pore, surround them on all sides. How do they support themselves in such a state of equilibrium, suspended on nothing? Science tells us that this is impossible without the presence of two forces at least. If a point or body be acted upon by a single force, it will continue to move on forever with a uniform motion in a straight line. But this may be arrested by a second opposing force, which brings about rest. So the equilibrium of particles in solid bodies is not an ultimate fact which cannot be accounted for, but one that has been brought about by the two opposite forces

of attraction and repulsion active in all atoms, which hold each one in its place, just as the planets are held in their orbits by the action of the two opposing forces. In ordinary circumstances, atoms are thus defined in position by their likes and dislikes, but as we know, they are continually liable to be disturbed by outside influences, when all of a sudden immense hosts of them are set in motion. The relatively large, empty spaces, or pores, around each individual afford ample space for their marches and counter-marches, up and down, forwards and backwards. This elasticity of bodies, producing vibrations and sounds, active for a time and then relapsing into their customary slumber, so far as we know, can result only from the action and reaction of innumerable small atoms or agents, that stand guard at their several posts and are always ready to resist any intrusion into their domain.

As a general thing the structure of solid bodies is amorphous, that is, each atom in the general rush towards centralization, seems to have cared only for itself without any regard to its fellows, and having once gained its position, has maintained it ever since. A bird's-eye view of this vast host of individuals does not present to us the order and regularity of a well-disciplined army. It is simply the vulgar crowd of atoms. But the facts of crystallography go far to show that atoms are susceptible of a higher stadium of social relation to each other. Under favorable conditions, when they are free to choose their position at leisure, they arrange themselves into crystals of regular, definite, mathematical form. Most substances have this susceptibility, and probably all of them, if the proper conditions were at hand. Here atoms cannot choose their position at random; but are marshalled into straight lines or ranks, where they are required to remain in place. It is only on such a supposition, that we can account for such regular symmetric forms. Charcoal and diamond are composed of the same substance, carbon, but how widely they differ in appearance. One would suppose that they differed in all other

respects; but their only real difference consists in the aggregation of the same ultimate particles.

The arrangement of atoms into crystals and transparent bodies, by which they are elevated from a region of darkness into that of light, suggests that they are endowed with other capacities besides their likes and dislikes, their attractions and repulsions. Here the presence of a magnetic force seems to reveal itself. It is not improbable that each atom is an infinitesimal magnet.

Solids are most likely the ultimate form which atoms tend to assume. Liquids and gases, especially gases, were their original state; certainly they were when the earth was without form and void and darkness dwelt on the face of the deep. Many of the fluids have been absorbed and now enter as constituents of the earth's crust; but many of them, for a wise purpose, have been left free to assist in carrying forward the economy of our own terrestrial life. Both manifest their atomic origin. In gases the repulsive forces of the atoms predominate. So far as we know they are indefinitely expansive and the hostility of their atoms is eternal and implacable. They furnish an illustration of the extremely minute size of atoms. The molecules of oxygen and hydrogen are too small to be seen under the highest magnifying power of the microscope. But if they are made up of other ultimate atoms, as there is reason for supposing, how extremely minute must these latter be. In liquids the original innate repulsion of atoms has in a measure yielded to the opposite force of contraction or attraction, so that they are free to move about among themselves, provided they do not transgress the limits which their own freedom has set for them.

The general object, however, which we have in view in this discussion, does not require of us to enlarge on this aspect of our subject. Enough has been said to show that Atomology has a foundation in nature and that it is entitled to a place in physical science. There ought, therefore, to be no hesitancy on the part of any one to admit its just claims or to accede to

any of its positions, provided these latter do not wage war against all our instincts as well as our reason. It has thrown light on a mysterious subject. It must now be admitted, also, we think, that such investigations have tended to elevate our idea of the nature of matter, and to give it a much more rational character than what was formerly accorded to it. They have served to bring out more prominently into view its dynamical in distinction from its more mechanical character, and this is an important step in the way of progress. As atoms are endowed with various internal forces of their own and tend towards organization, they plainly manifest indications of life in its lower rudimental forms. They constitute the twilight, if not the dawn of the daylight of nature that follows. We may indeed be generous and admit with Prof. Tyndall, that there is such a thing as a "cosmical life" at the foundations of nature. But if we admit all this, the question still recurs, What are we going to do with this inevitable activity of atoms all working together with no less a definite object in view than the formation of the universe? This is the main question which is continually coming uppermost, just as one discovery after another is made in the sphere of nature.

We have already seen how the ancient materialists answered the question. They made the kingdoms of nature their choice, and fell down and worshipped them. It is the answer of materialists of the present day, as it has been of all times. The region of primary atoms seems to be their last stronghold. To them it is the last link in the long chain of causation, and they strangely imagine, that here they find the first cause of all things, the cause of all other causes. They detach nature from all connection with another world, and consider it as the only form of existence, whilst all that is beyond it is mere dreamland without truth or existence; or if they dare not venture quite that far, they admit that there is here in this obscure region something like a ruling power in connection with nature. This is either chance, a blind necessity, a dark, brute force, or

some other kind of an unknown god. Thus men cut loose the vessel that fastens them to the rock of eternal truth and launch out into unknown regions of doubt and uncertainty.

This solution of the great question involves manifestly a deification of the powers of nature, for it makes it self-sufficient, self-existent and absolutely independent; but these are attributes, which we are accustomed to ascribe to the Divine Being. Materialism therefore does not, strictly speaking, refuse to worship or do homage. It does, however, certainly ask us to change the object of worship. It substitutes in the place of a personal being, one whom we can know, love and obey as one heavenly father, the darkest, the dreariest, and the most uncomely deity which the human imagination has ever conceived of, dwelling in the obscurest region of nature, in darkness that is inaccessible, and full of all kinds of delusions. Materialists complain of the mysteries of divine revelation, of the difficulty of conceiving of an infinite personal being, of a trinity or of any revelation from a region beyond nature. But do they mend the matter when they shut out the light from above, and offer us the fitful, phosphorescent flashes that gleam out upon us from the regions below? We think not. They only increase in an infinite degree the difficulties in the way of certainty and levy a truly exorbitant tax upon our credulity. It were much easier, just as it would be better, for the mass of men to believe in the fabulous divinities of Greece and Rome than the deity which a perverted science assays to set up for our admiration from time to time.

The materialist, however, when he makes such extravagant demands on our faith, may nevertheless be all the while serious and exhibit even a certain degree of candor. He professes that truth is the highest and only object of his pursuit. He believes what he sees and knows, but what he does not see, has for him no existence. His faith and knowledge are measured by the organs by which he communicates with existence, on the outside of him. This is all right so far as it goes; but his mis-

take is that he makes his own organ the measure of faith for the world at large. He has large and healthy organs for the study and contemplation of nature; the fact is, his organs for science are too largely developed—developed at the expense of those which are higher and better; but, as he professes, he has none for the perception of a spiritual world. Others cannot see so far into the natural world, but they have keen organs for the perception of spiritual and invisible things. Now it is peculiarly unfortunate for the materialist that these spiritual organs are alive and active in an overwhelming majority of his fellow-men. As we have already shown, this was palpably the case in the early history of the world. Then the spiritual side of existence absorbed almost exclusive attention, and it required some degree of coercion to get men to think of nature. Why was this so? If it were maintained that the spiritual organs of the ancients had no objective existence to which they corresponded, it might be retorted that the moderns have no better reasons for believing that the external world which responds to their senses or reason has any actual existence. Skepticism is just as valid in the one case as in the other. If the naturalist believes in a material world on the evidence of his natural senses, why may not the world at large believe in spiritual existences on the evidence of their spiritual senses? The very fact that men have such spiritual organs and that in all ages and countries they have been so prone to employ them, although they have been very much blurred and blinded by prevailing sensualism, is or ought to be, even to the skeptic, one of the strongest proofs that there is such a world of spiritual existences corresponding to these organs. When the idealist attempts to shake our faith in the reality of the outward world of nature, we point to our five senses to correct the delusion, and the appeal is irresistible. Why then should the appeal be less irresistible in the case of the believer when he exclaims: We know in whom we have believed? But the materialist alleges that he has no knowledge of the existence of such spiritual organs, so

far as his own experience goes. This may be so. He may be just so one-sided. But this can avail him nothing, because he has no right to make his own experience the measure of all knowledge. He does not in fact do this in his own sphere. He is continually using the experience of others. The testimony of scientific associations is authority everywhere. Astronomical observations made thousands of years ago are eagerly sought after and utilized by the moderns. Why then should the testimony of centuries flowing down to us through so many different channels, proclaiming that there is a personal God, be ignored by a comparatively few persons, who from wrong education or some internal defect of their own, cannot themselves rise to such an elevated idea? We merely answer that it cannot be done.

But to return to the primary atoms from which we have slightly been digressing. Materialists exercise their rational powers in regard to another world, no less than their intuitional senses. They allege that they know of the existence of natural forces by their effects, but that we can know of nothing beyond them and that they are ultimate facts. Having, therefore, traced the chain of causation down to ultimate atoms and having found there a vast reservoir of forces sufficient to form and sustain the universe, he concludes that there is nothing knowable beyond and that his occupation as a philosopher and interpreter of nature is finished. Tyndall finds here in this region of ultimates the "womb of nature" as he calls it, from which the present order of nature up to man has been developed in the Darwinian sense. But it is just here with regard to the forces of nature that we join issue with the materialist and find him most vulnerable. We deny in *toto* that forces anywhere are ultimate facts. So far as our knowledge and experience go they are always in close connection with an anterior reason, mind or will, of which they are eminently suggestive as correlatives. Let us see how this matter stands. If we take a palace, a town or city, it is manifest that they are made of

atoms, which have been brought together and reduced to a state of equilibrium; but it is also manifest that they were all brought into their places by the will and intelligence of man. And we know that they remain where they are by the sufferance of man, for he can pull down as well as build up. Again, in a locomotive or a steamship the atoms are not at rest but in motion. Their antagonisms have been excited and the result is the development of those tremendous energies which once lay concealed in sleeping atoms. But here again all these forces of matter are subject to the control of the human will, which started them and now controls them. We know that in these cases, the will of man only regulates the forces of atoms; it does not originate them. That however is something, because it shows the superiority of mind over matter. But let us take an example nearer home. The atoms in the human body, with their inherent properties unchanged, have been brought into their places by a mysterious power, which we call life, and are kept there by this same agency. When however they are set in motion by a movement of the body or limbs, we are conscious of the exertion of a new force, that does not proceed from the atoms of our muscles or of our brain, but from ourselves, from our souls, in a word, from our wills. Here then in our own immediate experience we have an example of a force that does not come from matter but mind, operating directly upon atoms and setting them in motion. Why then should it be deemed a thing impossible or irrational, that the primitive atoms of creation should receive all their powers immediately from a supreme will and be continually directed by a supreme reason? Such, we think, is the conclusion to which both reason and analogy lead, apart from our intuitional instincts.

As already said, study and reflection have invested primary atoms with much higher capacities than they were formerly supposed to possess. They have no doubt some spark of vitality about them. They have not a conscious intelligence, but

they show evidence of rationality. Each one involves in it, in some degree, the meaning and sense of the whole universe, which together they have realized in time and space. Let all this be granted. The more intelligence, indeed, we put into these dynamic centers of creation, the better it will be for the argument which we have in hand. It all helps so much the better to show the intelligence and wisdom of that Being, whose behests they are evermore obeying. We might indeed invest them with far more intelligence than they really possess, as has been done by Mr. Tyndall; and yet no such amplification of their powers could raise them above the dignity of secondary causes. In regard to this whole subject, let us listen to the words of the judicious Plutarch. "The ancients," he says, "directed their attention simply to the divine in phenomena, as God is the beginning and center of all, and from Him all things proceed; and they overlooked natural causes. The moderns turned themselves wholly away from that Divine ground of things and supposed that everything could be explained from natural causes. Both these views are, however, partial and defective; and the right understanding of the matter requires that both should be combined."\*

This would be the proper place to consider the office of atoms in the cosmos, as claimed for them by Prof. Tyndall, whose tract on the "Advancement of Science" we have had in view all along in the preparation of this paper. But this is unnecessary for the object which we have immediately in view.

From what has now been said, it will appear that nature and spirit are by no means antagonistic. They are related and friendly spheres and much may be drawn from science to show their inward relation and harmony. It is therefore an unauthorized act of violence when either of these spheres of knowledge is detached from the other and made to occupy such a

\* Neander, vol. I., p. 23.

position as to ignore the claims of the other, as is too much the case with the philosophy and science of the present day.

Science, when properly pursued, can lead to no such results. Its real tendency lies in the opposite direction. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that it of itself ought to produce in us faith in a spiritual world. This is something that lies outside of the range of science. Unless we bring faith with us to the study of nature, it is not likely that we will make any considerable advance in spiritual knowledge, whatever our other attainments and accomplishments may be. The probability is that just the contrary effect will be produced, so that even that light which is within us, will become darkness. Faith in its lower form, including fear and reverence for God, is a natural gift which all may possess in a higher or lower degree. It may be cultivated and cherished, or it may be thrown away as the disciples of Epicurus were taught to do. It is the light that is still left with man; and even in the absence of the supernatural light of revelation, it is of unspeakable value to him. It is his only guide. It is the salt that preserves his knowledge from entire corruption and decay. It is therefore one of the pre-requisites of all successful study, especially in the science of nature, without which it is not strange that so many go astray and fail to realize the high aim of a liberal education. As schools and seminaries of learning cannot impart intellectual capacities, but can cultivate and strengthen them, so they cannot give their students faith, reverence or the fear of God; but they can cultivate and confirm these elements of our nature. Students, therefore, must bring both kinds of gifts with them from their homes, and not seek them in laboratories nor textbooks, nor entirely in the grand temple of nature, but in the sanctuary of the Lord, in which the science of knowledge of divine things is to be found in its greatest profusion.

## ART. VI.—THE PENNSYLVANIA GERMANS.

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AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE DEDICATION OF PALATINATE COLLEGE,  
MYERSTOWN, PA., DECEMBER 23, 1875.

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BY GEO. F. BAER, ESQ.

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A DESCENDANT of a Palatine, I count it a high privilege to meet with you at the dedication of Palatinate College. Most heartily do I wish the part assigned to me had fallen to some more worthy representative of our people. But let my interest and zeal for whatever concerns the Pennsylvania Germans, offset my unfitness, and my want of thorough preparation be atoned for by a heart whose every pulsation is true to my own people. It speaks well for the future of our people that here in Eastern Pennsylvania a college should be founded and named Palatinate. The impulse which prompts us to honor our ancestors, is one of the noblest of our nature. Next to the Christian principle which requires our walk and conversation to be perfect before the Lord, there is no greater conservator of public morality nor stricter censor, of private action, than the reflection that a given line of conduct will be unworthy of our ancestors, and bring disgrace on our children, even beyond the fourth generation. This respect was in the very beginning implied in the command of the decalogue, "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land the Lord thy God giveth thee."

If it be true that the departed dead can look from their mansions in the skies upon the abodes of mortal men, there will be joy in heaven, that after a century and a half of neglect of, and indifference to the fame of the pious Germans, who for the sake of religious freedom, and rest and peace from strife and war,

settled these lands, and made this wilderness to blossom as the rose, their descendants, in recognition and commemoration of their trials and merits, meet to dedicate a college named in honor of them.

No people are so little understood as the Pennsylvania Germans. They have never been given their true place in the history of this continent. They and their descendants who have migrated to different parts of the United States, constitute a large proportion of the population of this country; but the written histories fail to give any fair account of them. They are either completely ignored, or if mentioned, it is in the most casual way, and too often with the sneers and the gibes of narrow-minded men who can see no merit in the German people.

The stories of Plymouth Rock, of Jamestown, and of New Amsterdam, are as familiar as household words, all over the land. Their minutest details have been carefully preserved and recorded. In history, in poetry and song, in school-books, on every national fast or festival, in the halls of legislation, at the hustings, and in the pulpit the story of the Pilgrim fathers is told: How, because of religious persecutions, a little band of oppressed English Christians fled to Holland, and from thence ventured on the bosom of the great deep, and after being storm-tossed and tempest-driven, landed on a bleak, wintry day on Plymouth Rock; how they suffered privation and want, were wasted by famine and consumed by fevers, braved the ferocity of savages, bore untold hardships, to find freedom to worship God, to found an asylum for the oppressed of the earth.

Grand, sublimely grand, was the heroism of the men, and grander still the fortitude of the women and children who composed that Pilgrim band! I bow in respectful deference to the memory of the Pilgrim fathers.

Happy Pilgrims! They have had such poets as Hemans, such orators as Webster to perpetuate in words that shall never be lost, their undying fame; and if the truth of history itself be not sufficient, the fame of their great orator will surely sup-

ply the defect, and accomplish and fulfill his proud prediction that, "It shall yet go hard if the three hundred millions of people of China shall not one day hear and know something of the rock of Plymouth too."

I would not take one leaf from the proud chaplet, the sons of New England have woven for their Puritan fathers. I can forget their faults, their short-comings, their inconsistencies, their crimes, when I remember how much their descendants have done to build up and defend our great fabric of Constitutional American liberty. The great public services of one such man as Webster, is more than a propitiation for a century of mistakes and errors of the people from whom he sprang.

But there is a story untold by the historian, neglected by the poet, forgotten by the many, perverted by the few, of a people whose descendants outnumber the Puritans, which, when truthfully told, is worthy of no mean place alongside the story of Plymouth Rock. I need not hesitate to tell it to this audience; for it is the glorious record of a noble people, you may well exult to call your ancestors.

It starts with the great German Reformation that gave birth to Protestantism. Here at least history gives no uncertain sound. I need not dwell on the scenes of that first great struggle. For almost two centuries those noble old German heroes, with a faith in God that never faltered, defended the faith and principles of Protestantism with their lives and property. The records of history, whether sacred or profane, contain no more heart-rending accounts of privations, sufferings, persecutions, and martyrdoms, than those which fell to the lot of the defenders of Protestantism in Germany, France and Switzerland. All the sufferings and persecutions the Anglo-Saxons of England inflicted upon the Puritans, were "trifles light as air," compared with the beastly violence, inhuman tortures and fiendish cruelties inflicted by Spanish and French fanaticism on the followers of the Reformers. The direst punishments pagan imagination could create, as the fit doom of the greatest crimi-

nals, were in actual practice exceeded by the religious fanaticism of the people who sought to exterminate Protestantism in the countries of the Rhine.

The armies of France after Louis XIV. revoked the edict of Nantes (1685), were let loose upon the Protestants to terrify them into conversion. Whole troops of dissolute soldiers were allowed to practice the most revolting cruelties and frightful barbarities. Not only were the French provinces subjected to these barbarities, but the Palatinate was over-run, and her devoted people treated in the same way.

The French army on the Rhine was ordered to reduce everything to ashes. "The French generals who dared not refuse to obey," writes Voltaire, "were then obliged to drive out in the middle of winter the unfortunate inhabitants of the Palatinate and the neighboring provinces. It was the second time during the reign of Louis XIV. this beautiful country was rendered desolate; but the fires with which Turenne had burnt ten cities and twenty villages of the Palatinate were but sparks in comparison with this last conflagration. Spires, Worms, Heidelberg, Manheim, and a multitude of burghs and villages were given to the flames. The Palatinate, the Electorate of Treves and the Margravate of Baden were covered with ruins. Never had the Vandals, who at a former epoch passed over this country, committed such awful atrocities."

The whole country was pillaged; houses were burnt and crops destroyed; men, women and children were left without homes, food or shelter. Not only were they stripped of all earthly possessions and reduced to beggary and starvation, but they were denied the right in their distress to call upon God for protection and help in the only modes of worship and forms of prayer their tongues knew, or their souls could pour forth. The peace of Utrecht (1713), and Radstadt (1714), brought only partial relief. As late as 1719 a decree prohibited entirely the use of the Heidelberg Catechism in the Palatinate.

The loved fatherland, the Rhine, as dear to them then, as it

still is to the German hearts, who, on the fields of battle and in the councils of State, have made "*Der Wacht Am Rhein*" resound through the world, and have wiped out centuries of contumely and reproach, had no home, no rest, no peace, no future for them. Where shall they go? Europe offered no asylum; England had the heart, but not the space to give homes to so large a migration. There was but one hope. Across the mighty ocean, a continent was still to be redeemed from barbarism and made the home of civilized men. Thither they turned their longing eyes. I speak it reverently: The forty years' wanderings of the Israelites in the wilderness were not years of greater trial (for God by miracles provided for and protected them), than the years of suffering and privation our German forefathers endured between the repeal of the edict of Nantes, and the beginning of that great migration which transplanted them to this land, across a mightier water than the Jordan. No pillar of cloud by day nor fire by night guided their path; but who can fail to discern, with the eye of faith, the finger of God in guiding them to a province destined to become a goodly inheritance, an empire within itself.

In New England they were still burning witches and persecuting all who dared to differ from or question the narrow tenets of rigid, stern and frigid Puritanism. The prospect for religious freedom there was less inviting than the scalping-knife of the savage was terrible. The Roman Catholic settlements, though to their credit be it spoken, the most liberal and tolerant, were not to be trusted, because they were Roman Catholic. The province of Penn alone promised a sure and safe retreat. Thither they fled by the thousands. They settled the "back parts of the province."

On the 17th September, 1717, the Lieutenant-Governor "observed to the Board that great numbers of foreigners from Germany, strangers to our language and constitutions, have lately been imported into this province." In the proceedings of the Council between the Indians and the Government of Penn-

sylvania, held at Conestoga on the 15th day of March, 1721, the fact that the Palatines undertook to furnish the corn to be presented to the Indians is specially mentioned. They experienced great trouble in securing titles to the lands they improved. The Indians claimed title. An Act of the General Assembly, passed in 1700, prohibited the buying of lands of the natives. The proprietary agents treated them unkindly, and refused to sell them lands. In 1724 they formally petitioned the Governor and Council that they "would recommend them (Palatines), to the favorable usage of the proprietaries' agents, and that they might be allowed to purchase lands in this province."

In 1726, Logan, the Secretary of the Province, writes, "We shall soon have a German colony, so many thousands of Palatines are already in the country. They say the proprietary invited people to come and settle his country."

The extent of this great exodus from the Palatinate to these shores may be gathered from a report to the Synod of Holland, made in 1731, which gives the number of Reformed members of the oppressed inhabitants of Germany, particularly out of the Palatinate, already here, as 15,000, and there were perhaps as many more Lutherans.

Exiles from the home of their birth, martyrs to Protestantism, they only asked permission to settle the back parts of Penn's province. They had known all the horrors of war, of famine, of torture, of oppression. They had suffered all that the ingenuity of civilized men could invent to wrong their fellow-men, and they were perfectly willing to risk finding peace and rest among the savage tribes of the new world. They should have been kindly received and heartily welcomed, for their own sakes, as well as for the sake of Him in whose cause they had suffered so much. But they were not. For many years they were subjected to great annoyances at the hands of the Government officials of the province.

Here is the action of the Government of Pennsylvania. It

speaks for itself: At a meeting of Council, held on the 14th September, 1727, at Philadelphia, "The Governor acquainted the Board that he had called them together at this time to inform them that there is lately arrived from Holland, a ship with four hundred Palatines, as 'tis said, and that he has information they will very soon be followed by a much greater number, who design to settle in the back parts of this province, \* \* \*, and it would be highly necessary to concert proper measures for the peace and security of the province, which may be endangered by such numbers of strangers daily poured in, who, being ignorant of our language and laws, and settling in a body together, make as it were a distinct people from His Majesty's subjects."

"The Board, taking the same into their serious considerations, observe, as these people pretended at first that they fly hither on the score of their religious liberties, and come under the protection of His Majesty, it's requisite that in the first place they should take the Oath of Allegiance, or some equivalent to it, to His Majesty, and promise fidelity to the Proprietor and obedience to our established constitution; and, therefore, *until some proper remedy can be had from home, to prevent the importation of such numbers of strangers into this or others of His Majesty's Colonies.* 'Tis ordered, &c."

Think of it, ye descendants of the Palatines! The Government of Pennsylvania, in history set down as so peaceful and tolerant, sought to prevent your ancestors fleeing hither, on the score of their religious liberties, from settling even the "back parts of this province." The world will never cease to admire the sterling integrity of the founder of Pennsylvania, who could not endure the thought of dispossessing the native Indians of their lands without just recompense, and out of pure honesty and philanthropy paid the extravagant price of a string of beads and a belt of wampum for half a State. It was not to be expected that lands bought at such high figures would be given to the exiles from the Palatinate, but for years the proprietary

agents refused to sell the German exiles any portion of this costly domain. It was part of a determined purpose to prevent the Germans settling in Pennsylvania.

There is a history yet to be written of the landed system of the Proprietaries of Pennsylvania, "the state and management of which," the Assembly as early as 1755, in an address to Governor Morris, declare "is pretty much of a mystery." How the settlers were taxed, not only to meet the expenses of Government and to buy the Indians presents which formed the consideration of extensive grants of lands to the proprietaries, but for "raising to the Proprietary and Governor" large sums of money; how the Acts providing a sinking fund for the bills of credit to raise grants to his Majesty "by a tax on all estates real or personal and taxables within the Province" were required to be amended "to prevent the operation of the proposed tax on the proprietary estate;" how the German settlers were sorely oppressed and burdened, so that in the quarrel (1754), between the Assembly and the Proprietaries, "the Assembly charged the Proprietaries with the design of putting every one under burthens like those of the German peasants;" how the settlers were left to themselves to defend the Province from hostile invasions until the Germans marched to Philadelphia (24th Nov., 1755), crowded the halls of the Assembly, and demanded that means for their protection and safety be adopted, wisely answering the objections of the Assembly by declaring "that their liberties were of no use when the enemy was taking their life and property;" these are matters of no small interest, and when truthfully told may break the gloss of fame thrown around the Proprietary Government.

Thus far I have given a hurried outline of the general migration of Palatines to this State, and the causes which led to it. There is a particular migration which ought not to be overlooked. It is fitting that it should be referred to at this place and on this day.

When the Palatinate was invaded by the French army, many

of the Palatinates sought refuge in England, under the protection of Queen Anne. Their story is best told in the opening words of the petition to the Queen for relief in 1709:

"We, the poor distressed Palatines, whose utter ruin was occasioned by the merciless cruelty of a bloody enemy, the French, whose prevailing power some years ago, like a torrent, rushed into our country, overwhelmed us at once, and not being content with money and with food necessary for their occasions, not only dispossessed us of all support, but inhumanly burnt our homes to the ground, when being deprived of both shelter and food, we were turned into the open fields, driven with our families to seek what shelter we could find, being obliged to make the frozen earth our lodging and the clouds our covering."

An Indian Sachem saw them in London. His savage heart was moved to pity, and he offered them part of his own country in Schoharie, New York. The bounty of Queen Anne provided them the means of transportation. In 1711 they landed in New York, after a six months' voyage, seventeen hundred of their number having died at sea. Their treatment in New York is one of the most disgraceful chapters of American history. I cannot take time to give the details. Sent into the wilderness they were only saved from starvation by the friendliness of Indians, who taught them to subsist on roots. When, after years of toil and privation they had improved little farms and constructed dwellings, they were cruelly driven from them, again to become wanderers on the earth. Governor Keith invited them to Pennsylvania. Under the leadership of Conrad Weiser, a son of one of their most prominent men, they constructed rude rafts, floated down the Susquehanna to the mouth of the Swatara, then up the Swatara to the fertile plains of the Tulpehocken. They were your ancestors. The story of their migrations, of their sufferings and wrongs, will some day, when the Pennsylvania Germans become fully aroused, form as grand an epic as that of Plymouth Rock. Then, too, the name and fame of Conrad Weiser, the great Indian interpreter and peace-

maker, will be rescued from comparative obscurity, and he will be given the high rank and place in history which he so faithfully earned and so richly merits.

Exhausted and impoverished by wars and persecutions, and wearied of strife, the Palatines settled down in what was then the back parts of Penn's Province. They formed the advanced outposts of civilization; the barrier to protect the English settlements from the tomahawk and firebrand of the Indians. Instead of the peace and security of the Province being endangered by these strangers, ignorant of the English language, (as was so much feared by the Governor of the Province when they landed), it was steadfastly maintained by them. Here, year after year, with German fortitude and thrift, and with German faith, they toiled ceaselessly; clearing their lands, building houses, making for themselves and their children comfortable homes, and erecting churches, for they were devout men. They had brought their Bibles and hymn-books with them, and

"The sounding aisles of the dim woods rang"

with the melody of the grand old German chorals they had sung on the banks of the Rhine. In a few years they made the Province of Pennsylvania the most prosperous and flourishing of all the colonies. Governor George Thomas, as early as 1747, attributes the great prosperity of the Province to the thrift, industry, energy, and the moral, law-abiding character of the German settlers.

Superstitious it is true they were, but it was the superstition of religion, and not of fanaticism. They burned no old women on the charge of witchcraft. They delivered no friendly Indian benefactor into the hands of savage executioners. No man was denied a home among them because he could not accept their religious belief. It is true, they at first took no part in governmental affairs, because the English language was strange to them, and the Latin petitions and addresses they presented to the government were perhaps as strange to the officials. Yet

they steadfastly set their faces against the introduction and perpetuation of human slavery in the Province. Their conduct on this subject, if on no other, extorted from Whittier, the Quaker poet, these words of praise:—

“And that bold-hearted yeomanry, honest and true,  
Who, haters of fraud, give to labor its due;  
Whose fathers, of old, sang in concert with thine,  
On the banks of Swatara, the songs of the Rhine—  
The German-born Pilgrims, who first dared to brave  
The scorn of the proud, in the cause of the slave.”

When the great struggle for Independence came, they were the steadfast defenders of liberty. They never for a moment swerved in their allegiance to the new government. It could and did rely implicitly on the German counties of Pennsylvania, for aid and support, when many of the neighboring settlements were disaffected and not to be trusted.

If history fails to give them credit for their real deserts, it records no wrongs, no outrages, no persecutions, no deeds of violence and crime for which their descendants need blush or bow their heads in shame. In their lives and works they came as near to the measure of the apostle, as a body of men well can:

“Cleaving to that which is good,” “not slothful in business,” “fervent in spirit,” “serving the Lord,” “rejoicing in hope,” “patient in tribulation,” “given to hospitality,” “minding not high things,” “condescending to men of low estate,” “recompensing no man evil for evil,” “providing things honest in the sight of all men,” “living peaceably with all men.”

More than one hundred and fifty years have passed since these pious, persecuted Palatines, destitute and penniless, settled these lands. Tradition has it, that there was an ancient prophecy current among the Palatines, at the time they were so sorely persecuted, that God would bless the Germans in a foreign country. Behold the fulfillment of the prophecy! Look you out on this fair land! See the beautiful rivers, the

well-watered plains, the thriving cities, the rich pastures, the productive farms, the comfortable homes, the wealth, the great industries, the long lines of railroads and telegraphs that cover it like a net-work! See the hills filled with untold mineral wealth! Behold the pleasant landscape! The climate is healthy. The air is salubrious. The skies rival those of Italy. Truly it is a goodly land, flowing with better things than milk and honey. It has been the fruitful nursery of a hardy, honest race of men. This is the home of the descendants of the persecuted Palatines. This is the land God gives them in exchange for the land of the Rhine. Dear as the Rhine is to German hearts, it is barrenness itself compared with this. It is a nobler land than the land of the Rhine, for it is a land of freedom. Truly God has been merciful unto our people and blessed them, and caused His face to shine upon them.

It is passing strange that after our German people have done so much to build up a country, after their social organism has produced a population so thrifty, orderly, solid, substantial, law-abiding and meritorious, the same prejudices which were excited when they first migrated here, should continue. With rare exceptions it is the misfortune of those who do not understand German to misrepresent and take a narrow and unfavorable view of our people. We are used to the jeers and sneers of small men, but it is hard to bear the defamation of a historian like Parkman, who, in his history of the Pontiac conspiracy, says:

“The counties east of the Susquehanna supported a mixed population, among whom was conspicuous a swarm of German peasants, who had been inundating the country for many years past, and who for the most part were dull and ignorant boors, a character not wholly inapplicable to the great body of their descendants.”

Indeed, this defamation has gone so far that some of our people, when thrown among English-speaking people or educated at New England colleges, grow ashamed of their German ori-

gin and oft-times make ludicrous attempts to Anglicize their names. The day will come when they will wish their names still had the broad German accent.

To this almost general misconception and belittling of our people, by men whose veins contain no German blood, there is a noble exception. Years ago, a man of Scotch descent, of great distinction among his own people, saw by the pure light of his extraordinary mental vision the real merits and the true character of the Pennsylvania Germans. With a self-abnegation that is without a parallel, he left high position to cast his lot among and devote his life to the task of arousing the latent energies of the Pennsylvania Germans, and to the development of the great gifts entrusted to their keeping. At a time when Protestantism was threatened with disintegration into a thousand illogical and narrow schemes of religious faith, he came like a prophet of God, and by the most masterly presentation of Christian truth the age has seen, restored the theology of the Reformation, and developed from it the true churchly principles of Protestantism. But I mean to speak of him in a narrower light. It was his influence on our people that first aroused them to a full realization of their mental and moral capacities and smothered greatness. The great educational work which has been steadily going forward among them is largely due to him. The foundation of this very college can be as certainly traced to him, as the fountain can be reached by following the stream. The Germans of Pennsylvania owe him a debt of gratitude which they can never pay. His fame will be as lasting as the race whose cause he championed. Need I name the man? Your descendants will wonder what manner of men their ancestors were, who failed thoroughly to appreciate the extraordinary abilities and superior merits of Dr. John W. Nevin, for among the men of this century there is none greater.

I have not wearied you with these things simply because the location and name of this college naturally suggests them, nor

because the truth of history required our ancestors to be vindicated from the charge often made, that they were a band of mercenary adventurers, ignorant boors, and stupid peasants, without any redeeming traits of character. My object in calling attention at this time to the true reasons and causes which led to the migration of our people from the banks of the Rhine to this State, to their great prosperity and good behaviour since here, to the fact that the English-speaking people have utterly failed to understand, or to find any good in them, was to show that there is a radical difference of character between the two races; one which lies much deeper than the difference in language, and therefore that the system of education which meets the wants of the one, must necessarily fail to properly develop and educate the other.

There is something very attractive and plausible in Puritan principles and theories. But they are too superficial, narrow and contracted to suit the broad, comprehensive grasp, and the thoroughness of the German intellect. A tree will not attain to vigorous growth unless the soil and conditions of its growth correspond to the law of its development. It may thrive as an exotic, but exotics are only beautiful to gaze upon. They are of no practical use. So, too, in education. A man can only be properly educated when placed under influences which harmonize with his character, and assist in developing his latent powers. Any system of education which makes no account of the traditions, the habits of thought, and the general character and surroundings of those to be educated, falls far short of what it ought to be.

The great secret of the success of New England in impressing her ideas on the age, and wielding so large an influence in the affairs of this continent, lies in the fact that in her educational systems she has made full account of the traditions, the ideas, and the peculiarities of her people. The descendants of the Puritans have been educated as Puritans. Students from all parts of the United States return from New England colleges,

saturated with New England history, Puritan philosophy, Puritan ideas and prejudices. I find no fault with this system of New England education. I mean rather to commend it, because exactly suited to the wants of her people. What we need in Pennsylvania is a system of education which shall be broader and more liberal than hers, but shall certainly be just as successful as hers has been, in bringing out the traditions and history of our people—in developing and propagating the philosophy and systems of thought peculiar to our Germanico-American race. In this way only can we hope to fulfill our destiny.

The very first great lesson to be taught to our people is this: That as long as we cling to the German language, in the sense of preferring it to English, the development of our people will be retarded. It is no question of merit between two languages. The language of this country is unalterably fixed. The English is the language of the Government, of legislation, of courts, of business, of newspapers; it follows that it must be the language of the literature of the country. No other language can supplant it. No literature printed in any other language can ever reach the masses, or become known and read, as literature must be, in this age of invention and learning, by those who desire to keep pace with the onward progress of the world. To seek to ignore this fact and all that is implied in it, is simply to commit a great crime against our race. Pure German can never become a general language here. As for Pennsylvania German, it is a mere dialect, the *patois* of the Palatinate, with a sprinkling of English words. It is a mere vulgar delusion, to suppose that it can be elevated to the dignity of a language, capable of being taught, and used in writing as a medium of expressing thoughts. It can never become a written language. It has never been used except in conversation. The Pennsylvania Germans would not for one moment tolerate its use in the pulpit. Think of the German in Luther's translation of the Bible, or in those grand old chorals and hymns being changed

to Pennsylvania German, and read and sung in church, and that, too, in this age! It is impossible to create a literature in Pennsylvania German. The whole literature of the country must be made available and accessible to our people. If this is not done, all educational efforts among them might as well be stopped. It may be necessary to teach German along with English, for the purpose of facilitating and aiding them in acquiring English; to enable them the better to understand and comprehend the best writers and ablest thinkers of the great Germanic people. But their general education must be English. They must be taught to speak and write good English, if they are ever to make an impression on this continent; if they are ever to reach the power, influence, and position which justly belongs to them. No man need ever fear the eventual ascendancy of the Germanic race. Wherever it has been true to itself, it has demonstrated the greatest capacity for leadership in government, science, arts, theology and politics. But on this continent, the first step towards equality and ultimate ascendancy, necessarily involves a change of language.

Nearly all of the misconceptions of the true character of our people come from the tenacity with which they have clung to a language which is foreign to the ruling, active, and literary language of the country. One-half—more than one-half—of the best descendants of our German people have been driven from the churches of the Reformation by the obstinate refusal of our fathers to know any other than the German tongue in worship. It is a natural prejudice, but one unworthy of our race. A man does not lose his German character, his German faith, his German worth and thrift, his hard common sense, by ceasing to use the German tongue, no more than a Jew ceases to be a Jew when he forsakes Hebrew.

Without attempting to define in detail what the educational system suited to our people should be, let me briefly refer to several requisites:—

First—It must be Christian. Any other will be false to the

traditions and character of our people. I do not mean that it shall be sectarian, in the sense of turning over all who cannot adopt the faith of the Germans, to the uncovenanted mercies of God. But positive, practical Christianity must be taught. A grace-bearing, historical Christianity, that holds fast to the form of sound words, and is not swept away by every wind of doctrine. I do not know what greater good the Pennsylvania Germans could do for this continent than to hold fast and extend their childlike, steadfast, trusting faith in God.

We are living in an age of rationalism and materialism. Darwin, Huxley and Tyndall, mighty men of science, are, like the fabled giants, trying to scale the heavens and dethrone our God. It is true they thunder from masked batteries, but the fire is only the more destructive, because hidden. Now, more than ever, it is demonstrated that faith is the gift of God. The people who have this great gift, must take care to cultivate and preserve it. Our ancestors held fast to it through good and evil report. Let us teach it to our children, that blessings may continue to follow our people.

Prof. Tyndall, when told that Agassiz refused to accept the theories of the Darwinian school, accounted for it by the fact that he was descended from a race of theologians. It is the admission of the cautious man of science that the gift of faith descends from parent to child, and is full of significance. I would not limit the bold ventures of men who seek to pry into the hidden secrets of the universe, or like

“*Expertus vacuum Dædalus sera  
Pennis non homini datis,*”

but in religion I feel like heeding Jeremiah's advice: “Stand ye in the ways and see, and ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein, and ye shall find rest for your souls.”

Secondly—It must be liberal. The times foretold by Daniel—when “many shall run to and fro, and knowledge

shall be increased," are upon us. Fifty years more like the past fifty will change the very face of the earth. This is the age of progress—

" We are living, we are dwelling  
In a grand and awful time,  
In an age on ages telling  
When to live, is to be sublime."

The liberal education demanded for this age requires not only the mastery of the learning of the past, the assimilation of all that is good and true wherever found, without limitation of creed or race, but the capacity to develop things new. It must be as broad and general as the casing air.

Lastly—It must be true to the spirit of our institutions and the theory of our government. The crucial tests to which free government can be subjected, are not all passed through. It is no small problem to nationalize the many men of different races, countries and creeds who constitute our population. It will always require the wisest acts of the best statesmen to harmonize the conflicting material interests of this country because of the diversity of climate and production. Worse than all, demagogues will be found endeavoring to stir up religious strife and sectional animosities. It will be an evil day for our land when religion shall enter into politics. The history of the world is but a confirmation of Christ's teaching, that His kingdom was not of this world. The most intolerant governments the civilized world has seen, have been those ruled by religious bigotry and priesthood. Whenever the clergy exercise or control temporal power, it is a melancholy truth, that they imbibe the zeal of Saint Peter, draw their swords and set about cutting off ears. If ever the evil hour comes, that makes the affairs of State a foot-ball between the different religious denominations, that hour will date the beginning of the downfall of this republic. The common sense, the peaceful, conservative character, the liberal, religious views of the Pennsylvania Germans, who, whilst preferring their own forms of faith, see much

that is good in Catholicism, as well as in the various forms of Protestantism, and regard them all as brethren in Christ; and the German love of home, and of his neighbor, must exert a powerful influence in allaying strife, and in preserving and perfecting our great system of free government. They may yet prove the leaven to leaven the whole lump.

I have no fears for the future of the Pennsylvania Germans. Under circumstances most unfavorable to intellectual development, they have already given Pennsylvania a number of her best Governors and wisest statesmen. Their patriotism, courage, and ability to command, has been demonstrated in every war this country has known. Wherever entrusted with power, they have shown themselves honest, faithful and capable. They have given to theology the soundest thinkers and most scholarly men. In every branch of art, in every department of science and knowledge, you can find scores of prominent men whose names indicate their German origin, and whose lineage can be traced back to the German settlers of Pennsylvania.

A people that have done so much, weighed down by a strange language, and cut off from general literature, must have within them the healthy germs of great intellectual and moral vigor. They have subdued the wilderness. They have restored their wasted fortunes. They are far removed from penury and want. Riches and honor belong to them, because they have earned them. They have by their lives and works shown themselves honest, industrious, law-abiding citizens. They have preserved their vigor of mind and body. Now, if they will in earnest turn attention to the thorough education of their children, the day will come, if it is not already here, when no man will wish for a greater birthright, than to be counted one of the descendants of the Pennsylvania Germans.

To the high and noble work of educating the descendants of the Palatines, and of the Germans of Eastern Pennsylvania, let this college be dedicated to-day. May the God who watched

over our people, and brought them safely over the great deep, and blessed them in this land, with wealth and children, watch over, and rule it, that it may become a co-worker with similar institutions, in educating, elevating and developing into the full stature of perfect men and women, the youth who crowd its halls.

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#### AET. VII.—MAN : HIS RELATION TO NATURE AND TO GOD.

##### MADE IN THE IMAGE OF GOD.

BY THE REV. E. V. GERHART, D. D.

##### SECOND ARTICLE.\*

THE relation of man to God involves a distinctive characteristic belonging to the human constitution, which, in the progress of the previous article, we approached but did not take up and discuss. This characteristic is man's God-resemblance or God-likeness, which the sacred record represents by the use of two terms, *image* and *likeness*, or *image* and *similitude*. Comp. Gen. i. 26, 27; Gen. ii. 7; Ja. iii. 9; Acts xiv. 11; Rom. viii. 3; Phil. ii. 7. A succinct and comprehensive history of the progress of dogmatic thought respecting this anthropological question and the Scriptural terminology is given in an excellent article from the pen of the Rev. C. Z. Weiser, D.D., published in the October number of the Mercersburg Review for 1869. This article, to which we refer the reader, renders it unnecessary to begin the present inquiry by premising the

\* See *Mercersburg Review*, volume XXI, 1874, p. 624.

various modes of apprehension which have appeared in the development of the Christian doctrine of man.

Approaching the difficult question from the stand-point of the christological idea, we propose to inquire what is the God-likeness of man, or in what does the likeness of man to God consist? Whilst we do not expect to furnish an entirely satisfactory answer, it is proper nevertheless to attempt an inquiry from this point of observation; inasmuch as in past ages of the Church the christological idea has not ruled with the force of a principle in the anthropological studies of theologians.

Of man we do not speak as he now exists in his fallen, perverted, abnormal condition. Nor do we speak of man as he was in his state of original sinlessness. Profound as the depth of the fall is, and indescribably great as is the contrast between his primeval dignity and his present humiliation, man, in distinction from the being of God his Creator and from the nature of every non-human creature, is as to the substance of humanity identical with himself in these two states of existence. Admitting by a free act of his will the virus of sin into his soul, all his powers have been perverted and depraved; but he has himself not ceased to be really and distinctively man. Whilst sin corrupts his entire spiritual life, it does not dehumanize him. As glorification does not transmute the Son of Man into God; so the fall does not transmute the being of Adam either into a beast or into the Devil. Being identical with himself in these two states, different and even contradictory as they are in point of character, the image of God in man is to be regarded as a mark or characteristic, not of Adam in Eden nor of Adam cast out and accursed, but of the Adamic constitution as such. Neither the history of religion, nor experience, nor Holy Scripture allows us to think of the divine image as an element or attribute of his primeval state and not of man himself irrespective of his state whether normal or abnormal.

Yet, agreeably to the position taken in our previous article,

a valid doctrine of man must be constructed on the basis of a complete survey of his life. A complete survey does indeed include him as he was before his fall and as he now exists suffering the curse of violated law; but it embraces more especially the being of man as manifested in his transcendent state of perfection and glory. What is now only a possibility, and therefore hidden, will then be an actual fact and fully revealed. The seed planted in Eden, now in process of development and culture, will then be a tree bearing ripe fruit. That fruitage in the heavenly state manifests the mystery of the divine image in a measure of fullness which no antecedent stage of existence can ever approximate. Of that exaltation and dignity the regenerate man in the church militant, and the original man in Eden, furnish but a dim prophetic indication. Lineaments of the Divine now faint and blurred will then be distinct and perfect; and lineaments now neither seen nor supposed to be traceable in the face of his spirit will then appear and stand out in relief.

The transcendent state of glorification differs from every antecedent state in the history of human life. Every antecedent state is only temporary and transient. In one respect, indeed, a given period or status of life on earth is analogous to the final state of perfection. Any given status is internally connected with the entire historical process through which the life of man up to that point has passed; it gathers up into itself all the results of his previous history. So does the perfection of heaven assert and actualize the hidden intent of all the positive forces operating through the entire course of human life, including not only the energy of the new birth in Christ by the Spirit and the original breath of God in the act of creation, but also the mysterious fullness of the eternal divine idea of man. But beyond this aspect of resemblance the analogy does not hold.

The contrast is greater than the resemblance. The original state failed of its end; having been supplanted by transgression

and disorganization. Then the state of subjection to nature and the kingdom of darkness is radically changed by the new birth of the Spirit and faith in Christ. A perpetual and successful warfare against the powers of evil follows upon the total perversion caused by sin and the reign of Satan. But the conflict terminates in apparent defeat. The law of death seems to triumph. The grave claims the infidel and the Christian alike. No status of human life, neither of any individual, nor of the whole race, can abide. The day which announces the fruit of the past heralds the falsehood and decay of to-morrow. How can this alternation of dignity and humiliation, this confusion of good and evil, this contradiction between the new birth and the old death, between the victory of faith and the despair of the grave; how can this grotesque commingling of truth and satire, of heroism and tragedy, be a legitimate standard of judgment respecting the nature and intrinsic capacities of the divine image? We get, at most, only a defective and distorted reflection of his primeval dignity and greatness. How much more does the confusion of light and darkness, of weakness and strength, of living and dying which fills the entire period of our earthly existence fall short of that transcendent excellence and glory when the original life-principle infused by the inbreathing of God shall shine forth with the splendor of the noon-day sun.

From the condition of man in every epoch of his long history that transcendent state of excellence differs in as much as it is not temporary but final, not transient but permanent, not relative but absolute. There man asserts the divine image in its purity and integrity. There both in what he is and in what he does he will actualize the likeness of his life to the life of God. Says St. John: It doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when God shall appear we shall be like Him: for we shall see Him as He is. Of similar import are the words of St. Paul: Your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with

Him in glory. In another place he says: We all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. Christ glorified is the brightness of the glory of the Father, and the express image of His Person. When the consummation of redemption supervenes, the believer will be so changed and advanced as to be in spirit and soul and body like the Lord Jesus, the Christ of God. Risen from the dead, triumphant over all disorganization and corruption, he will be clothed with an incorruptible and spiritual body, homogeneous with the glorious body of Jesus sitting at the right hand of God. On this ultimate plane of perfection, when in the totality of his constitution man shall be like Christ as Christ is like the Father, then will the divine image wherein he was created attain to a degree and mode of manifestation which will be commensurate with its idea. That state of maturity and perfect manifestation is the true stand-point for anthropological speculation, if we would aim at sounding the depths, now unseen, of the truth comprehended in the original God-likeness of man.

Against the propriety of taking this point of observation, located in the transcendent spiritual world, the objection cannot be urged that we are still in the natural body and in the natural world, and thus removed from the transcendent spiritual domain both by time and by all the limitations of our mundane existence. That world is not an unknown region. Of our ultimate destiny we know as much comparatively as we do of our origin, our present being and finite relations. And what we know of the transcendent future authenticates its validity to our Christian consciousness with as much certainty as what we know of the buried past. True, we know only in part. Hereafter we shall know even as we are known. The contrast between *now* and *then* is immeasurable. Yet, though fragmentary, our knowledge is for this reason not wanting in the elements of verity. Our knowledge is *knowledge*, not empty fancy. We

possess the necessary data of knowledge; and these are, by faith, seen in Jesus Christ.

We, the members of Christ, are indeed still in the flesh. The bride of the Lamb is still in the midst of the conflict. She is waiting in hope whilst the final consummation is pending. And did these facts limit the circle of our knowledge we should verily be in want of an adequate basis of inquiry and judgment respecting the divine capacities of mature manhood. But the horizon of our vision is bounded neither by what we are now, nor by what the church militant is, or has been, or may be in time to come. We can look beyond the horizon which limits the intuitive vision of the natural man, and penetrate into the transcendent spiritual realm. Nor are the data thus discerned merely the projection of our own minds. That which confronts our faith is a fact, the ultimate fact in the history of human life. Man has in reality surmounted the corruption of the fall and the contradiction of death. He has broken through all the limitations of time and space. Transcending the existing cosmical order, he has passed from the temporal into the eternal, from the domain of the finite into the domain of the infinite. Enthroned in glory and clothed with divine majesty, he is even now above angels and archangels, far above all principality and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. Unto man is given, not by anticipation or as the object of hope only, but truly and really all power in heaven and on earth.

This transcendent dignity, this absolute glorification has been realized in the person of the Son of Man. For He who has ascended up far above all heavens that He might fill all things is none other than Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of the lowly Virgin, a daughter of Abraham. At the name of this Jesus, who is bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, and was in all points tempted like as we are, every knee shall bow of things in heaven, of things on earth, and of things under the earth,

and every tongue confess that He, Jesus of Nazareth, is Lord to the glory of God the Father.

The fact that in the Person of our Lord man has broken through all the limitations of the present finite order of things, and entered into the heaven of heavens where he is a partaker of the divine nature, dwelling in the very bosom of the eternal, uncreated glory of the Godhead ; this fact is a distinguishing element in the Christology of the New Testament. Our Lord most commonly represents Himself, not as the Son of God, but as the Son of Man. Of Himself as the Son of Man He predicates the resurrection from the dead, the ascension into heaven, the session at the right hand of God, the Second Coming in the clouds of heaven with all His holy angels, the certain conquest over the powers of darkness and the final consummation of all things. For example : What and if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where He was before ? When the Son of Man shall come in His glory, and all the holy angels with Him, then shall He sit upon the throne of His glory. And before Him shall be gathered all nations. These transcendent acts are predicted of Him who was betrayed by Judas, condemned by Pilate, and crucified between two thieves.

The same principle underlies the representation of the majesty of our Lord as taught by the Apostles, especially St. Paul and St. Peter. Indeed, the glory of the mystery of godliness as everywhere set forth in glowing language just turns on this point that the *Man* crucified by the Jews has been exalted to the throne of God. This is the culminating point in the sermons of St. Peter as recorded in the book of Acts. Therefore, let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ. Again : The God of our fathers raised up Jesus, whom ye slew and hanged on a tree. Him hath God exalted with His right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins. He who could not be holden of death, and, exalted to God's right hand, has been crowned

with authority to forgive sins and execute judgment is, not God, only, but Man.

The proper Godhead of Christ we neither doubt nor ignore. Nor do we question the fundamental truth that Christ is in His Person and history the absolute revelation of the being of God. But the Son of God did not live among men, and redeem them, in the form of God. The Son of God was made the Son of Man. God lived His life in the proper life of man, Jesus of Nazareth. His eternal life He lived in man's temporal life. All the acts of redemption from first to last were in the full and proper sense the acts of man, the acts, too, of man suffering the full curse of God under violated law; not indeed of one who was merely an individual member of the posterity of Adam, but of one who whilst conceived and born, and partaking of the flesh and blood of His mother, was by the agency of the Holy Ghost assumed into union with God. But this assumption was in no sense a wrong done to the manhood of man; nor was any law, or essential attribute, or latent capacity, or normal relation either suspended or superseded. On the contrary, the idea of the Word made flesh in the Person of Jesus implies that Jesus was, in a pre-eminent sense, a veritable man as to body, soul, and spirit; that He possessed the proper freedom and dignity of man; that He asserted human rights and human prerogatives; that He lived agreeably to all the essential mundane conditions of manhood; and that the very nature of man was thus in Him a reality answering so far forth to the original and distinctive type of manhood formed in the image of God.

St. Peter only asserts in few words the exaltation of Jesus, emphasizing the great contrast between His throne in heaven and the ignominious cross. But St. Paul goes a step further. He elaborates this central truth, at some length and at different times, in his epistles; aiming in the use of the most explicit and forcible language at a representation of the extraordinary fact that Jesus Christ, the man who died on the cross for our sins, and was buried, and rose again, has been exalted to a position

of dignity, authority and power in the heavenly world, transcending absolutely the authority and power of every other class of created existences, even the most noble and mighty. Thus in Phil. 2: 5-11, the pivot on which the descending and ascending movement of thought hinges is the humiliation and incarnation of Him who was eternally in the form of God, or the proper human nature of Christ. He who was found in fashion as a man, and humbling Himself became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross, He it is, Jesus, the Son of Man, whom God has exalted and given a Name which is above every name. At the name of Jesus every knee in heaven, and on earth, and under the earth, shall bow; and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father. Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of man, has, according to St. Paul, been raised from the lowest depths of humiliation and constituted the absolute Lord over heaven and earth.

Equally explicit, and to the same effect, is the passage in Eph. i. 19-23; Col. i. 19, 20; and 2 Thess. i. 7-9. See also 1 Pet. iii. 18, 22. According to the New Testament, the essential and distinguishing matter in the lifting up and glorification of our Lord, is not that the eternal and co-equal Son of God sits on the mediatorial throne, but that this sinless and perfect Man, one with God in the person of His Son, has gone beyond the present finite order of things, and clothed with all power in heaven and on earth, now reigns over all creatures, good and evil, with direct reference to the honor and ultimate triumph of His Church.

On the Son of Man thus exalted and glorified we fix our faith and contemplation in order to discover something of the nature of the divine element in the being of mankind. This final, mature status actualizing and fulfilling the divine idea, is the stand-point of thought respecting the image of God. We must study the beginning of man, and the religious phenomena of his history on earth, in the light of the glorious end to which he has attained in Jesus Christ. On the one side the eternal

prototype of man, Christ on the other becomes through the work of redemption the very reality and ultimate fulfilment of the manhood of man. Taking a point of observation, fixed beyond the earthly economy to which we now belong, the science of christological anthropology asserts a principle analogous to the principle which in modern times has been conceded to the science of astronomy. Astronomy claims that the sun, not the earth, is the center of our planetary system, and therefore the astronomer studies the phenomena of the heavens, guided and supported at every point by this acknowledged fact as the all-controlling idea, the distance of ninety-five millions of miles being neither an objection to the validity of the principle nor an obstacle in the way of the correctness of his observations.

Christ in His state of exaltation, possessing all power in heaven and on earth, is the Word made flesh, the God-man; true God indeed, but no less also true Man. As on earth Christ lived in fashion as a man, and was active in word and deed conformably to the law and all the normal conditions of human life; as He died on the cross the very death of man and was buried really after the manner of men; as He was under the power and in the realm of death agreeably to the law reigning over the posterity of the first Adam, and rose from the dead on the third day in His human nature, reasserting His divine-human life in a new but veritable human body; so now, exalted to heaven where the Father glorifies Him with His own self, with the glory which He had with the Father before the world was, He possesses the ineffable dignity of such transcendent exaltation in His humanity, the very humanity in which He was conceived and born, suffered and died. In heaven the human in the mystery of His person is a factor as real and essential as it was when Christ lived on earth. As when He was on earth the Divine was not in abeyance or quiescent, so neither is the human in abeyance or quiescent now, living in the state of glorification. But just as the eternal Son of God lived in the life of the Son of Man among men, so now in the transcen-

dent world does the life of the Divine live in the life of the human.

Does the glorification suspend or supersede the reality of the incarnation? Does it change the reciprocal relation of the Divine and human in the person of the Mediator? Does the glorification diminish the capacity of the human for the Divine? Does it in any degree disqualify the human to be the effulgent manifestation of the true God? Is the Son of Man glorified any less the brightness of the glory of God, or any less the express image of His substance than the Son of Man unglorified? Is that significant utterance: He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father, true of Jesus in the flesh, but untrue of Jesus in the Spirit? If not; if the glorification maintains the integrity of the humanity in the mystery of Christ's person; if the Son of Man *lives* in heaven as truly as He *lived* on earth; if He lives His human life there agreeably to the constitution and laws of humanity as certainly as He lived His life here according to the laws and conditions of human nature prevailing on this lower plane; then we are justified in regarding the Son of Man glorified as active in all the functions of the mediatorial office; active in the outpouring of the Holy Ghost, in the formation, growth and perpetuity of the Church; active in the inspiration of the apostles, and in the illumination of all believers through the Spirit; active in the prevailing intercession with the Father, in the regeneration of fallen men, in the forgiveness of their sins, in the shedding forth of heavenly gifts on us His members, and in all the priestly activities whereby the propitiatory virtue of His sacrifice on the cross and the quickening power of His resurrection are bestowed upon men in the process of salvation from sin; active in the possession and exercise of authority and power in heaven, on earth and over all worlds, in the government of the human race preparing the way for His second coming with all His holy angels, and in all the mighty deeds preceding and accompanying the consummation of all things wherein the power of the devil shall be overthrown and the

Church militant attain the goal of perfection with Him in the glory of His Father. Humanity glorified in the person of our Lord, we are led to affirm, must be the Shekinah of the Divine in heaven, and the organ of divine manifestation and divine activity relative to the members of Christ's mystical body and to the angels; a mystery *there* answering to the mystery of the historical Christ in whom the human existing according to the economy of our mundane life was the Shekinah of the God-head and the organ of the manifestation of God among men as Spirit, life, light, love.

The Son of Man living in the bosom of the eternal glory of God, and active in the functions and offices of the Mediator, Head over all things unto the Church, sets before the vision of faith the destiny and intrinsic capacities of man as created in the image of God. The second Adam in heaven is the goal of the first Adam in Eden. In Eden the truth is hidden in the potential beginning as in a germ; in heaven the potential beginning has become mature reality; the type latent in the germ is manifest in perfect God-likeness.

The Son of Man glorified in heaven is *man*, as truly as when He lived among men on earth; not God. Jesus Christ was God; Jesus Christ was man. The incarnation of the Son of God in the successive stages of humiliation involves no inanition of divinity. The eternal Son\*of God, as the Heidelberg Catechism teaches, is and continues true and eternal God. So neither, on the other hand, does the fact that the incarnate Son of God is now invested with the glory of His Father in heaven involve any confusion of the human with the Divine, and no change of any kind by which the humanity of our Lord becomes less human, neither less human as regards His distinctive being nor as regards His freedom and ethical activity. On the contrary, the Son of Man translated to this sublime realm is in all respects man; man in the most emphatic and unequivocal sense of the term. He asserts and actualizes the generic idea of humanity as He did not and could not in His

state of humiliation. In heaven the human in the constitution of the person of our Lord, since He is and ever continues to be veritable man, lives not in the image merely, but in the absolute image of God. In Him and from Him the eternal life of God shines forth as from a perfect mirror.

Pursuing our investigation of the nature of the image of God wherein the first Adam was created on the basis of this general principle of thought, we can proceed to develop, to some extent at least, the particular contents of the idea.

The Heidelberg Catechism teaches that God created man good, and after His own image, that is, in righteousness and true holiness; that he might rightly know God his Creator, heartily love Him, and live with Him in eternal blessedness, to praise and glorify Him. [Q. 6.]

According to this view the image of God pertains to the ethical condition and the ethical activity of man. Adam was sinless. No perverse moral or spiritual force, no abnormal tendency, was either active in any part of his complex being, or latent in the hidden recesses of his life. All his powers, somatic, psychical and pneumatic were in a state of perfect equipoise. Such absence of all evil, natural and moral, cannot prevail by itself. It presupposes a positive, spiritual ground. Innocence implies righteousness and holiness. With the inception of his existence Adam began to be *active*, active in all the powers of his spirit and soul and body. No other assumption is admissible. Activity is coeval with the origin of life; ethical activity coeval with the dawn of personal life. This activity of the first man was normal at every stage of its development prior to the fall, commencing with the instant in which through the inbreathing of God he became a "living soul." Adam was positively righteous and positively holy. He was righteous in that he asserted every power and function of his being in thought and purpose, word and deed, conformably to the divine will. He was holy in that he lived his whole life purely in the conscious and free communion of love with God. Holiness

conditions righteousness. It was by virtue of this normal, personal communion of pure love, the communion of God with man and of man with God, that Adam asserted his powers of body, soul and spirit agreeably to the demands of the divine law.

The formula of expression and the conception of the Catechism are evidently both suggested by the doctrine of the Apostle Paul as taught in Col. iii. 10: Put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him; and especially as expressed in Eph. iv. 24: Put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness. The scriptural formula answers a double purpose. Whilst it suggests the terminology of the Catechism, it at the same time serves the purpose incidentally of an argument in support of the validity of the conception respecting the nature of the divine image. If the new man, who is after God or after the image of Him that created him, is created in righteousness and true holiness, the presumption arises that the original man, formed in the image and likeness of God, possesses the same cardinal qualities; or, in other words, that the original image of God in man consists in righteousness and true holiness.

That the original God-likeness of man, if it does not, properly speaking, consist in righteousness and true holiness, yet necessarily includes these ethical qualities, is a proposition warranted both by Scripture and christological anthropology. Taken in connection with a deeper idea which the proposition presupposes, it may even be regarded as involving the whole truth. Taken, however, by itself, and ignoring the logical presupposition, the formula suggested by St. Paul (Eph. iv. 24), expresses the nature of the divine image under one aspect only; and that aspect, though necessary, is nevertheless rather the phenomenal than the substantial part of the truth. That the formula as it stands is inadequate is intimated, it may be undesignedly, by the Catechism itself. Passing on in the second half of the sixth answer to set forth the ultimate end of man's creation after the image of God, it says: "that he might rightly

know God his Creator, heartily love Him, and *live with Him* in eternal blessedness." The love to God of man in the heavenly state is a *life* of love. According to the Catechism the end of the divine image in man is that man may live with God. A communion of life with God presupposes more than resemblance of moral and spiritual character. It presupposes an essential life-likeness. The life of man must be like the life of God. The Catechism thus warrants a conception of the divine image which is broader than its own particular definition.

The Book of Genesis, in the Mosaic account of the creation, connects with the divine image in man immediately man's lordship over the lower kingdoms. Indeed, the divine afflatus whereby man became a living soul and the position of kingly authority assigned him by God are so closely connected that the latter appears as the direct consequence and manifestation of the former. "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." This close and internal connection of these two things, the lordship of man with the divine image, accounts for the opinion current among theologians from the earliest times that the one was the other; or, that the dominion of man over the natural world was an element peculiar to the image of God.

Studied in the light of christological anthropology the divine image is certainly something even more significant than the lordship of man over nature; yet the opinion that his lordship is an intrinsic element peculiar to the divine image can claim validity, if asserted in synthesis with the true fundamental idea. If, however, on the other hand, lordship over the natural world be viewed as an external endowment, the internal connection of the endowment with the essential manhood of man being overlooked, the opinion evidently falls short of the truth.

God-likeness is the predicate of man himself; and does not inure to him in consequence of his position relatively to the lower kingdoms of nature. He is not like God because his dominion resembles the dominion of God. It is more correct to say that this distinguishing prerogative presupposes the divine image and inheres in it necessarily than that the divine image itself consists in this distinguishing prerogative. The lordship of man is rather the spontaneous assertion of man's God-likeness. It is the way and manner in which the God-likeness of man must express itself in relation to every order of existence below him.

There is another view of the divine image from which, when considered from the stand-point of Christology, the true doctrine of man differs. Not only man, but all other orders of existence, being like man the work of God, embody the divine idea. The divine idea asserted and manifested by the eternal Word of God is the pre-mundane basis of the cosmos. The Word is the prototype; whilst the cosmos becomes its actualization in time. Every order of created existence, and even every individual thing, must thus be regarded as representing, in its measure, the eternal prototype, especially every class of creatures endowed with intelligence and will. All things are the reflection of divine being. Hence it is thought that angels no less than men are fashioned after the image of God; and the divine image is not therefore an attribute of man distinguishing him characteristically from other intelligent creatures.

That the eternal Word of God, or the Logos, is the prototype of the cosmos may possibly be conceded consistently with a theistic conception of the world. Conceded it may be with safety provided the existence of the world be related immediately, not to the essence, but to the will of the Logos. The world is not properly an emanation from the Divine. The life of nature is not an efflux from the life of God. Affirming the life of nature to come by immediate derivation from the life of God, and ignoring thus the essential difference between the

creature and the Creator, it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid being drawn into the Niagara current of pantheistic thinking.

Of man Christology warrants a predicate peculiar to himself. Between the Logos and man there is a relation which does not hold between the Logos and any other class of creatures, whether impersonal or personal. Angels are not men. No angel possesses the latent capacities of man. Nor is the destiny of any rank of angels equivalent to the final goal of mankind. Whether we can express the difference adequately or not, we are nevertheless justified by revelation in maintaining that the difference between angels, however elevated their rank, and man is generic. In man there is a receptivity for union and fellowship with the Logos, which is predicable of no other being. For verily he took not on him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful high-priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people. (Heb. ii. 16, 17.) That the Son of God became, according to Scripture, not an angel, but man, is not accidental. Nor can the passing by of the angels be explained on the ground that man fell by transgression through the instigation of the Devil, whilst the Devil, on the contrary, fell from his original state of sinlessness, not by temptation from without, but of himself. "When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it." Great as is the difference between the metaphysical origin of sin in Satan and the historical fact of man's fall, yet this difference, whilst a scientific view of sin and redemption may not fail to emphasize it, does not suffice to account for the character of the incarnation as consummated in the glorification of our Lord. For the incarnation effects far more than the restoration of man to his original state of communion with God, more even than man would have come into the possession of by virtue of a life of sinless obedience to the divine will.

The reason is deeper than the accident of sin and the conse-

quent necessity of redemption. It must lie in the original relation between man and the Son of God. That relation must involve fellowship between man and the eternal Son, a fellowship predicable of man distinctively. "For both He that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one; for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren." Of the Son of God man is the *brother* in a sense that no angel appears to be. This distinctive relationship between the eternal Logos and the nature of the human race constitutes the possibility of the Son of Man. The possibility was indeed only a latent possibility until the advent of Christ. But when the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin Mary, and she was overshadowed by the power of the Highest, this original possibility became a reality. What was hitherto hidden and therefore unknown, though not unfelt, is now made manifest. For that unique union of the life of man with the life of God which distinguishes the mystery of the incarnation in the person of the Son of Man, can violate no law of the human constitution nor be in any respect alien to the original relation between human life and the divine life brought to pass when "the Lord God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul."

This latent possibility of the Son of Man, this original fitness for assumption into God, which distinguishes the nature of man from the nature of an angel, is the image of God. Whilst every creature, in its measure, reflects the idea of God; whilst His eternal power and Godhead are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made; and whilst accordingly there is a general sense in which science may say that irrational creatures as well as angelic spirits image God; yet that image of God in which man was created is a characteristic of his being which he shares with no other creature, whether on earth or in heaven. It is his own emphatically. In the constitution of man the divine image is accordingly the living form and mode of created being answering to that eternal form of God in which the Son was with the Father before the foundation of the

world. (Phil. ii. 6.) In virtue of this essential resemblance and affinity between the created life-form and the uncreated life-form, man was capable of life union with God, capable of a personal union which is at once both the *Menschwerdung* of God, and the *Vergottung* of man.

The central truth of Christianity, that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, affects man as man. It changes, not merely the moral condition of human life, nor the relation of fallen man to God and the world; but it touches his being. A change is wrought in the nature and life of man, whereby he is advanced from a lower to a higher status of existence, from the natural economy to the supernatural economy, or from the domain of the finite and temporal to the domain of the infinite and eternal. What this change wrought in the nature and life of man comprehends, is seen in the transition of our Lord from His natural life in the flesh, through the article of death, through the mystery of the resurrection and the ascension, into the transcendent realm of uncreated glory. The original affinity and resemblance between man and God, or between the created life-form of the Adamic race and the uncreated life-form of the eternal Son, the prototype of Adam, is consummated when humanity is thus changed and advanced by the transition in Christ to this divine realm.

The divine image must therefore be predicated, not only of some one integral part of man's constitution, as of his spirit in contradistinction to the soul and the body, but of man himself, and of man in the wholeness of his constitution. The finite *being* of man answers to the infinite *being* of God. The created life-form is the life-form of the whole man. That is to say, no integral part of man fails to share in the glorification of our Lord. As Jesus Himself was capable of such translation and exaltation, so was His natural body, circumscribed, limited and conditioned as it was by times and places, capable of surmounting the conditions of nature-time and nature-space, and of becoming a spiritual body; a body that, transcending every

earthly limitation of space and time and all-glorious, sustains an internal relation to the divine human life of our Lord in heaven, analogous to the relation prevailing between the natural body and the natural life of Jesus when He tabernacled in the flesh. The question, whether or not, or in what sense, and to what extent, the divine image pertains to the human body as well as to the human spirit, must in order to be satisfactorily answered be examined and decided from this ultimate stand-point of reflection.

The divine image being predicate of man himself, or of the being and life of man, a consistent anthropology must extend the resemblance to particulars.

The divine attributes are qualities of the divine Being. They are one with the life of God, and inseparable from it. Hence the likeness of man to God, since this likeness answers to the life-form of the eternal Son, involves the resemblance of man's endowments to the attributes of God. Human attributes are akin to divine attributes. The attributes of God shine forth in the attributes of man.

Nor may the application of this principle be limited to the ethical side of man's nature. That the will of God is law for the will of man; and that when he lives by faith in Christ, man is capable of truly fulfilling the divine will, no one denies. Man is to be holy as God is holy, and righteous in all his ways as God is righteous. The question at issue is whether the resemblance extends to what are known as the metaphysical attributes, the power, knowledge and omnipresence of God. Does man image God as regards energy and intelligence? Is the finite nature of man capable of surmounting the existing limitations of space? The point is not whether divine attributes, such as omniscience and omnipresence, may be communicated to humanity; but whether qualities in man properly human bear resemblance to the attributes of God's essence as distinguishable from His will.

Theology has introduced what we cannot but regard as an

arbitrary, if it be not a dualistic, division into the idea of God. The common classification of divine attributes into metaphysical and moral may be both valid and valuable. We do not criticise it. But when a valid scientific distinction ignores the unity of the divine fulness, and when, failing to emphasize the internal oneness of the attributes with the being of God, it proceeds to divide God as it were from Himself, maintaining that the moral attributes are communicable to man, while the metaphysical are not; then the distinction, otherwise valid, is carried too far, and becomes the occasion of a defective view of the fellowship holding between God and man. Man is capable, not only of fulfilling the righteousness enjoined by the will of God, but also of asserting and realizing God's power. Indeed metaphysical attributes can never be divorced from ethical activity. The ethical and metaphysical, will and reason or self-determination and commensurate energy, postulate each other mutually.

Even more than this can be safely affirmed. The best rational capacity, and the highest kind of *knowledge* is developed, not in seeing things inanimate or animate, not in penetrating into the secret depths of their being, and tracing their laws, modes of existence and relations, but in discerning and knowing the right, and in discriminating the true from the false, the good from the evil. So likewise the highest grade of *power* is necessary and manifest, not in subduing the physical elements, not in resisting and controlling the laws and forces of the material world, but in maintaining the right against the wrong, and in doing the good and the true in opposition to the evil and the false. The ethical and spiritual is the domain where no knowledge less than God-like knowledge, and no power weaker than God-like power can be of avail.

The Son of Man *knew* the will of His Father, and fulfilled that will. Knowledge in Him was commensurate with desire and purpose; and power commensurate with knowledge. He illustrated God in the wholeness of His being; the divine

reason, no less than the divine will ; divine power, no less than divine goodness ; the divine presence among men, no less than the divine authority. Look at any crisis during His earthly life ; the temptation in the wilderness, for example. Confronted by the powers of the kingdom of darkness in its representative head, mightier than genius and scholarship, mightier than the sciences, the arts and philosophies, Jesus passed through a moral and spiritual ordeal in which, at every point, He not only proved Himself true to God and faithful to His mission, but in sustaining Himself throughout this moral trial, asserted triumphantly God-like knowledge and God-like power. Majestic as was the might of His power, when rising from repose, He rebuked the winds and subdued the raging waves by the word of His mouth, yet still more majestic is the might of His will by which, despite the fierce assault from the super-human world of evil, He maintained Himself in holy communion with God, and by the irresistible energy of His word repelled him who by no man had ever before been repelled.

On earth however the manifestation of the metaphysical attributes of God is partial only and incomplete. To see the likeness of human to divine attributes, faith must behold the Son of Man exalted to the right hand of God. There He fulfils and displays the full import of His words, uttered shortly before His ascension : All power is given unto me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore, and ; Lo ! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. The same Jesus who lived on earth now lives in Heaven. The same Jesus who was with His disciples in the flesh, is now with His people in every place and at all times in the Spirit. Translated from the finite domain of the earthly to the infinite domain of the heavenly, this change of the position and relation of our Lord, includes a corresponding change wrought as in the being so also in the endowments or faculties of His human nature, whereby the Son of Man has become the perfected mediator between God and the fallen race. As in the unglorified state, so now in the glori-

fied state the humanity of our Lord is the medium and the organ of His mediatorship. This mystery of the Christian faith implies a resemblance of all the essential qualities of manhood to the attributes of the Godhead. Light as shining in the face of Jesus Christ reveals the omniscience and the glory of God. Energy and power as asserted in the earthly life, and now in the mediatorial reign of Christ, displays God's omnipotence. And the presence of our Lord through the Spirit in the entire communion of His mystical body irrespectively of places and times, shows the nature of God's omnipresence.

As when, whilst in the flesh, our Lord was a veritable man among men, and the ideal of mankind on the earthly plane of existence; so now, living in the Spirit, He is the ideal of the ultimate destiny of men. He is the resurrection and the life. The blessedness and glory which He possesses, His people shall inherit. As He overcame death and the grave, so will they surmount all the consequences of sin. As He was lifted up and transformed in His ascension, so will they be changed and perfected. He is preparing a mansion for them. Where He now is they shall go. They shall be like Him, for they shall see Him as He is. They are heirs of God; joint heirs with Christ. As God is glorified in the Son of Man; so will the Son of Man be glorified in His saints. Our Lord images the Father; and we shall image our Lord.

From the God-likeness of man as exemplified in the personal history of our Lord on earth and perfected in His exaltation to the right hand of God, and as now confronting our faith in the functions of His mediatorial office, several legitimate inferences may be drawn, important in their bearing upon the science of Biblical Exegesis and Christian Dogmatics. But we shall name only one.

Since man is made in the image of God, and this image pervades and characterizes his entire constitution, it follows that man is the true manifestation of God. The being of man answers to the being of God, somewhat as the image in a glass

answers to the face of a person. Moreover, however great the contrast between divine infinitude and human finitude, yet the life-form of man as man corresponds to the life-form of God; and the manner or mode which the revelation of God assumes in man, that is, in the life and character, the faith and thought of man is legitimate. Eternal truth comes to view in what man is and becomes, in what he does and utters.

This principle is fully valid as related only to the Son of Man. But it possesses validity likewise, as related to all men. The natural heavens declare the glory of God; but the constellations in the firmament of human genius, moral and religious, declare that glory with brighter effulgence. The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, even His eternal power and Godhead; being understood by the things that are made. But nowhere throughout the domain of creation are the invisible things of God so clearly seen, as in the economy of man; for he is the work of God which is the crown and perfection of the natural world.

A revelation of God appears in the contour of a rock and in the twinkling of a star. A higher revelation appears in the fruit of the tree, and the instincts of the animal. But more perfect than all these is the revelation of God in the *form* of man. The human life-form is for the absolute truth of God the fittest organ of communication.

The anthropomorphisms of the Old and New Testament, when considered from the stand-point of man's God-likeness, are to be regarded, not as a crude and inadequate mode of representing and teaching things spiritual and divine, but as a manner legitimate and valid, adapted on the one side to the spirituality and constitution of the Godhead, and on the other to the religious and moral, the intellectual and scientific needs of mankind. Instead of being, as it is frequently assumed, a temporary accommodation to the ignorance and infirmities of men living on a low plane of civilization and culture, this mode of representation, on the contrary, asserts the intrinsic dignity

and Godlike nobility of human nature, and proclaims a universal law of divine revelation.

As the absolute revelation of God is given to the world under the form of the Son of Man, so must the best kind of rational and scientific reflection on God and on the church glorified, be anthropomorphic. And the key with which we may gain access to the true meaning of the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic representations of God given in His Word, is the human life and character, the human sympathies and antipathies of our Lord Jesus Christ.

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#### ART. VIII.—THE KANTIAN ANTINOMIES.

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BY GEO. N. ABBOTT.

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A FIRST attempt at reading Kant's Critique years ago left on my mind an impression that there might be some defects in the author's reasoning—much as I had been taught to revere him as the father of German Philosophy. This impression took the most definite shape in regard to what the author styled the Antinomies.\* The demonstrations offered for them approached so nearly a mathematical method as to present a somewhat familiar aspect. The mistiness that attended a first view of the more subjective transcendental phases of perception and conception seemed to clear up a little on an approach to the more easily objectivated cosmologic ideas—especially when taking on the comparatively tangible form of a series of definitely related terms; this being substantially the form in which the proofs of the an-

\* Kant uses the singular (antinomy) with reference to the whole subject, and also applies the term to each pair of contradictories belonging to it.

tinomies present themselves. With the greater distinctness of the reasoning arose also a greater doubt of its absolute correctness.

When not very long afterwards an opportunity occurred for mentioning this doubt to one who was thoroughly conversant with the whole field of German Philosophy, the reply received, giving to the subject a sort of idealizing turn, led to the impression that possibly more mature thought would dispel the imagined difficulties. Previous experience had taught that the strictest reasoning is not always appreciated when the mind is in a crude state with regard to the subject discussed. Every now and then some genius arises who regards himself as competent to show up a fallacy in the established mode of squaring the circle, or in some other equally well assured fixture of science. The warning furnished by examples of this kind formed at least the partial cause for not proceeding rashly with an attempt to disclose a fallacy where many of the wisest men of the age had seen only conclusive argument.

Possibly the thought of reviving the old spirit of criticism might not have arisen at present, had it not been for meeting with a somewhat critical view of thought from a German source. In a brief general survey of modern philosophy preliminary to a development of his own views on a theory of cognition, the author indulged in some reflections to the effect that the course of philosophic development in Germany, while it had wrought many substantial and noble results, had not after all left nothing more to be desired,—that it had in fact reached one of those “turning points which lead under the most favorable circumstances to a reconstruction upon a new basis, and under the most adverse conditions to decline and dissolution.” Its present condition was pronounced languid and unsettled, requiring a remedy of some kind; in looking about for which the author was reminded of “the remark made by that ingenious Italian Statesman who claims that nations and their governments have to return from time to time to first principles.” In the course

of every organic intellectual development—he proceeds to say in substance—there appears at certain times necessity to return to the starting point and commence anew the solution of the problem involved, though perhaps by a different method from the one before employed. Such an occasion being assumed then to have arrived in the case of German philosophy, a more particular view is presented in the following words :\*—

“The origin of this development, however, in which our present philosophy is engaged must be traced back to Kant; and the scientific achievement by means of which Kant assigned a new path to philosophy is his theory of cognition. To the investigation of this subject, first of all, every one who intends to rectify the fundamental principles of philosophy must go back, and, enlightened by present experience, again examine, in the spirit which prevails in Kant’s Critique, the questions he raised, in order to avoid the mistakes into which Kant had fallen.”

These words were not long in waking up again some of the old queries above mentioned; and the thought arose that possibly calling attention to even a minor error—if such there were—in the reasonings of that justly celebrated thinker might be of some small service in this day of reckoning for all theories, whether old or new,—whether the products of great or small minds.

#### PRECAUTIONS TO BE OBSERVED IN CRITICISM.

It may perhaps properly be premised that an exhaustive estimate of consequences to Kant’s system is not what is aimed at in this attempt to point out what may indicate that in certain instances he was not wholly free from the short-sightedness common to mankind, including even the greatest philosophers. Indeed those consequences might be more or less—might bear a high or low ratio to any discovered error of argument, somewhat in proportion as this should occur in an essential or non-

\* See *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. 9; Zeller’s *Theory of Cognition*.

essential connection. Nothing can be weaker or more puerile than that style of criticism which, having discovered a writer's "weak spot," affects to know how very little all his utterances were worth. In all criticism of argument a certain logical caution ought carefully to be observed, to the effect that, though one may assign false reasons for an opinion or doctrine, the opinion or doctrine itself is not necessarily thereby proved untrue, but may be true for other reasons. It must be admitted, however, that, in so far as one's reasons for a peculiar belief are proved groundless, the belief is, as it were, thrown upon its own merits, and becomes a proper subject for a further investigation.

It may, for instance, be the opinion of some philosopher that a certain theory entertained by his predecessors is incorrect because, in his view, it involves a certain contradiction. Another may think he has disproved this contradiction as a consequence of the theory. But he does not necessarily, by this disproof of the particular alleged inconsistency, prove the truth of the theory, and the entire incorrectness of the first philosopher's belief in its untruth. There is still room left for the question whether some other contradiction may not be involved, which has not been clearly discovered. Suppose for illustration that I state as my opinion that a certain man is not a person of truth and veracity, alleging as a reason for my belief that at a certain trial he gave self-contradictory testimony. Suppose again that this allegation of mine proves to be untrue, and that the person's testimony on the given occasion was entirely consistent. This would not prove him to be on all occasions a perfectly reliable and truthful man. My suspicion of his general untruthfulness might still be well founded, although my allegation in proof might be invalid.

There are, to be sure, cases in science where the disproof of a single assumed inconsistency serves to establish a proposition without farther question. The ordinary method of determining the area of a circle requires that the circle be conceived as

divisible into an infinite number of triangles having their bases in the circumference. An objection could here be raised, on the score that this requirement contradicts the definition of a curved line, such as the circumference is, to conceive it to be composed of straight lines, however short, such as would be required for the bases of the triangles. If, however, it can be shown that, by a sufficient multiplication of the number of polygonal sides, they will ultimately assimilate with the circumference, thus removing the contradiction, the proposed method of squaring the circle will have to be admitted as correct, since no other inconsistency can possibly be conceived. But not often is a *scientific hypothesis* so simple in its implications. Hence the fate of such a hypothesis can not generally be made to depend upon either the truth or falsehood of a single demonstration.

#### HUMAN COGNITION CONSTRUCTIVE, ACCORDING TO KANT.

With these precautions we may enter unassumingly upon the consideration of possible errors in the thoughts of one who undoubtedly did in his day a great work for the progress of mind. In order to appreciate to any good degree the force of Kant's reasoning at any given point, it is needful to have some general notion of certain characteristics in his theory of cognition. One important characteristic I do not know how to describe better than by saying that human cognition is, in Kant's view, *constructive*. We do not cognize things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear *to us*. It is a necessity of the pre-ordained nature of our peculiar kind of sensibility that we regard objects as extended in space or as persistent in time; space and time being merely subjective *forms*, or modes of presentation, through which *our* perception is limited and characterized, without being in any essential sense determinants of things in themselves. Whether any, or even all, other finite intelligent beings look upon objects as extended and enduring is a matter out of our ken. But however it may be with other beings' mode of cognition, man certainly must get his first impressions of ob-

jects under the limitations of his sensibility, and these first impressions can never be got rid of by dint of any amount of available intellectual insight. The *human* mind is compelled, therefore, to view all matter, or rather to conceive the *substrate* of matter, under the really untrue aspect of extended body, *i. e.*, as having length, breadth and thickness;—and also as passing from moment to moment through a succession of varying states or conditions.

The properties, with their consequences, thus thrust upon the objective world (or upon its ground-reality), by the reflex activity of our sensibility will be consistent and harmonious, so long as reason in its survey of them restrains itself within the proper bounds of experimental research. But it will not do to *idealize* too far. Because we have observed a succession of states in surrounding objects, and have found that one state conditions another, so that we have in some sense a law of succession, we are not for this reason to imagine that we can project backwards the entire history antecedent to the present state of things. This is not simply on account of imperfection in our knowledge of a present state, but the inability ideally to restore the past is owing chiefly to the fact that the successional element is just as much inducted extrinsically into things by our mode of sensibility as—to use our own illustration, not Kant's—the time-keeping element is into a clock by human ingenuity. No more can we, according to our author, securely generalize upon the *spatial* relations of the universe, and this, because of the illigitimacy of making space a property of the thing-in-itself,—because, in other words, mere phenomena furnish no *terra firma* on which to stand, to survey and measure the universal domain.

But what will happen if these salutary cautions are not heeded—if reason, in its presumption, leaps over all barriers, and undertakes to determine how long a succession of states or of causes has preceded and conditioned the present, or how widely the universe must be expanded, in order to its proper balance?

Either of the questions of this order is susceptible, we are told, of a double answer involving direct contradictions. Suppose we take the first part of Kant's first Antinomy, involving the length of time during which the universe has existed ;—the two contradictory opposites,

THESIS :

*The universe had a beginning in time,*

ANTITHESIS :

*The universe had no beginning, but is infinite in respect to time,*

we are assured, are equally provable, and both demonstrable by proof, without the least tincture of sophism. The proofs offered for both are of the negative kind, technically called *reductio ad absurdum*, or *reductio per impossibile*. A denial of the truth of the given proposition is assumed, and then is shown to result in a palpable absurdity ; whence it is inferred that the denial is a falsehood, and the proposition itself a truth.

KANT'S PROOFS.

The proof that the universe had a beginning in time, is as follows :—Suppose the universe had in respect to time no beginning ; then up to any given point of time an eternity has elapsed ; and consequently an infinite series of successive states of things in the universe has flown by. But the infinitude of a series consists just in the fact that it can never be completed through a successive synthesis [*i. e.*, through a regular succession of the terms one after another]. Hence an infinite series of past states of the universe is impossible ; and, accordingly, a beginning of it is a necessary condition of its existence ; which was the point to be proved.

The criticism on this demonstration we will reserve until after the proof of the antithesis has been given. That proof is after this wise :—Suppose the universe had a beginning. Since

the beginning is an existence preceded by an antecedent time, wherein the thing concerned was not, there must have been, then, a pre-elapsed or foregone time wherein the universe was not, that is, an empty time. Now in an empty time no origination of any thing is possible, since no part of such time in preference to another, has, in itself, any distinctive condition of existence, over that of non-existence, (whether it be assumed that the thing originates of itself, or through another cause). Therefore can, to be sure, many series of things begin in the universe ; but the universe itself can have no beginning, and is consequently infinite in respect to past time.\*

These demonstrations have certainly the virtue of brevity. Nor would they seem to be chargeable with much obscurity, especially as being in a work professedly ranging in the transcendental stratum of thought. The proof of the thesis, establishing the finiteness of the age of the universe, is made to depend purely and simply on the *definition* of an infinite series. If that definition is correctly and *fully* given, then it would seem that a flaw in the reasoning would be hard to find—unless, indeed, it should be surmised that an error may lurk in the positing of a *present*, or at least a *fixed*, moment of time in which to terminate the series ; while in fact the series itself recognizes no such closing-point, but goes unceasingly on with its successive synthesis. It might thus be imagined that one *subjective* element was here worked in without a corresponding *objective* element, even in the sense-world ; that an attempt to

\* The present writer is responsible for the translations in the body of this article. The following translation of the same passage as the above is from Bohn's Philosophical Library :—" For let it be granted that it has a beginning. A beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing does not exist. On the above supposition, it follows that there must have been a time in which the world did not exist, that is, a void time. But in a void time the origination of a thing is impossible ; because no part of any such time contains a distinctive condition of being, in preference to that of non-being (whether the supposed thing originate of itself, or by means of some other cause). Consequently many series of things may have a beginning in the world, but the world itself cannot have a beginning, and is, therefore, in relation to past time infinite."

measure backward to its source the course of changes in whose ever-onward movement we are all involved, whether we will or not, bears a seeming resemblance to an undertaking to compute the length of an ocean-current from its start down to our position on a floating raft, with no objects to fix on except other floating rafts, and with no knowledge whatever of our absolute velocity of movement.

The proof of the antithesis has at least an air of plausibility about it, though it cannot claim quite the simplicity of its opponent. Perhaps the seeming greater complexity belongs, however, more to the necessities of the wording than to the idea itself. The point seems to be that a perfectly void or empty time, which, if it can be thought at all, can be thought only as a completely uniform succession, cannot be conceived to furnish a *favorable moment or opportunity* for the uprising of any supposed latent force or activity, whether the resulting *manifestation* be identical in any sense with the *energy itself*, or only a product of it. That is, so far as pure time can be a condition of activity, a force or system of forces in inactive equilibrium in one time cannot be jostled out of this state of quietude into a bustle of overt activity by another time exerting upon it precisely the same influence as the first. But even here a subtilizing fantasy might throw in the bare suggestion that, as a continual dropping wears away a stone, so the persistent intrusion of an agency, in itself as deliberate and unprovoking as time, might possibly wear away the patience of self-restrained or mutually restrained energies.

Again, as to the statement, concessively thrown in, that "many a series can begin in the universe," can this mean anything more than that a series having some *new phases* merely can append itself to a previously developing series as a continuation of the same, so that in reality we have no new beginning of a series, but only the continuation of an old one? In this view, one hardly sees the need of this concessive clause.

Having thus taken a brief general view of the proofs on both

sides, let us return, for a more careful consideration, to the proof of the Thesis. The main dependence of that proof, as has been seen, is on the definition of an infinite series, as one which can never be completed by a successive synthesis. The use of this definition seems at first sight pretty fair and legitimate; but it will admit of closer scrutiny. The conception of an infinite series will admit of some variety. If we may take the same liberty in assuming a fixed point in space as Kant takes in positing a terminal point of a series in time, we may suppose that through a certain point a line is passed, say in a north and south direction, and extended without limit both ways. If this line be conceived to be graduated throughout, and to have positive numbers applied to the successive units of graduation to the northward, and negative numbers in like manner to the southward, the double sets of figures will plainly form an exhaustive series of the natural numbers. Indeed the successive units of measure in both directions, will of themselves, when merely viewed successively, constitute what is called an infinite series. But, according to the ordinary acceptance, either branch of this unterminated line, the one to the northward or the one to the southward, forms an infinite line, and its series of measuring units an infinite series. Now that it is the latter kind of infinite series, a series with *one* terminus only, that Kant has in view is made quite evident from the proof of the Antithesis, which concludes with the assertion, "The universe is infinite in relation to *past* time." Kant's series, then, whether finite or infinite, has by its very construction *one* terminus,—the only question being whether or not it has also another limit.

#### KANT'S PROOF OF THESIS A PETITIO PRINCIPII.

Making now a distinction, which Kant clearly makes in his introduction to the antinomies, between a *progressive* order in a series, *a, b, c, &c.*, going forward from a beginning point towards an ending, and a *regressive* order, *n, m, l, &c.*, going

backward from an end towards a beginning, we naturally find the Kantian definition of an infinite series taking two forms: *It is either a series which can never be completed (ended), or one which can never have begun.* According to our author's own distinct showing, it is the *re-regressive* order with which we have to do in the antinomy. The last term in the series is the "conditioned," the next preceding term the proximate condition, the next earlier the condition of the latter, and so on until the entire series of conditions, longer or shorter, is completed, if possible, in the reverse of the historic order. Now it is evident that the *second* form of the definition above is the one applicable to the hypothesis that such a series is infinite. Then, instead of a contradiction, there will be complete harmony between hypothesis and definition, and so not the least foundation for a *reductio ad absurdum*. It would seem, then, that Kant, simply by using the definition in a form strictly applicable to a progressive series only, (which form would be quite sufficient for the mathematician's use, since all the cases can readily be adapted to this form), unwittingly reversed the order of the series, and then really *assumed* a beginning, which was just the point in question. The argument appears thus to be a simple case of *petitio principii*.

To make this still clearer, we may put this definition into a form in which all shall be expressed which is implied:—An infinite series is one which, *if it have a beginning*, must have no end. The clause (most certainly implied), *if it have a beginning*, seems entirely to have eluded his generally vigilant perception. The counterpart to the definition as just given would be, An infinite series is one which, *if it have an end*, must have no beginning; which is clearly the wording applicable to the case in hand.

It was just now intimated that, in the use of a wording proper to a progressive order, Kant unwittingly reversed the order of conceiving his series. In truth he had already done this by implication in his direct deduction from the hypothesis

that the universe had no beginning: "Then up to any given moment an eternity has elapsed," that is, evidently, *in the historic order*. To see how very inconsistent it was for him to fall into this order of conception, we may be pardoned for going back again to the introduction to this topic, and examining his exact words on this point. "I will call the synthesis of a series on the side of the conditions, *i. e.*, setting out from that condition which is nearest to the given phenomenon and going on to the more remote conditions, the *regressive*; but the synthesis which, on the side of the conditioned, advances from the nearest sequent to the more remote, the *progressive*. The former goes *in antecedentia*, the latter *in consequentia*. The cosmologic ideas consequently concern themselves with the totality of the regressive synthesis, and go *in antecedentia*, not *in consequentia*."

It appears, thus, as if, instead of holding to his stand-point in the present, and looking steadily from thence into the past, he simply set up a flag-staff at this stand-point, and then, withdrawing in thought behind the whole procession in question, he looked over it to the assumed terminus, and pronounced it limited; while in his counter-proof, keeping his first position, he took a back-sight over the course of nature without discovering any sign of a limit.

It may be objected that, whatever the possible inconsistencies of Kant's argument, the fact still remains that Nature has in reality accomplished her own course thus far *progressively*, and not *regressively*; and it may farther be claimed that by no possibility can nature be conceived to have progressed infinitely, since her course is still onward, and her age, consequently, still increasing, and *that which can be augmented can not be infinite*.\* But if the proof of the thesis be supported by this sort of argu-

\* In truth infinites can be increased in certain ways. An infinite series of the form  $a+a+a+\&c.$ , can be multiplied by 2, giving  $2a+2a+2a+\&c.$  A quantity, in order to be infinite, needs only to be incapable of *proportional* increase by the addition of a *finite* quantity.

ment, that of the antithesis will be destroyed by the same ; for it will not do to argue one side of the question on the principle that the world is moving, and the other on the assumption that it has come to a stand-still, having completed its course. A *hypothetical* unbounded past, in other words, ought to stand in no disadvantage with a *real* or *demonstrated* unbounded past in the eyes of the pure Reason ; for the pure Reason is no respecter of real and fictitious magnitudes. The relations of these two magnitudes are all governed by precisely the same laws. If, then, it be true that a series can never be infinite so long as there is any possibility of even a finite increment in either direction, thesis and antithesis must fare alike, and a verdict of *finitude* must be the conclusion of the whole matter.

#### ZENO'S ACHILLES AND TORTOISE.

But let us return once more to Kant's definition of an infinite series as *one that can never be completed*, and see whether it can have universal application even to progressive series. To give the matter a historic interest, suppose we consider Zeno's attempted demonstration that Achilles can never overtake the tortoise, since, while the former is coming up to the place now occupied by the latter, the latter will have made some advancement, so that Achilles will still be behind ; and if both parties repeat their movements ever so many times, the close of each movement will find them in the same relative position ; for, while Achilles advances a distance equal to the space between them at the beginning of any movement, the tortoise will also have gained ground. Nor does it seem necessary to conceive the successive movements to be separated by intervals of time. The advancement may be regarded as continuous, and only be *mentally* divided for the sake of a clearer conception of the relative progress of the two bodies. Now suppose that the ratio of Achilles's velocity is to that of the tortoise as  $n$  to 1, and their distance apart = 1. Then, while Achilles goes over the distance 1, the tortoise will go  $1-n^n$ , as far ; and it will be easy

to show that the whole distance to be gained by the former in order to overtake the latter will be the series of distances.

$1 + \frac{1}{10} + \frac{1}{100} + \frac{1}{1000} + \dots$  *in infinitum*. But in order to simplify the idea of such a series, we may substitute numbers for the letters. Let it be supposed that Achilles travels ten times as fast as the tortoise. Then the above series will become  $1 \times \frac{1}{10} + \frac{1}{100} + \frac{1}{1000} + \dots$ , or what is the same thing,  $1.1111\dots$ , to infinity. The ultimate value of this series is, as every arithmetician knows, the limited sum of  $1\frac{1}{9}$ . If the unit regarded as one mile, then Achilles, in order to overtake the tortoise, will really have to travel  $1\frac{1}{9}$  miles and no more; although this brief distance may be spun out in thought into an infinite series. The spaces represented by each of the terms (or decimal units) in their descending order of value will, let it be observed, be passed over *successively*, and can be passed over in no other way.

Now supposing Achilles's rate of travel to be one mile an hour, and the tortoise's rate of course one-tenth as great, unless we have difficulty in believing that in one hour and one-ninth the former can accomplish as many miles, we are bound to believe he will in that time overtake the latter, and also that in the same time he *will have completed successively the synthesis of an infinite series*. It may be further observed that the terms of the series  $1.1111\dots$ , are finite down to any assignable place, and not infinitely small, though they are progressively diminishing, and tending to become infinitesimal. If a man should spend his life in extending the series, he would not reach even a near approximation to the true infinitesimal, and would have accomplished no assignable part of the work of writing the whole progression. How much easier the task of Achilles, who walks over all these figures, made and unmade, or rather over their spatial values, in the brief time before mentioned.

Again, suppose we substitute for such a decreasing progression a series composed wholly of terms like those to be ultimate-

ly arrived at in the decreasing one, and inexpressibly smaller than what we might imagine to be the *average* magnitude of the terms in the above example. In that case it was really the one-ninth of a mile that contained ideally the infinite number of fractional terms. But when all are in thought reduced to the magnitude of the smallest of those, how easy is it to conceive an infinite number of them in, for instance, a whole mile. Imagine this to be a mile of railway, which a swift locomotive can pass over in one minute. If Kant, with his quiet habits, had chanced to stand near and see the iron horse performing this feat, having in his mind all the *figures* involved in the subject, he might, I imagine, have thought about closing up the loopholes in his definition. Then think of the earth moving in her orbit more than a thousand miles in the same brief minute, and say whether at least a passage over an infinite number of successive points may not be completed within the bounds of time. The truth is, our own consciousness goes through an infinitude of variations every hour,—nay, why not every second?

The difficulty of conceiving an infinitude of past states of the universe cannot, then, it would seem, well lie in the mere *numerical* impossibility of the case. If then we have a numerical infinitude as an accomplished fact, why may we not, if there is no better way, conceive our successive points in spatial movement as elongating into lines, and our temporal instants as proportionally growing into measurable times, and in their enlargement pushing each other successively back into a past beyond all limits?

In this view the conflict of the pure reason with itself, so far at least as the proof of this antinomy is concerned, seems to vanish, even without any nullification of the objective validity of temporal or spatial relations. By this it is not imperatively to be understood that the universe, as we sensuously apprehend it, is necessarily eternal; but only that, so long as the simple principle of antecedence and consequence has in thought

free and unobstructed play, the pure reason does not appear to maintain any insuperable objection to an unbounded persistence of the principle on the score of a practical impossibility of an infinite series. Whether the universe may involve in itself some such law of rhythmic sequence as shows itself in the annual ebb and flow of life in a tree, so that it may be subject to appearing and disappearing (in our sense) by turns; or, again, whether what we call the universe may be correlated to an "unseen universe," which may in effect at some time or times silence its activity as one musical string sometimes silences another, or as two swinging bodies hung from the same beam alternately stimulate and quiet each other's motions; or, once more, whether some frictional element must enter into the computation, compelling belief in an ultimate winding-up of progressive movement, and, conversely, in a necessary beginning of the same; or, finally, whether the energies of the universe may not be gradually wasting themselves upon a vacuity which will make no returns for them, whence we must infer a beginning of the wasting process; we cannot, perhaps, know till we learn more facts in the case. But in the first two of these imaginary views we should have really no breach of a law of perpetual succession, but only a complication of the same; while in the last two we should have elements to consider outside the necessary conditions of pure temporal succession to which Kant, in the antinomy specially considered, professes to confine himself. His series is, in substance, neither an increasing nor a decreasing one, but consists of equal terms. At all events he makes no provision for their inequality.

As Kant distinguishes between the law of mere sequence and the law of cause and effect, making the latter the subject of another antinomic discussion, we need not discuss in this connection the doctrine of an original creation. It is the beginning or non-beginning of the universe according to the rational necessities of sequence in time that forms the present theme for discussion. Can there, or can there not, have been

an infinite succession, independently of any extraneous consideration ? is the question.

After this somewhat extended consideration of the first half of what Kant sets down as the "first conflict of the transcendental ideas" (the other half being on the question whether the spatial expansion of the universe is finite or infinite), it is not proposed to follow up in the same way the remaining antinomies, pertaining to the divisibility of matter, and to the principles of causality and freedom. If the present writer is not in error in regard to Kant's reasoning on the remaining topics, however, the force of the first proof and counter-proof runs through the whole; so that if there is any fallacy in the one case, there is a vitiating influence from this fallacy traceable in all.

It may be interesting to note a curious illustration which Kant gives in his comment on the fourth and last of the antinomies, namely, Thesis : There belongs to the universe something which, either as its part or as its cause, is an absolutely necessary being; Antithesis : There exists no absolutely necessary being, either in the universe or outside the universe as its cause. The concluding paragraph of his annotation (*Anmerkung*) on this antinomy is in part as follows : "There appears in this antinomy a strange contrast, namely, that from the same ground-reason, in the thesis the existence, and in the antithesis the non-existence, of an Original Being was deduced, and each with the same rigorousness. . . . Still the mode of inference in both cases is quite in harmony with the common reason of mankind, which often finds occasion to differ with itself according as it contemplates its object from two different stand-points. M. de Mairan regarded the quarrel of two renowned astronomers, which grew out of a similar difficulty about the choice of a stand-point, as a phenomenon remarkable enough to call for the writing of a special treatise. The one concluded that the moon revolves on its axis, because it always presents the same side towards the earth : the other, that

the moon does not revolve on its axis, because it always presents the same side towards the earth. Both conclusions were correct, according to the stand-point which was taken, from which to observe the moon's motion."

It is true that the seeming motions of the planets are much varied by the point of view from which they are supposed to be looked at; but how from the stand-point of an observer on the earth one can conclude that the moon does *not* revolve on its axis, while admitting that it does move in a monthly course about the earth, it must, I think, require a Kantian philosopher to conceive. Any one who has ever turned a grind-stone knows that the handle of the crank turns in his hand, or else in the wooden sheath designed to obviate manual friction.

#### THE OBJECT OF THE ANTINOMIES.

It is not within the intended scope of the present essay to consider in detail all the views set forth by the author of the antinomies in relation to their significance or use. The question, however, very naturally arises as to what could have been the inducement to his occupying, in all, over a hundred pages right in the middle of his great work on the Pure Reason in discussing a set of theses and antitheses all of which were, in his view, *essentially* untrue together. The proofs, in themselves considered, he, to be sure, regarded as irrefragable; yet he, nevertheless, believed them to establish nothing substantial in the end, because there was an illusion at the bottom. There was in fact, according to his theory, a profounder fallacy involved than anything in that line which the present writer has attempted to show up. The positive value of propositions thus based could not, therefore, well be supposed to have a large intrinsic importance for one whose great object was to get at the simple and unalloyed truth. At the same time it is not to be admitted that he had not in his own mind a sufficient reason for introducing into the heart of his great work so extended a discussion. If an illusion was involved, there was at the same

time meaning. Perhaps the present writer's view of the meaning was plainly enough hinted at in the introductory part of his essay. But what was there only hinted at is at certain points in his comments brought clearly out by our author himself. To one or two such passages attention will be called directly.

It has already been observed that Kant in his proof of the antinomies employed that indirect kind which makes an absurd conclusion reflect upon a false premise. The antinomies themselves were to be used for a similar retroactive effect. A subject of which two contradictory predicates can be proved at the same time might naturally be suspected of some absurdity in its conception; and such, clearly, was our author's inference.\* The existence of mutual counter-predicates with regard to nature were held to reflect upon the conception of nature whence they sprang. There must be something essentially untrue in our ordinary apprehensions of phenomena. The true substrata of matter is, according to Kant, something which neither sense through its space and time methods, nor the understanding through its categories, can lay hold of. It is an inscrutable entity which eludes every effort of our style of perception to grasp it. That there is a basis of reality for the objective world, Kant does not for a moment deny, or even seem to doubt; but all that presentative arrangement which the nature of our sense and understanding gives to the world of objects amounts only to an "orderly phantasmagoria." It does not seem strange that a hypothesis of this character should be difficult to prove positively, since there is really no positive ground to work on; nor is it unnatural that its supporter should resort to indirect methods of verification.

#### ZENO'S DIALECTICS—OR ANTINOMIES.

But suppose we let our author speak for himself. "The

\* Whether this is a necessary kind of inference in every case, possibly admits of further consideration.

Eleatic Zeno, a subtile dialectician, has indeed been censured by Plato as a wanton sophist, because, in order to show his cleverness, he sought to demonstrate by illusive reasoning, and then again to overthrow by argument just as strong, the *same proposition*. He assumed: God (probably with him this meant nothing but the universe), is neither finite nor infinite; he is neither in motion nor at rest; he is neither like nor unlike any other thing. It seemed to those who criticised him that his object was wholly to deny two contradictory opposites; which would be absurd. But I do not find that this can be justly laid to his charge. The first of these propositions I will soon examine more closely. But as regards the rest, if he by the word *God* meant the universe, he should by all means say that this is neither fixedly present in its place (at rest), nor is changing its position (is moving); since all places are only in the universe, and consequently this itself is *in no place*. If the universe embraces in itself all that exists, then is it also in so far neither similar nor unsimilar to anything else, since out of it there is nothing with which it can be compared. If two propositions opposed to each other presuppose an inadmissible condition, both become null and void in spite of their collision, because the condition under which alone each of these propositions should be valid utterly fails.

"Suppose one should say, every body either smells agreeably, or it smells disagreeably; there is room for a third judgment, namely, that it has no smell at all, and thus both conflicting judgments may be false. If I say it (*i. e.*, every body), is either sweet-smelling, or it is not sweet-smelling, the two judgments are contradictorily opposed; and only the first is [can be] false, but its contradictory opposite, namely, some bodies are not sweet-smelling, embraces in itself, also, the bodies which have no smell. In the previous opposition (*per disparata*) the non-essential condition of the conception of body (*i. e.*, smell), remained in the antithetic judgment, and was not canceled out (or put in condition to be canceled out) by it;

consequently the latter judgment was not the contradictory opposite of the former.

"Accordingly, if I say, either the universe is, in relation to space, infinite, or it is not infinite, then, if the former proposition is false, its contradictory opposite, the universe is not infinite, must be true. Thereby, (however), I should only sublate an infinite universe without positing another, namely, the finite one. But should it be said: the universe is either infinite or finite (non-infinite), both might be false. For I then regard the universe as in itself determined as to magnitude; since even my antithesis—the universe is finite—not merely sublates its infinity (and at the same time perhaps all chance for the existence of an actual infinite), but attributes a [quantitative] determination to the universe as a thing in itself real—falsely, if the universe ought to be presented not at all as a thing-in-itself; consequently, also, not as either infinite or finite as to magnitude. Allow me to call such opposition the *dialectic*, but that of contradiction the *analytic opposition*. Thus, two dialectically opposed judgments can both be false; because one not merely contradicts the other, but says something more than is required for the contradiction.

"If one regards as contradictorily opposite the two propositions; the universe is infinite as to magnitude; the universe is finite as to magnitude, he thereby assumes that the universe (the whole series of phenomena) is a thing-in-itself. For it remains, whether I sublate the infinite or finite regression in the series of its phenomena. But in case I take away this presupposition, or this transcendental illusion, and deny that it is a thing-in-itself, the contradictory opposition of the two assumptions changes to a simply dialectic one; and now that the universe does not exist at all in itself (independently of the regressive series of my presentations), it exists neither as an in-itself infinite whole, nor as an in-itself finite one." \* \* \* \*

"The antinomy of the pure reason in the case of its cosmologic ideas is thus cleared up by showing it to be simply dialectic,

and to represent a conflict of an illusion which springs from applying to phenomena the idea of absolute totality; which idea has validity only as a condition of things-in-themselves, while phenomena exist only in the mental presentation, and, if they form a series, in the successive regression; but otherwise do not exist."

#### KANT'S INFERENCE FROM THIS REASONING.

"From this antinomy, conversely, may be drawn a truly useful lesson—critical and instructive, if not dogmatic—namely, an indirect demonstration of the transcendental ideality of phenomena—in case any one was not satisfied with the direct demonstration in the transcendental aesthetic. The proof would consist in this dilemma: If the universe is an in-itself-existing whole, it is either finite or infinite. Now the former as well as the latter of these predicates is false (as appears from the foregoing proof of the antithesis on the one hand, and of the thesis on the other).\* Therefore is it also false that the universe (the collective whole of all phenomena) is an in-itself-existing whole. Whence it follows that phenomena generally, outside of our presentations, are naught; which is what we designed to express by attributing *transcendental ideality to them*."

#### THE UNIVERSE FOUNDED ON FACT.

Caution is to be used not to misunderstand Kant as meaning by these words that the universe of objects is merely a creature of our imagination. He expressly asserts that injustice would be done him by attributing to him that style of idealism which, admitting the proper reality of space, denies, or at all events doubts, the existence of extended being in it, and so makes room for no clear distinction, on this point, between dream and reality. On the contrary, since his theory, as in effect has been before stated, allows phenomena to be *founded on fact*, he

\* This of course refers to the (here omitted), proof of the second part of the first antinomy.



makes the same distinction between real and illusory perceptions as the ordinary common-sense view does. With him it is not the thing-in-itself that lacks essential reality, but only the form of its presentation to a sensuously limited intellect.

It will hence be seen that the theses and antitheses of his antinomies are no analogues of the double roots of quadratic equations, or the double series resulting from certain cases of division. These double roots and double series, instead of calling for a sublation of space or time, often appeal to a construction in one of them for their justification.\* Something which may come nearer to being analogous with the Kantian conception of the antinomic illusion can be observed in certain freaks of perspective. All artificial perspective has this much in common with Kant's "phenomena," that it presents a fact under an illusive aspect. But it is not always so easy to make the illusion play a double part. The following case has recently come to my notice. A piece of tri-colored patchwork, formed of lozenge-shaped pieces so arranged that the same colors shall present the same way, will represent cubes, if looked at nearly perpendicularly. As these cubes will have a stair-like arrangement, one corner of each will stand out as if elevated above the average surface. If from this point a diagonal be drawn in either of three directions, it will come to a point where the lower corners of two cubes coincide with an upper corner of a third; and this will appear as a point of depression. Now, to experiment on the perspective in the case, let the eye rest on the general surface of the patchwork until it sees distinctly the cubic shapes, and then set a pin in an outstanding corner of a cube. Then, looking away a moment, or changing your own position, turn the patchwork round so that it will present a different aspect. Another look at it may find the pin standing at a depressed point (between three cubes). If one such turn does not produce this change, try another, and

\*Students of Bourdon will recall the "Problem of the Lights," as an example of this kind of justification.

so on, each time looking away for a moment to allow the previous perspective to vanish. After a little practice the change of perspective may be made without any turning of the patch-work or variation of position;\* the different views being really independent of the position of either patchwork or observer—except as the lightest-colored patches may incline to represent the side of the cube towards the light. Now the illustrative deduction is that the same point appears with equally good reason in different relations to the figures.† This result, it is plain, comes from the *illusory solidity* involved in the perspective. If once the solidity be granted—and our perspective pretty naturally takes it for granted—the one view with regard to the *point* in question is doubtless just as demonstrably correct as the other; and so we have a sort of antinomy.

In case then it be admitted that space itself is only a grand perspective principle, we might readily infer that it would most likely introduce into our views of the thing-in-itself some kind of contradictions. Still, such an inference from our example might be quite overdrawn; for the latter involves a mixture of fact and fiction (in the ordinary sense of the terms); and it is by no means certain that pure fiction needs to implicate itself in the same inconsistencies as attend such a mixture. Our patchwork possesses solid ground enough to *set a pin in*, which can at best with uncertainty be said of Kant's absolutely unknown thing-in-itself. A foundation in fact of which we know nothing is not a safe one to build on, since for aught we know,

\* The changes of perspective may be aided by looking through the hand or a small roll of paper.

† The case is that the point in question, being at the meeting of three lines in a plane, can by a little help from the suggestion of color be looked at as the vertex of a solid angle viewed either externally or internally. In other words, if to the two dimensions of an actual surface a third be mentally added, this third dimension may be projected either towards or from the eye.

At a point in our patchwork where six lines meet (or three intersect), the cubic perspective elevates three lines obliquely from this point, and in like manner depresses three; and the elevations and depressions may be interchanged.

it may at any time sink under us. On the other hand, how can we know in advance that the thing-in-itself, though it have not in its primitive constitution the least element of space or time, cannot for this reason be consistently represented in the forms of either? Again, how can we know that the thing-in-itself, though it be in the more radical sense unlimited by space and time forms, may not, nevertheless, imply both, at least in some secondary way? How, indeed, can we be certain that it may not have, *co-ordinately*, its spaceless and timeless modes of being, and its space and time modes? Once more, what assures us that space and time themselves are not the livelier modes of being for the thing-in-itself, and the so-called tangible entities the less lively? How do we know that in the space and time conceptions—which Kant sets down as purely subjective—the subjective and objective do not really meet on common ground, the true laws of expansion and succession thus becoming at once laws of our thought, and laws of existence of the thing-in-itself?\*

If caution is to be used in drawing inferences in the direction from the unknown to the known, just as much should unsafe inferences in the opposite direction be guarded against. Not every apparent contradiction in spatial analysis, for instance, is necessarily to be resolved by jumping at the conclusion that space was never meant for anything but a stage on which the great unknown could play its part to the apprehension of limited intellects. Often, as has been hinted above, the difficulty can be easily cleared up on the spot where it occurs. If the problem be to find the side of a square whose area =  $a^2$ , the answer will be either +  $a$  or —  $a$ . But if one square be constructed to the right of and above a certain point, and another be constructed to the left of and below the same point, each

\* Of course, such questions as the last two are meaningless so long as one holds to the Kantian idea of a *void* and in itself *meaningless* space. But if space be full of meaning, on what ground can we assert that it is not full of force, nay, of energetic force, unseen, to be sure, but not simply for this reason unproductive?

construction (having  $a$  for the length of side), will answer the purpose equally well; and the conflict will disappear without any appeal to an extra-spatial principle of consistency.

In this connection allow me to introduce one more illustration of the antinomy asserting the finite and infinite age of the universe. Every one knows that parallel lines—for example, those of a railway-track,—viewed longitudinally from a stand-point between or above them, appear to approach each other. In a vertical perspective delineation of horizontal parallels, the representatives of the latter will in fact meet in a point called the point of sight or vanishing point; which point, however, represents an *infinite distance*, though this is not so evident to vision. Indeed, the convergence of the lines themselves appears so rapid near the observer as to suggest that the meeting-point can not be far distant. Even making some allowance for diminution in the rate of convergence for equal lengths as the vision moves on, one would scarce hesitate to conclude that the distance to that point must at all events be finite—as the artist's drawing *seems* to make it. But if a railway be the case considered, a moment's thought will decide that the lines never will meet—even for vision—except as the intermediate space becomes angularly narrower than the *minimum visible*. Hasty, and yet for certain purposes correct enough, inference leads here to a result not sustained by critical reflection.

In this respect, it seems to the writer that the case bears a strong resemblance to Kant's view of the antinomy just adverted to. In sympathy with that same limited vision of the ancients which arched over the sky with a solid firmament beyond which no eye could penetrate, even the philosophic fantasy, if it be not wary, will find itself fixing a *ne plus ultra* to its conception without sufficient reason; and then, recovering its clearer insight, will reverse the previous judgment.

Let it not, however, be assumed that, because an effort has been made to show that Kant's *proof* of the antinomies may be defective, therefore the antinomies themselves are *necessarily*

untrue in every sense, or indeed that they are certainly incapable of proof. The chief aim of the writer has been, in accordance with the suggestion of Zeller, quoted near the outset, to examine and see whether there may be grounds for exception to Kant's showing in the case, so that his conclusions need not be accepted as a finality.

#### THE ANTINOMIES NOT MERE RELICS OF THE DEAD PAST.

An additional reason for reviving discussion of this topic lies in the fact that the questions it involves still live. In substance these questions have come down the ages. Those same contradictions, in one form or another, have long puzzled the minds of the thoughtful. Whether such contradictions are more properly to be regarded as collisions of the reason with itself, or as conflicts between sense and reason, may not be so easy to decide. Again, whether their present influence on human thought is more due to the momentum which they have brought down with them from the past, or to the really ambiguous responses of nature herself to the earnest questionings of living science, may be equally hard to determine. But either because thought has not ceased to move considerably in the old ruts, notwithstanding the many new paths, or because it continues to meet with the old obstructions, whatever its course, it has not yet found an altogether smooth passage through the cosmologic ideas. The writer of an article which has come to hand since most of the above was written, and which purports to be an attempt to solve Tyndall's problem with regard to the idea of matter, says near the opening of his discussion, "The problem of philosophy or speculative thinking is precisely to find an idea of matter that does not involve contradiction, the final solution of this fantastic knot of ideas." The "knot of ideas" has just before been described in a way to bring them partly, if not wholly, within the sphere of our special theme. Further on he remarks: "Hence, while the thinking mind analyzes the phenomenon, it must posit its [*i. e.*, matter's] being as the plainly existing unity which lies at the

foundation. And that would be conceded by all, if in this attempt at absolute comprehension thought did not involve itself in logical contradictions which seem insurmountable (cf. Kant's *Antinomies* and the contradictions shown by Hegel and Herbart in all notions of experience).”\* The references at the end of this passage furnish one among the many indications in the course of the *Essay*, that the writer does not indeed ignore familiarity with the past history of philosophy, while he grapples earnestly with the problems of the living present. Of course no one can accomplish a great deal of successful philosophizing in a single life-time, beginning absolutely *de novo*, though differing degrees of consciousness in relation to the old may attend the mental development of the new.

If there has ever been a time in the history of human thought when the utterances of science ought to show the signs of a new departure—of a looking forward to the things that are before, and a forgetting of the things that are behind—one would suppose the present to be such a time. Probably never before have so many land-marks of opinion suffered obliteration, either partial or entire, in so many minds in an equally brief period. If, however, in spite of all the apparent orbital changes in thought, the same old freaks of vacillation will frequently seize upon the movement, is this fact not to be construed as a sign of some unsolved problem broad and comprehensive in its implications? It is often unfair to pick up evidence from opposing statements from different men, or even from different utterances from the same men, in order to prove the existence of real collisions or inconsistencies. Still, perhaps, evidence of *some* value may be obtained in this way. Every one is familiar with the fact that a few years ago any book treating of matter could not be read far without a meeting with some passage to the effect that matter is, in its substance, subject neither to increase

\* See “The Idea of Matter,” by K. Th. Bayrhoffer, in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Jan. 1876. (This No. appeared several weeks after its date.)

nor diminution—that it can be changed only in form or relation, not in its quantum of reality. More recently science, having penetrated farther into the workings of the unseen forces on whose activities the phenomena of matter depend, the conservation of forces, or of energies (*i. e.*, living forces), has taken the place of interest before occupied by the conservation of matter. Now at first sight it would naturally be expected that this new form of the theme of conservation would more than ever promise, not only persistence, but perpetual youth to the universe.

But hearken to the deliverance of science: "Although in a strictly mechanical sense there is a conservation of energy, yet, as regards usefulness or fitness for living beings, the energy of the universe is in process of deterioration." \* \* \* "It will be seen that in this chapter we have regarded the universe, not as a collection of matter, but rather as an energetic agent—in fact, as a lamp. Now it has well been pointed out by Thomson, that looked at in this light, the universe is a system that had a beginning and must have an end; for a process of degradation cannot be eternal." \* \* \* "We are led to look to a beginning in which the particles of matter were in a diffuse, chaotic state, but endowed with the power of gravitation, and we are led to look to an end in which the whole universe will be one equally heated mass, and from which everything like life or motion or beauty will have utterly gone away."\*

Not getting entire satisfaction from this book, let us turn to another, whose source is unknown, but which is "attributed" in part to the same authorship as the one from which we have just quoted. Let us see if we can find the *antithesis* to this Kantian *thesis* of the first antinomy. "Thus," say the authors of '*The Unseen Universe*,' "the argument is in favor of the production of the visible universe by means of an intelligent agency residing in the invisible universe.

\* Balfour Stewart's *Conservation of Energy*, p. 153.

"But, again, let us realize the position in which we are placed by the principle of Continuity—we are led by it not only to regard the invisible universe as having existed before the present one, but the same principle drives us to acknowledge its existence in some form as a universe from all eternity. Now we can readily conceive a universe containing conditioned intelligent beings to have existed before the present; nay, to have existed for a time greater than any assignable time, which is the only way in which our thoughts can approach the eternal."

Now if this does not present an absolute contradiction of what was just quoted from the "Conservation of Energy"—and it ought not to do so, for only a few pages earlier in the book now in hand occurs an exact duplicate\* in sentiment of what we just now characterized as "this Kantian thesis"—then the apparent opposition is cleared up by the consideration that in the "thesis" we had in view only our "ephemeral" universe, while in the antithetic presentation we have a series or system of universes destined to furnish to progressive intelligence "an endless vista, reaching from eternity to eternity."

An all-pervading ether-world, the medium of light and heat waves, may be regarded—according to one form of the proposed hypothesis—as an entity a grade higher than the visible one, and may at the same time be conceived as that from which the visible has been evolved, and into which it is returning—somewhat like, to compare great things with small, the ocean of the ancients, out of which the sun rose in the morning and in which it set at evening; only that the rising and setting of the visible universe may be conceived as a gradual rather than a sudden event. In beginning to apprehend the ether-world as the grand source of our evanescent phenomenal one, are we indeed

\* "In fine, it [the visible universe], will become old and effete, no less truly than the individual—it is a glorious garment, this visible universe, but not an immortality—we must look elsewhere if we are to be clothed with immortality, as with a garment."—*The Unseen Universe*, p. 144.

getting a glimpse of Kant's thing-in-itself? Perhaps so; but we must not be too much elated as if the thing-in-itself were almost in hand, for the end of the search is not yet. The ether-world needs accounting for just as much as the visible one. We are bound to discover a super-ethereal world still more intensely invisible as the ground of the ethereal, and so on indefinitely.

If such a theory does not remove the bounds set to the regressive historic series in *our* universe by the Kantian and Stewartian "thesis," there would certainly seem to be presented a *continuation* of that series into the *antecedents* of our universe; so that thought is no longer bounded in the regression. In effect, then, the antinomy would appear to be annulled, or if not the antinomy itself, the theoretic hindrance to an unbounded regression, on which Kant's proof of "thesis" was founded. Still, as this is all mere hypothesis, we can only hope the future *may* disclose a practical solution of the difficulty.

But I would, in closing, like to ask, in what I understand to be the spirit of a recent American criticism\* on "The Unseen Universe" from which we have just now quoted, why we are obliged to divide up into separate objects of thought the various orders of existence which we have seen to be classed as universes. Why may we not as well conceive the whole as one grand system, with a continuous evolution of the more visible from the less visible, as well as a continuous return of the former to the latter—so that the whole movement should be a grand circulation, or, if you please, vibration—a state of things feebly epitomized by the changes of water, which now evanishes from sight into etheroid exaltation, and anon returning—passing rapidly or slowly through various grades of tangibility—*may* (at its icy extreme), appear in brotherhood with petrode grossness?

All this will doubtless prove in time to be an extremely crude style of speculation, but we are bound to own it as belonging to the living present.

\* See articles by John Fiske on the "Unseen World" in February and March Nos. of Atlantic Monthly.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

**HARPER'S MONTHLY FOR APRIL.** A magazine of such wide circulation and solid merit needs no special commendation. The April number is full of interest. The illustrated articles are well adapted to stir up the national spirit in this Centennial of our nation's independence. The Romance of the Hudson, by Benson J. Lossing, and Old Philadelphia, by Rebecca Harding Davis, present reminiscences of the two great States, New York and Pennsylvania. Another interesting paper on The First Century of the Republic, traces the progress made in the fine arts. Daniel Deronda, by George Eliot, is continued. The other articles are of the usual varied and interesting character. *Harper's* is the metropolitan magazine of America. It covers every department and is adapted to every variety of taste. Its illustrations are instructive to the young and entertaining to the aged. Every page is marked by solid worth. It breathes a fresh and pure spirit, and cultivates a love for nature and for the great and good of every age and every clime. The amount of instruction conveyed and the pleasure afforded by each successive number are well worth the year's subscription.

**THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY** for April presents the usual variety of interesting articles. The Carnival of Rome, Private Theatricals, and Old Woman's Gossip, are continued. Among the practical articles are, Rural Architecture, by William Flagg, and Liernur's Pneumatic System of Sewerage, by George Waring, Jr. The articles, At Lutzen and Early American Novelists, are of historical interest. Recent Literature, Art and Music, is fully up to the standard. The Atlantic Monthly moves in a somewhat different field from that of Harper's Magazine. It is published at Boston, by H. O. Houghton and Company; New York: Hurd and Houghton. Terms—Yearly subscription, \$4.00. Single number, 35 cents.

**COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT.** Intended for popular use. By Rev. D. D. Whedon, LL. D. Vol. IV. I. Corinthians; II. Timothy. New York: Nelson and Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden, 1875.

This volume is a duodecimo of 460 double-column pages, uniform with Dr. Whedon's other volumes on the Old Testament and also the New Testament. In one more volume, he says, he will finish his commentary on the New Testament.

THE WESLEYAN DEMOSTHENES: Comprising Select Sermons of Rev. Joseph Beaumont. With a sketch of his character. By Rev. J. B. Wakeley, D. D. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden, 1875.

The title is rather pretentious, we should say, judging from the book itself, unless the author meant to convey the impression that it did not require anything extraordinary to entitle a public speaker to be a Demosthenes in the Wesleyan body. The sketch of the life is interesting, though it brings out nothing beyond the order or routine in the life of many a minister. The sermons appended show a ready flow of language, an active imagination, and a rich glow of feeling. They were no doubt delivered with a good deal of natural power. But beyond this there is but little to notice. The description of the entrance of Abel into heaven, the silence of all the angels when he, the first saint, began his song of praise, is all pretty enough as a picture of the fancy; but what is the use of men attempting to picture such scenes in the other world when no revelation from God has given us any such information. The very Epistle (Hebrews), from which the text, in part, is selected, tells us, "these all died in the faith, *not having received the promise*, that they should not, apart from us, be made perfect." And yet the preacher describes heaven here just as though the work of redemption had already been accomplished, and all the scenes in it were already clearly seen by Abel. "*There is silence in heaven.* But, hark! hark! the lonely voice swells on the breeze: Unto Him" (as he points to the throne of the Redeemer), "unto Him that loved me, and washed me in His own blood, be riches, and strength, and wisdom, and blessing, and honor. Amen and amen. O, how these notes float, and swell, and echo, and reverberate through the world of light! It was the first song sung by a redeemed spirit. Hallelujah." Well, that will do as a specimen of this Demosthenes. It is always best to confine our preaching to what is revealed, to what we know, rather than indulge in fancies, and fancies, too, that set the whole order of revelation and redemption at defiance and reduce it to confusion. The older one becomes, if he is growing in wisdom, the more guardedly and earnestly will he think and speak of the spiritual world.

CHRISTIANS AND THE THEATER. By J. M. Buckley. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden, 1875.

A very sensible little book of 156 pages, and worthy of being read by every Christian, especially every Christian parent. To our mind it carries more power than any number of passionate and violent onslaughts, such as those of the Rev. Talmadge in Brooklyn. The writer first gives the position of the Roman, Greek, and Protestant

Churches in reference to the subject. He might have included the attitude of the Primitive Church with profit. Then he presents very fairly and concisely the arguments for and against the theater. This is followed by a very sensible dissertation on the nature of the Christian life and its relation to amusements. A brief description of the leading plays that have been put upon the stage in New York for the last three years, and then the argument goes on to its conclusion. We agree in the main with the author, and commend his calm, sensible, and forcible treatment of a subject which is of great practical interest to the Church in these days, especially in the cities and large towns.

**THE REVISED COMPENDIUM OF METHODISM:** Embracing the history and present condition of its various branches in all countries; with a Defense of its doctrinal, governmental, and prudential peculiarities. By Rev. James Porter, D. D. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden.

A neat volume of 500 pages, presenting a great amount of valuable information, statistics, etc., in regard to the Methodist denomination. Methodism has certainly become a historical power in modern Christianity. It is the largest denomination, numerically, or if not the largest next to the largest, in this country. In foreign countries it is small. It owes its origin to something like a revival in the English Church among some pious students at Oxford, among whom as leaders were the brothers John and Charles Wesley. At the same time there was a broader preparation for the rise of Methodism, in a negative way at least, in the general deadness of the English Church, in the spread of deism, and the inability of the established Church to overcome its opposition. This book is suited for Sunday-schools, but may be placed also in the family. It is of special interest to Methodists, but it conveys information that is important for all who desire to study the movements in modern Church history.